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EDITORS’ NOTE
American University’s Washington College of Law hosted the
Prior Informed Consent: Emergence as a Principle of
International Law, and Implementation at International,
National, and Local Levels conference on March 2, 2004 in
Washington, D.C. Practitioners and leaders of the sustainable
development community gathered to discuss the importance of
“prior informed consent.” As a publication committed to
advancing current topics in this arena, Sustainable Development
Law & Policy proudly presents articles and edited transcripts based on
the issues that arose during this conference. Disclosure of information is a
key component of prior informed consent, so it is our hope that this special
issue will inform and educate our
readers by recording the powerful
ideas raised this spring.
The basic principle of prior
informed consent is that the people
affected by a project must have a thorough understanding of the potential
implications and outcomes and then
must be empowered to freely accept or
reject the proposal. Through the
efforts of numerous leaders, policymakers, and activists who have contributed to this issue, the concept of
prior informed consent has evolved
into a tool used to address the problems inherent in a wide range of disciplines. The concept began as a component of medical research, but is now
being broadly applied to areas such as
environmental policies, access to natural resources, and the rights of
indigenous communities. Within this
issue, the authors approach the concept of prior informed consent from diverse angles. Some focus on case studies, some on
international financial institutions, the inter-American human
rights regime, or the multilateral environmental agreements.
Prior informed consent is increasingly recognized as an
essential prerequisite to development projects impacting those
who lack the political and economic weight to defend their own
self-interests. Recently the Environmental Law Institute (“ELI”)
released a report entitled Prior Informed Consent and Mining:
Promoting Sustainable Development of Local Communities.
Susan Bass, the Director of the ELI Inter-American Program,
noted that prior informed consent is about balancing specific
short term interests with a community’s long term need for survival. Given this context, this special summer issue of

Sustainable Development Law & Policy aims to broaden the discussion of prior informed consent and shed light on how this
concept exists in a variety of projects that involve indigenous
communities, human rights, the environment, and sustainable
development.
It is important to note that requiring prior informed consent
as a part of these project proposals does not necessarily guarantee
a win-win situation for all parties involved. As the contributors
to this issue emphasize, no single template fits all communities. Rather the
concept must be adapted to fit each
particular culture and each specific
project. As a result, implementation of
prior informed consent can be controversial, rousing debates on issues such
as: how should a nation’s right to
develop be balanced with preservation
of an indigenous community’s cultural
integrity? What percentage of a community must consent for the process to
be legitimate? How does a developing
organization or corporation ensure
that the affected people understand the
meaning of their consent?
Through a discussion of these and
many other difficult questions posed
within this issue, we hope to give our
readers a sense of the next steps, and
perhaps the end results, of integrating
prior informed consent into all environmental and development contexts.
Later this year, the World Bank will be
addressing its perspective on prior
informed consent, and perhaps this
will set the stage for widely publicized
use of the concept among the international financial institutions, if not among a wider range of organizations.

Prior informed
consent is
increasingly
recognized as an
essential prerequisite
to development
projects impacting
those who lack the
political and
economic weight to
defend their own
self-interests.
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SUMMARY OF OPENING REMARKS
by Daniel Magraw*
The Prior Informed Consent Conference held at American University’s Washington College of
Law began with opening remarks by Daniel Magraw, President of the Center for International
Environmental Law. Mr. Magraw began this conference by briefly addressing the origins of
“prior informed consent” (“PIC”) and raising some key questions about this concept.

I

n the realm of international law and natural resources, the
notion of “prior informed consent” is relatively undeveloped
with respect to community-based rights to land and natural
resources. “Prior informed consent” (often referred to as “PIC”),
is developed in some areas, but not this particular area. It is largely reliant on doctrines of self-determination and on nation states’
permanent sovereignty over their natural resources. PIC provides
opportunities for developing new international law that blends
the state level with the individual and/or the community level. A
brief overview of the history of PIC is worth noting.
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PIC developed in the medical area in the United States
where powerful medical groups such as hospitals, physicians,
and experimenters were making decisions for individuals without fully disclosing or alerting them to their actions. The existing power relationships at the time allowed those powerful
groups, that is the hospitals, the experimenters, and the physicians, to make the decisions about what they were going to do
with individuals. There are some horrifying examples of this in
the history of the early 20th century in this country. Out of this
time of relative little disclosure of information came the idea
that individuals should have a right to voice their concerns and
a right to elect to be part of an experiment or not, even though
the hospitals, physicians, and experimenters thought these
experiments were good for society. This idea gave the individual the right to choose not to be part of certain experiments thus
preventing the physician, hospital, and even the government
from acquiring certain data. Fifty years ago, this concept was
radical, the societal dynamics of the time were such that there
was a relationship between the powerful and informed, on the
one hand, and the less powerful and uninformed, on the other.
Today, although the PIC concept has developed quite extensively with respect to state-to-state, that is government-to-government interaction, individuals and communities should also
be involved and not overlooked. This begs the question that will
be addressed later on in this conference, should PIC be extended, under what circumstances, and in what ways? So in a way,
we are coming back to asking similar questions to those that
society confronted when discussion of PIC began.
Now let us turn to the basic facts we are dealing with on the
ground. There are clear adverse environmental and human
development trends around the world. There is a dirth of local
community voices in decision making about natural resources.
Despite economic growth in many countries, there is an increasing income and wealth disparity. We are not getting more equal
as a world. Finally, many nation states fail to aid and protect
materially impoverished constituencies. While this is part of the
reason for an increasing gap, it is not the only reason.
Let us now turn to the political parameters and context of
PIC. First of all, and these are my assertions of course, my own
views. Powerful groups are unlikely to recognize stronger rights
in weaker groups. This generalization is one that seems plausi*Daniel Magraw is the President of the Center for International Environmental Law.
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ble because governments, certainly in our country right now, are
often beholden to powerful groups, to people or institutions that
contribute to their election or to their selection. Civil society
groups, on the other hand, often have a preference for poorer
groups. So we have political conflicts in addition to legal questions surrounding the PIC concept. For example, the doctrine of
eminent domain, which is virtually universal under different
names, often clashes with local communities, particularly
indigenous people’s right to their own property, to be free from
forced displacement, and to be treated fairly in their ancestral
domains. Therefore, there is a tension between eminent
domain, on the one hand, where governments will seize property and take property rights, and with individual and community rights, on the other. As I say, these are partly political and
partly legal issues.
I am going to propose a participation principle that is actually Owen Lynch’s, a Senior Attorney at the Center for
International Environmental Law (“CIEL”) who was invited to
speak, but could not attend. He says, “every human being by
virtue of being human, not
because of the legal system but
because he or she is human,
has a right to participate in
official government decisions
that directly impact on his or
her life or livelihood.” This is a
basic public participation and
democracy
point
which
assumes that there is information. A person cannot participate in a meaningful way if he or
she does not have adequate information. The challenge today,
and more broadly of course, is to define what these words and
concepts mean.
CIEL just participated in a case in the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights where a group of 700 indigenous
people were being displaced from their ancestral lands by a dam
in Chile. We eventually settled the case on very fair and favorable grounds but a hurdle that had to be overcome was that the
indigenous people did not want to move. However, the Chilean
Government claimed that the country’s national sustainable
development depended on construction of the dam.
The dam’s catchment area would inundate the lands where
the indigenous people lived forcing the indigenous people to
move. Now, should the community have the right to say no and
stop that kind of national project? Arguably, governments are
going to be extremely reluctant to provide this type of veto, and
while that should not be determinative in terms of a discussion
on PIC, we must recognize that it is part of the political reality.
Therefore, we have come to our first question that arises out
of the PIC concept: What does “participate” mean and does it
mean veto? If it does not mean veto, what does it mean in order
to be meaningful? Does the government merely have to hold a
hearing, listen, and then make a decision? That cannot be all that
there is to “participation.” There must be something else. The

second question, which I find very interesting from a professional point of view and important from an advocacy point of
view, is how does one attain meaningful disposition if there is,
for example, an indigenous tribe? How does someone inform
indigenous people? Informing is essential to the entire PIC
process. If people do not have the right information or they do
not have complete information, they will not be able to participate meaningfully. This is a supposition on my part, a proposition. So, how can someone carry out the educational process of
providing information? Thirdly, how does one get consent, in
terms of “prior informed consent”? The “prior” piece of PIC can
be done beforehand in conjunction with education. But suppose
only 51% of a community agrees, or suppose there are rival
decision making methodologies in a particular community. The
difficulties that can emerge are clear. From all perspectives,
including those of the government and the private sector, there
are no easy answers to these questions.
The following are some other questions given to me from
Owen Lynch. Nation states have the right to information in
order to provide and to protect
information and to promote the
public interest. It is important to
protect information, a notion that
I added, because this is a problem
found in PIC situations where
governments are often simultaneously providing information to
the public, while protecting confidential business information or
even national security information. How can there be prior
informed consent if that information cannot or was not provided by the government? In this situation there may be some prior
information and there may be consent, but how truly informed
is it? This is particularly going to be a problem with the
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety because I think countries will
be extremely reluctant to provide the appropriate information to
allow the importing country to really make an informed decision. Another consideration is how to fit the indigenous and
other local peoples rights to due process and fair compensation
into the PIC notion.
One way to find answers to these questions is to ask more
questions. For example, what does “prior” mean? When must it
occur or how early does it have to be to constitute “prior”? Who
is responsible for providing information and in what format?
Are there minimum standards of information that need to be
given? What does “informed” mean? What level of knowledge
do people need to have and what kind of information? How
should information be phrased, packaged, and disseminated so
people effectively understand it? Finally, what does “consent”
mean?
Owen wanted me to leave you with this charge: any productive exploration of the PIC concept requires you to abandon all
preconceived notions you might have about prior informed consent. So remember to be open-minded, to listen, and to learn.

What does “participate”
mean and does it mean
veto?
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OVERVIEW OF PRIOR INFORMED CONSENT FROM AN
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE
by Melanie Nakagawa*

INTRODUCTION

P

rior Informed Consent ("PIC") is an important and timely
topic because it raises and melds significant issues in the
international community beyond those that involve the
protection of human health and the environment.
PIC is considered by many as both arising from and being an
extension of several United States laws, specifically the Toxic
Substances Control Act ("TSCA") of 1976. This is because
TSCA includes provisions on export notification and conditions
requiring the United States Environmental Protection Agency
("EPA") to implement specific measures to control potential
hazards associated with chemical substances or mixtures that
present or will present an unreasonable risk of injury to health or
the environment. TSCA subjects those persons or companies
seeking to export a chemical deemed hazardous by the EPA to a
notification process as part of an information sharing procedure
for the benefit of the receiving government. The exporter is
obligated to notify the EPA of its export plans prior to the actual
export. In turn, the EPA provides the importer with information
regarding their potential imports.
Another U.S. law with a PIC mechanism is the Federal law
governing the management of hazardous waste known as the
Resource Conservation Recovery Act ("RCRA"). RCRA requires
exporters of hazardous waste to give the EPA sixty days notice
prior to the planned export. The State Department, acting for the
EPA, gives notice to the receiving or importing government, at
which point the importing government must provide written
consent to the import. The EPA will provide exporters with information on the receiving government’s consent (with or without
conditions) or objections.
TSCA and RCRA are detailed examples of how the "prior"
aspect of PIC is used in practice, however, the question remains
as to how "informed" parties are and what constitutes "consent."
Consider for instance an importer attempting to bring a chemical
substance into Brazil. In Brazil, the importer of a chemical substance from the United States receives a federal register notice
and several documents about that substance. These documents
can consist of dozens or perhaps hundreds of pages of highly
technical information. At this point, it is unclear what the
Brazilian government actually does with this information, begging
the question of whether or not informed consent can be given.
This article presents an overview of the current context of
PIC by highlighting various international PIC instruments. These
include multinational agreements and their PIC provisions as well

as international examples to demonstrate PIC’s complexity in
practice. This article concludes with future PIC developments
and challenges facing the growing international community.

CURRENT CONTEXT
While the PIC notion is rooted in U.S. domestic law, it is
important to recognize that it is an evolving idea incorporating a
growing number of multilateral environmental agreements
("MEAs"). The current context of PIC includes the following
components: international trade, role of governments, economic
and technological advancements, resource constraints, and MEAs.
International trade continues to expand dramatically.
Although foreign direct investment flows dropped slightly in
2003, the amount of money that large multinational corporations
are moving from developed to developing countries far outweighs
what the public sector is investing. Put in this context, economic
activity is high as goods are continually crossing borders between
nations with the help of corporations. One key indicator demonstrating this expansion is the significant increase in the value of
goods moving internationally since the World Trade Organization
was established in 1995.
It is important to note the role of governments and the challenges they are presented with when creating international
regimes to address the rise in international trade in a growing
global environment. For example, the United Nations ("UN")
consists of 191 Member States, of which nearly two thirds were
not recognized countries when the UN was founded in the 1940s.
The diversity of resources, languages, economies, and national
priorities for all 191 countries makes global consensus on common
approaches nearly impossible.
Recent technological advancements present important cross
currents to consider when looking at PIC regimes in different
countries. These advancements range from what testing methodologies can be used to evaluate and manage potentially hazardous
chemicals to new technologies leading to an expansion of trade in
genetically modified crops. There are also differences in capacity
between governments and industries. For instance, the United
States, Australia, and Europe have a relatively high level of technical sophistication, legal capacity, and a robust regulatory regime
in comparison to developing countries. Similarly this capacity
difference can also be exemplified by the number of environmental
protection employees in the United States compared to China.
The U.S. EPA employs roughly 18,000 people while China’s State
* Melanie Nakagawa is a J.D. and M.A. (International Affairs) candidate 2005 at American University
Washington College of Law and School of International Service. This article expands on Paul E. Hagen's
presentation on "Prior Informed Consent in International Instruments: Background and Context" made at the
Prior Informed Consent: Emergence as a Principle of International Law, and Implementation at International,
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National, and Local Levels conference held at American University's Washington College of Law in Washington
D.C. on March 2, 2004. Mr. Hagen is a Principle with Beveridge & Diamond, P.C., practicing in the areas of
U.S. and international environmental law. The author wishes to thank Mr. Hagen for his invaluable guidance.

Environmental Protection Administration has approximately
2,000 employees in a country whose population is over four times
as large as that of the U.S. Another example of the imbalances
faced by many countries is their level of business expertise, the
advantage here clearly in the developed world.
Lastly, there is an expanding universe of products and materials covered by MEAs such as waste recyclables, hazardous
waste, commercial chemicals, pesticides, living modified organisms, and genetically modified crops. MEAs are significant
because they are the international instruments that implement PIC
requirements worldwide.

The current context of PIC
includes the following
components: international
trade, role of governments,
economic and technological
advancements, resource
constraints, and MEAs.
MULTILATERAL AGREEMENTS EMPLOYING PIC
A growing number of organizations and MEAs have incorporated PIC provisions. Many of these multinational agreements
establish a basic PIC framework to address specific transboundary
environmental problems or materials crossing international
borders through trade. These include:
• OECD decisions governing movements of trade in hazardous waste destined for recycling within the OECD area;
• The Convention on Biological Diversity working on an
access and benefit sharing ("ABS") regime. The current
program in place is voluntary, but there has recently been a
commitment to develop a binding legal regime;
• The Cartagena Protocol addressing trade in living modified
organisms, including crops (PIC is applied for the first time
to imports of these organisms by another country);
• The Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic
Pollutants ("POPs");
• The Rotterdam Convention requiring exporters of listed
banned or restricted chemicals and pesticides to obtain the
prior informed consent of importers before trading. The
Convention promotes the safe import of chemicals through
various forms of assistance and through ensuring that
exporters comply with the requirements to safely manage
the import and export of hazardous substances.
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The Basel Convention is discussed in greater detail in the
following section because the Convention has explicit provisions
that illustrate how PIC is applied in MEAs and how it can be
applied in future MEAs.

THE BASEL CONVENTION
The Basel Convention, with 159 signatories, came into force
over a decade ago. The Basel Convention sets up a PIC regime
for the transboundary movement of hazardous waste, addresses
which materials are deemed hazardous, and specifies the criteria
for environmentally sound management.
The Basel Convention absorbed what the U.S. law had done
several years earlier, when it implemented prior informed consent
provisions in RCRA. For example, before Country A authorizes
a shipment of hazardous waste to Country B, there must be a government-to-government dialogue where the receiving country
must give prior written consent to the import. The Basel
Convention incorporates a PIC system where consent for imports
of covered waste is required. Basel also creates a legal obligation
on both the sending and receiving government, stipulating that the
waste be managed in an environmentally sound manner.
A more recent development is the pending Basel ban amendment. This amendment prohibits a developed country, such as
Canada or Norway, from sending hazardous waste for disposal or
recycling to a developing country. However, such an extreme
measure eliminates any possibility for PIC and emphasizes the
assumption that developing countries cannot under any circumstances properly dispose of or recycle hazardous waste.
It is interesting to note the evolution of the PIC notion from a
time where there was no consent, then prior and written consent
between governments, followed by prior and written consent
upon assurance of sound environmental management, and now
toward a system where many argue that nearly two-thirds of the
governments around the world cannot be trusted to engage in a
meaningful PIC discussion, therefore they should not be allowed
to consent. This evolution means that PIC must be evaluated not
only from the perspective of government-to-individual, but also
from that between governments-to-nations. Now questions arise
over how accurate and complete prior informed consent actually
is between governments and nations.

KEY CONSIDERATIONS
Given the previous examples of PIC and the difficulties it
presents to nations, particularly those adhering to international
environmental agreements, it is important to evaluate the concept
itself more carefully in order to more fully understand the
complexities it embodies and the myriad of potential implications
it poses for governments and nations worldwide. In analyzing the
PIC concept, it is important to consider the following fundamental
components:
• What does "prior" mean? The "prior" part of PIC looks at
the activity before action. More specifically, "prior"
addresses what steps need to be taken when an import is
about to take place that could create a risk or a hazard in the
importing country.
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT LAW & POLICY

• How "informed" must a party be to provide meaningful
consent? Differences in languages as well as differences in
technical capacity can lead to problems in determining and
receiving meaningful consent. For example, the published
rules under TSCA are complex and would challenge many
U.S. lawyers who are trained to understand them. How
would this translate for developing countries whose second
or third language is English and who lack the resources to
comprehend such complex rules? Another example is the
Basel Convention that lists covered waste streams.
Sophisticated governments with sufficient resources can
run a Toxic Characteristic Leaching Procedure ("TCLP"),
which is an "analytical method that simulates sanitary landfill contaminant leaching in waste samples" and is used to
test a substance to see if it exhibits hazardous characteristics.
However, in many countries governments may need to use
a less sophisticated approach to hazardous waste identification. For example, Annex 8 of the Basel Convention
includes commonly traded materials that are generally
presumed hazardous in most instances while Annex 9 lists
generally traded materials that are not typically deemed
hazardous. These lists demonstrate a need for governments
to simplify the approaches in determining hazardous waste.
Governments also face the challenge of creating an international regime that appreciates what a sophisticated developed
country can do versus what might be acceptable to a
developing country.
• How do we secure meaningful "consent"? This idea was
addressed during discussions on the Cartegena Protocol on
Biosafety in reference to a Biosafety Clearing House.
Under the Clearing House, governments and individuals
can post technical information, risk studies, and impact
assessments on particular seeds and commodities in a central
database, which the public can access via the Internet.
While this would be an effective way to disseminate information internationally, some governments have raised
concerns that their ministries did not have computers.
• Whose consent? Another problem that arises with "consent"
is who gives "consent" in MEAs? Is it the national governments with some involvement by the subnational government? Are private parties able or required to seek consent
directly from governments? Who is engaged or consulted
at this point in the international regime is important. There
are also varying degrees of public participation and involvement among competing industries and indigenous people
and concern arises whether information is properly disseminated to the public and individual level. And a fundamental
question is whether people trust the government to get the
right answer (to get proper information and thereby be able
to give informed consent).
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An interesting case study exploring the complexities of PIC is
occurring in Chile where Goldman Sachs found that it owned a
large track of land, thousands of acres, in Tierra del Fuego. They
wish to give the biologically unique land to the Chilean people as
a national park for future generations to enjoy. While to many
foreigners this may sound wonderful, some local citizens may
have reservations about turning a large portion of their country
into a park at the behest of foreigners. Should indigenous peoples,
local fisherman, or miners in Chile have the opportunity to voice
their concerns? Should they have a veto over the project?
A similar situation is faced by native people in Alaska regarding
opening up the Alaskan Wildlife Refuge to drilling. While a
Washington, D.C. lawyer may want to keep this area as a wilderness
preserve, what choices would or should the local people make?
There is a need for caution on the part of all stakeholders as
"results-oriented thinking" can often compete with balanced
engagement, dialogue, and consent in the context of who should
be consulted and who has the authority to withhold consent.
Another issue confronting the international community in the
future is whether developed countries should take on most or all
of the obligations. There has been a tendency under many of the
MEAs to push the obligations back onto the developed countries.
There also appears to be an underlying notion that the developing
world and their governments have neither the resources nor the
capacity to engage in aspects of technical and legal enforcement.

Questions still remain
as to whether the
international community
is properly equipped to
successfully implement the
PIC concept between the
developed and developing
world.
The obligations are therefore shifted upstream to developed countries such as the United States, Norway, and Canada.
Some believe that developing countries are not in a position
to engage in a meaningful discussion on PIC due to the difficulties
in implementing these regimes. However, this notion can be
problematic when countries such as Chile and China, which have
sophisticated and robust economies, are grouped together with
countries such as Haiti. There is a need to recognize that at least
some developing countries are in a position to take on meaningful
obligations.
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A final consideration with PIC is whether we are addressing
priority risks from an environmental standpoint. The Basel
Convention is estimated to address approximately 10% of all
hazardous waste generated. Signed in 1989, the Convention’s
main objectives were to minimize the generation of hazardous
waste, reduce the transboundary movement of it, and through
greater transparency and monitoring, ensure its proper treatment

QUESTIONS TO CONSIDER

CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
With PIC now a prominent component of several binding
international accords, increasing capacity at the national level is
essential to promoting trade and protecting the environment.
However, questions still remain as to whether the international
community is properly equipped to successfully implement the
PIC concept between the developed and developing world. In
essence, simply including the PIC concept in international
accords is far different from having countries understand,
internalize, and implement them.

The following are some important questions that arise
out of PIC. While there are no clear answers to them,
these questions serve as the starting points for meaningful discussions on PIC.
• Who should the law empower?
• Should the MEAs or the different implementations of
MEAs, governments, indigenous people, both?
• Should someone get a veto?
• Are we addressing priority risks from an environmental standpoint?
• What and who are at risk? People, property, environment, biodiversity? Who is covered and who decides?
The National government?

and disposal. This was intended to be enforced through information
sharing mechanisms and the PIC system, in conjunction with the
Convention’s database, which tracks the increase in the proportion
of hazardous waste destined for recycling across borders. But
when observing these sharing and tracking mechanisms through a
trade and indigenous community’s perspective, it is unclear how
effective and transparent PIC is internationally. Moreover, the
management of hazardous waste generated and disposed of within individual countries presents enormous challenges that are not
even addressed at the international level.

OBSERVATIONS
Higher profile events, have been successful in shutting down
or reducing the degradation and harm due to activities such as
waste dumping in poor and developing countries. However not
much progress has been achieved in handling how China or Brazil
or other similar countries manage hazardous waste generated
domestically. A possible way to address this issue is to keep a
watch on the priority risks at the international level where monitoring can be difficult. Whether PIC works outside these basic
trade scenarios is still unclear but will certainly pose a challenge
in the future as these trade regimes grapple with ideas such as
access and benefit under the CBD.
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30022, prepared by Linda Schierow, available at
http://www.ncseonline.org/NLE/CRSreports/BriefingBooks/Laws/k.cfm?
&CFID=14419994&CFTOKEN=59568301 (last accessed June 20,
2004).
4 See 15 U.S.C. § 2606, TSCA § 7.
5 42 U.S.C. § 6901 et seq.
6 For more information see the Convention on Biological Diversity
homepage available at http://www.biodiv.org/doc/publications/guide.asp
(last accessed June 19, 2004).
7 For more information see the Cartegena Protocol on Biosafety homepage available at http://www.biodiv.org/biosafety/default.aspx (last
accessed June 19, 2004).
8 For more information see the Stockholm Convention on Persistent
Organic Pollutants homepage available at http://www.pops.int/ (last
accessed June 20, 2004).
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9 For more information see the Rotterdam Convention homepage available at http://www.pic.int/ (last accessed June 20, 2004).
10 For more information on the Basel Convention, see the Basel
Convention homepage available at http://www.basel.int/ (last accessed
June 20, 2004).
11 For more information on the Basel Ban Amendment see
http://www.basel.int/pub/baselban.html (last accessed June 21, 2004).
12 For more information on TCLP see EPA’s homepage on “Frequently
Asked Questions: TCLP Questions” available at http://www.epa.gov/SW846/faqs_tclp.htm (last accessed June 22, 2004).
13 Based on 1999 version of the Basel Convention, the generation of
toxic waste was around 440 million tons of which an estimated 10 percent of that waste crossed international boundaries (Jennifer Clapp,
“Seeping Through the Regulatory Cracks: The International Transfer of
Toxic Waste,” Trent International Political Economy Centre Working
Paper 01/1, pg 1, citing estimate for traded waste from Christoph Hilz,
The International Toxic Waste Trade, New York: VanNostrand Reinhold,
1992, pg 20) available at http://www.trentu.ca/tipec/clapp1.pdf (last
accessed June 21, 2004).

8

BALANCING INDIGENOUS RIGHTS AND A STATE’S
RIGHT TO DEVELOP IN LATIN AMERICA:
THE INTER-AMERICAN RIGHTS REGIME AND ILO CONVENTION 169
by David C. Baluarte*
INTRODUCTION

L

atin America is a unique continent in many respects. Its
vicious colonial history, characterized by the enslavement of indigenous peoples and the extraction of limitless wealth by occupying powers, left modern society to cope
with a legacy of oppression. However, many critics believe that
post-colonial marginalization of Native Latin Americans is
largely equivalent to the oppression attributed to the colonial
architects.1 Much of this abuse has occurred in the name of
development: expansive industrialization projects that overtake
indigenous lands and decimate cultures. However, in Latin
America, which is a patchwork of nations plagued by large populations of rural and urban poor, development is both a right and
a responsibility of all national governments.2
Many Latin American governments view the exploitation
of the continent’s natural wealth as their only escape from
poverty. Latin America sits atop the second largest petroleum
reserves in the world, and the vast Amazon is home to a variety
of other valuable resources. Petroleum is one of the most reliable revenue producers in the world, and the prevailing property rights regime gives the government complete control over
sub-surface resources, regardless of land title.3 Building dams
and roads and clearing forests is a necessary step not only in the
exploitation of petroleum, but in the exportation of products
such as timber and precious metals. Many of these projects,
however, negatively affect the environments of indigenous communities where these valuable products are found. The question
is then one of balancing indigenous rights to land and culture
with the State’s right, as representative of the national population, to develop. The notion of prior informed consent effectively captures this balance.
In Latin America, the American Convention on Human
Rights (“American Convention”) provides a coherent framework for the promotion and protection of human rights in the
continent. Over the past decade, the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights (“Inter-American Court” or “Court”) and the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (“InterAmerican Commission” or “Commission”) have used this document to develop a significant body of jurisprudence concerning the rights of indigenous communities in the Americas.4
This paper proposes using ILO Convention No. 169
Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent
Countries (“ILO 169”) as an interpretive tool to advance that
body of jurisprudence. One of the central principles of ILO
169 is the right of indigenous communities to prior informed
consent based on their participation in the formation and
9

implementation of development projects that will impact their
territories. The right to prior informed consent, however, has
yet to make its way into the Inter-American Commission and
Court’s interpretation of indigenous land rights under the
American Convention. Establishing ILO 169 as an interpretive
document in the inter-American human rights system would
create the possibility for advocates to solicit emergency protective measures from the system’s adjudicatory bodies when
governments fail to respect the right of indigenous peoples to
prior informed consent.
The first section of this paper articulates the content of the
indigenous land right under ILO 169. It provides specific cases
in which the ILO Committee of Experts (“ILO Committee” or
“Committee”) has found Latin American governments in violation of ILO 169 and explains the importance of applying ILO
169 principles to the process of Latin American development.
The second section provides the basis for using ILO 169 to
interpret the indigenous right to land under the American
Convention. It outlines the jurisprudence from the InterAmerican Commission and Court relating to indigenous rights
and explains how the notion of prior informed consent can be
imported into the American rights regime. Finally, the last section proposes that activists solicit precautionary and provisional
measures from the Inter-American Commission and Court to
protect the right of indigenous peoples to prior informed consent. These emergency measures could provide a means to
address potential abuses of indigenous land rights by ordering
governments to comply with their international obligations
before damage becomes irreparable.

THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK PROVIDED BY ILO 169
ILO 169 was adopted during the International Labour
Conference in 1989, and it entered into force two years later,
updating ILO Convention No. 107, adopted 30 years earlier.5
The first part of ILO 169, entitled “General Policy,” is composed of twelve articles that govern the six subsequent parts of
the convention, each of which discusses a substantive area of
rights.6 The first substantive right discussed, the right to land,
is the focus of this analysis. That part includes seven articles
that, when read together with the first twelve, articulate an elaborate framework of a state’s responsibilities when it plans to
carry out development projects that will affect indigenous
lands. Allegations of violations of those provisions are heard by
the ILO Committee.
*David C. Baluarte is a J.D. candidate 2005, at American University,
Washington College of Law.
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PRIOR INFORMED CONSENT
The notion of prior informed consent pervades ILO 169,
but the idea can be found specifically articulated in Articles 6
and 7, commonly considered the central principles of the convention.7 Article 6 requires states party to ILO 169 to consult
indigenous peoples through appropriate procedures whenever
administrative or legislative measures are being considered that
will affect them directly, to aid in the development of institutions for that purpose, and to carry out consultations in good
faith. It further requires states to establish means by which
indigenous peoples can participate freely and meaningfully at
all levels of government decision-making and policy formation
that concern them. Though there is no requirement that the state
and the indigenous communities reach a consensus, full participation is imperative.8 Article 7 bestows on indigenous peoples
the right to determine and pursue their own priorities in their
process of development and to exercise control over their own
social, economic, and cultural development. Further, that article

Many Latin American
governments view the
exploitation of the
continent’s natural wealth
as their only escape from
poverty.
expressly grants indigenous peoples the right to “participate in
the formulation, implementation and evaluation of plans and
programs for national and regional development which may
affect them directly.”9 These two articles, read together, reflect
the spirit of prior informed consent, and apply to each provision
of ILO 169 that follows.

DEMARCATION OF LANDS
In 1996, the Union of Huichol Indigenous Communities of
Jalisco (“Union”) submitted a claim against Mexico through the
National Trade Union of Education Workers to the ILO
Committee alleging violations of ILO 169. In that case, indigenous communities represented by the Union alleged that the
government had illegally adjudicated 22,000 hectares of historic
land to mixed (mestizo) agrarian communities in the 1960s.10
This case was brought under Article 13, which calls on governments
to respect the cultural and spiritual relationship of indigenous
groups to their land, and Article 14, which requires governments
to demarcate indigenous lands and create procedures by which
land claims can be resolved.11 The Committee analyzed these
alleged violations in the context of Article 2, namely that
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governments: (1) will have the responsibility for developing,
with the participation of the peoples concerned, coordinated and
systematic action to ensure indigenous people are not discriminated
against under national laws; (2) will promote the economic,
social, and cultural rights of those people; and (3) will assist in
closing any socio-economic gaps that exist between the indigenous
peoples and the rest of the national population.12
In finding that Mexico had violated ILO 169, the Committee
highlighted two fundamental principles of the convention. The
first is embodied in Article 4, which directs governments to adopt
special measures as appropriate for safeguarding the persons,
institutions, property, labor, cultures, and environment of the
people affected by any project. The second was Article 6 and the
requirement of a good faith consultation when an administrative
measure could directly affect them.13 These are some of the most
prevalent issues in indigenous rights.

NATURAL RESOURCES
As mentioned above, indigenous land rights are extremely
relevant in the context of petroleum exploration. Perhaps one of
the saddest catastrophes relating to the exploitation of Latin
American petroleum reserves occurred in Ecuador, where
Texaco, in the late 1960s, dumped 4.3 million gallons of toxic
waste into the rainforest and created 627 open-air toxic waste
pits that have negatively affected approximately 80 indigenous
communities in the Amazon region.14 It was in that historical
context that the Committee evaluated a claim by the Ecuadorian
Confederation of Free Trade Union Organizations (“CEOSL”)
against Ecuador in 2000. CEOSL alleged that the government
entered into a share agreement with the company Arco Oriente,
Inc. for the exploration of hydrocarbons in a region where 70
percent of the territory of the Independent Federation of the
Shuar People is located. According to CEOSL, the government
had entered into this agreement without consulting the Shuar,
and therefore had violated Article 15 of ILO 169, among others.15
Article 15(1) provides that the rights of indigenous peoples
to their natural resources should be “specially safeguarded.”
This includes the right of these peoples to “participate in the use,
management and conservation of these resources.” Article 15(2)
makes specific reference to petroleum as state patrimony, as is
the case throughout Latin America, but reiterates the need for
governments to create and maintain procedures for consultation
and means of ascertaining whether and to what extent the interests of the indigenous populations would be prejudiced by the
exercise of these sub-surface rights.
Despite the requirements of Article 15, the Ecuadorian government stated that it did not believe consultations to be an
appropriate part of granting share agreements for activities
involving petroleum exploration and exploitation.16 In responding to this, the Committee stressed that it was fully aware of the
difficulties relating to land rights and the exploration of sub-surface resources, “particularly when differing interests and points
of view are at stake such as the economic and development
interests represented by the hydrocarbon deposits and the cultural, spiritual, social, and economic interests of the indigenous
peoples situated in the zones where those deposits are situated.”
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However, the Committee continued to stress that consultation
and participation were the very essence of ILO 169, and that
parties were required to “establish a dialogue allowing them to
find appropriate solutions in an atmosphere of mutual respect
and full participation.”17 This framework is particularly significant due to the prevalence of petroleum exploration and the
severity of the damage that can result.

REMOVAL AND RELOCATION
Occasionally, due to the scale of a development project,
state authorities may need to temporarily or permanently
remove indigenous peoples from their lands. Article 16 of ILO
169 governs the necessity and legitimacy of such procedures.
The interpretation of this article was raised before the
Committee in 1999 when it evaluated a claim by the Central
Unitary Workers’ Union (“CUT”) and the Colombian Medical
Trade Union Association (“ASMEDAS”) against Colombia.18
The primary complaint in this case concerned the failure of the
Colombian government to adequately consult the Embira Katíu
community before building a dam which flooded their historic
lands. In finding that the State had violated its obligation to consult the community under Article 6 of ILO 169, the Committee
had cause to discuss the relocation of families whose land was
flooded due to the construction
of the dam.
Article 16 of ILO 169 provides that peoples shall only be
removed from their lands as an
exceptional measure. There are
also several explicit requirements: 1) the government must
obtain consent when removal is
necessary, or establish procedures governed by national laws
when consent cannot be
obtained; 2) peoples must
always be returned to their
lands, or given functionally
equivalent lands or monetary
compensation when return is
not possible; and 3) relocated peoples should be fully compensated for any resulting loss or injury.
In the case against Colombia, the Committee appeared to
approve of the government’s efforts to fix a food and transportation subsidy, which the owners of the project would pay to
each of the affected members of the indigenous community for
the next 15 years. The Committee emphasized the importance of
ensuring the physical and cultural survival of the Embera Katío
people while they adapted their customs to the new circumstances, weathered the inevitable political and economic
changes caused by the relocation, and educated the next generation about its culture so that it would survive in the medium
term.19 The Committee also noted with approval that the government, together with indigenous representatives, had produced written agreements that granted additional land to the
Embera Katío people and made provision for other compensa-

tory measures.20 The Committee’s sanctioning of these measures gives a concrete example of what compliance with the
requirements under Article 16 might actually look like.

TRANSFER OF LAND
Another important aspect of indigenous land rights included
in ILO 169 is the transfer of those rights among members of the
peoples concerned. Article 17 requires consultation whenever
there is a proposed change in the legal recognition of a peoples’
right to alienate or transfer land rights. The Committee had
cause to interpret the parameters of this right in 1997, when the
General Confederation of Workers in Peru (“CGTP”) alleged
that Peru had violated ILO 169 when the Congress of the
Republic passed Act No. 26845 (“Act”), which changed indigenous
lands from communal to individual title based on its determination
that the latter regime was more productive.21
In finding that the Peruvian government had violated ILO
169 with the passage of the Act, the Committee held that it was
not for the government to decide whether communal or individual ownership is most appropriate for an indigenous group.
Though Article 17 does create the possibility for governments to
make decisions about the rights of indigenous peoples to alienate their lands, those decision-making processes must conform
with the consultation requirements found in Articles 6 and 7
of the Convention.22

. . . indigenous property
rights are precarious, and
causing irreparable
damage to property can
cause “irreparable damage
to persons.”
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PENALTIES & NATIONAL
PROGRAMS

The last two articles in the
land rights part of ILO 169 are
Articles 18 and 19. Article 18,
rarely invoked before the
Committee, is the punitive
corollary to the remedial regime
created both implicitly and
explicitly by the five preceding
articles. It requires governments
to establish adequate penalties
for unauthorized intrusion on or
use of indigenous lands. It is not clear whether allegations of
violations of this Article are rare because States have generally
complied, or because States are often implicated and simply do
not have the capacity to punish themselves. Finally, Article 19
calls on governments to establish national agrarian programs
where the needs of growing indigenous groups are taken into
consideration. This includes the provision of more land when
the land holding cannot sustain them and their normal activities
and the provision of means required to develop the lands they
already possess.
The indigenous right to land found in Part Two of ILO 169
offers a significantly more complete articulation of that right
than any international instrument currently in effect in the
Americas. At this point, this paper has established the content of
the indigenous land right under ILO 169 as interpreted by the
ILO Committee. What follows is an explanation of how that
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT LAW & POLICY

jurisprudence could be used in the inter-American human rights
system to help further the rights of Latin American indigenous
populations.

USING ILO 169 IN THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM
In its Advisory Opinion 10/89, the Inter-American Court
discussed the interpretation of the American Declaration on
the Rights and Duties of Man (“American Declaration”)
through the American Convention. There, the Court held that
the American law of human rights “must be interpreted and
applied within the overall framework of the juridical system in
force at the time of the interpretation,” which naturally
includes international treaties.23

THE RIGHT TO PROPERTY UNDER THE AMERICAN
CONVENTION
Article 21(1) of the American Convention states that
“[e]veryone has the right to the use and enjoyment of his property,” but that “[t]he law may subordinate such use and enjoyment to the social interest.” In Awas Tingni v. Nicaragua, the
Inter-American Court interpreted Article 21 to protect indigenous land rights and ordered Nicaragua to legislate a procedure
for the demarcation and titling of indigenous lands.24 This monumental decision, however, did not go so far as to clarify the
extent of the indigenous right to property. Indeed, the claim
arose out of a timber concession that the Nicaraguan state had
awarded to a corporation through an administrative process.25
At no point did the Court rule on the legitimacy of that administrative process, though it is clear that the lands, once demarcated, would most likely encompass the concession. The Court’s
express denial of any reparations beyond the order to demarcate
the community’s lands leaves the question of where the line is
drawn between the indigenous right to land and the State’s right
to develop.26

USE OF “OTHER TREATIES”
Though OAS Member States have long argued against the
applicability of treaties that do not explicitly confer power on
the adjudicatory bodies of the inter-American system,27 the
interpretive power of such “other treaties” is widely accepted.
In its Advisory Opinion 1/82, the Inter-American Court
held that the Inter-American Commission “properly invoked
other treaties concerning the protection of human rights in the
American states, regardless of their bilateral or multilateral
character, or whether they have been adopted within the framework or under the auspices of the inter-American system.”28 It
is conceivable that the Court, in approving of the Commission’s
application of other treaties, authorized its own use of the full
body of international law when interpreting rights guaranteed
under the American Convention. Indeed, the Court has consistently done so in deciding contentious cases.
In Baena Ricardo et. al., the Court, in its discussion of the
alleged violation of Article 16 (freedom of association) of the
American Convention, made reference to the ILO Constitution,
ILO Convention No. 87 Concerning Freedom of Association
and Protection of the Right to Organise, and ILO Convention
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No. 98 Concerning the Application of the Principles of the Right
to Organise and Bargain Collectively.29 The Court also cited the
reasoning of the ILO Committee, seemingly opening the door to
the interpretive power of such jurisprudence.30 These examples
are not unique, but they effectively show the extent to which the
Inter-American Court will rely on “other treaties” and the decisions of the bodies that monitor those treaties as persuasive
interpretations of rights protected by the American Convention.

USING ILO 169 TO INTERPRET THE AMERICAN
CONVENTION
Although the Court itself has never used ILO 169 as an
interpretive tool, in its reparations decision in Aloeboetoe et. al.,
it briefly made reference to ILO 169, saying that Suriname was
not party to the convention. This language seems to imply that
the Court would have considered ILO 169 in its decision if
Suriname had been party to the convention.31 One can speculate, based on the Court’s treatment of “other treaties” and the
language in Aloeboetoe et. al. that it would be receptive to an
argument using provisions from ILO 169 to interpret the
American Convention.
Activities of the Inter-American Commission lend credence
to this supposition. The Commission used ILO 169 to interpret
the right to property guaranteed under the American Declaration
in its merits decision in Mary and Carrie Dann, a case concerning Western Shoshone land claims in the United States. In that
case, the Commission spoke of a set of general international
legal principles applicable in the context of indigenous human
rights. The Commission drew heavily from ILO 169, specifically Articles 13, 14, and 15, in articulating those principles which
include the right of indigenous groups to exercise legal ownership over the lands they have traditionally occupied, in the manner in which they have traditionally occupied them, and that
such title can only change through mutual consent and with due
compensation.32 This is significant due to both the
Commission’s use of “other treaties” to interpret the American
Declaration and because the United States, while bound by the
American Declaration, is not a signatory of ILO 169.
The Commission spoke specifically about ILO 169 in its
Second Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Peru. After
reiterating the principle that “international human rights instruments of both the inter-American and universal systems contain
provisions relevant to the analysis of the situation of indigenous
communities,”33 the Commission goes on to say that,
“[t]he most relevant international instrument is ILO
Convention 169 on indigenous and tribal peoples, ratified by Peru on February 2, 1994. That Convention
establishes obligations to consult and include the participation of indigenous peoples in respect of matters that
affect them…On ratifying this instrument, the Peruvian
State undertook to take special measures to guarantee
the indigenous peoples of Peru the effective enjoyment
of human rights and fundamental freedoms, without
restrictions, and to make efforts to improve living conditions, participation, and development in the context of
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respect for their cultural and religious values.”34
Peru, with 9.3 million indigenous people (47 percent of the
national population), is not the only country in Latin America to
ratify ILO 169. In fact, Latin America is the region that boasts
the most ratifications of this relatively new convention. Bolivia,
71 percent indigenous, ratified in 1992; Guatemala, 66 percent
indigenous, ratified ILO 169 in 1996 after integrating many of
its principles in that country’s 1995 Agreement on the Identity
and Rights of Indigenous Communities; Ecuador, 43 percent
indigenous, ratified in 1998; Honduras, 15 percent indigenous,
ratified in 1995; Mexico, 14 percent indigenous, ratified ILO
169 in 1990 and subsequently integrated many of its principles
into the 1996 peace accords with the Zapatistas (Acuerdo de San
Andrés Larraínzar); Paraguay, 3 percent indigenous, ratified in
1993; Colombia, 2 percent indigenous, ratified in 1991; Costa
Rica, 1 percent indigenous, ratified in 1993; and Argentina, 1
percent indigenous, ratified in 2000.35
It is therefore likely that the Inter-American Commission
and Court have both the power and the inclination to use ILO
169 to interpret the American Convention and treat the decisions
of the ILO Committee of Experts as instructive in doing so. It is
also apparent from the above mentioned statistics on populations and ratification that Latin American governments recognize the importance of ILO 169 as a tool to govern their relationships with the indigenous populations that live within their
borders. It is now important to look at specific mechanisms
within the inter-American system that advocates can utilize to
promote indigenous rights by compelling governments to take
their responsibilities seriously.

PRECAUTIONARY AND PROVISIONAL MEASURES
Article 25(1) of the Inter-American Commission’s Rules of
Procedure provides that “[i]n serious and urgent cases, and
whenever necessary according to the information available, the
Commission may, on its own initiative or at the request of a
party, request that the State concerned adopt precautionary
measures to prevent irreparable harm to persons.”36 Similarly,
Article 25(1) of the Inter-American Court’s Rules of Procedure,
echoing Article 63(2) of the American Convention, provides
that “[a]t any stage of the proceedings involving cases of
extreme gravity and urgency, and when necessary to avoid
irreparable damage to persons, the Court may, at the request of
a party or on its own motion, order such provisional measures as
it deems pertinent…” Article 25(2) continues “[w]ith respect to
matters not yet submitted to it, the Court may act at the request
of the Commission.”37
Both precautionary and provisional measures offer a way for
parties to call on the authority of the inter-American bodies and
shed light on government activity that is violative or potentially
violative of the guarantees provided by the American
Convention. Often times, the diplomatic pressure that accompanies such measures or the simple reminder that the international
community sits in judgment of a government’s actions can be
enough to alter State activities to the benefit of the citizenry.
In September 6, 2002, the Inter-American Court ordered
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provisional measures for the Awas Tingni community, approximately one year after issuing its decision in that case (discussed
above). In July 2002, the community filed a brief with the Court
alleging that, contrary to the Court’s explicit order, the
Nicaraguan government was not preventing third parties from
causing detriment to the community’s property and thus hindering the process of demarcation and titling.38 As a result, the
Court ordered the Nicaraguan government to adopt measures to
protect the community’s land, particularly from irreparable
damage, and ordered the State to allow representatives from the
community to help in the planning and implementation of those
measures.39 Similar to the important precedent that the Awas
Tingni decision set, this award of provisional measures represents the Court’s understanding that indigenous property rights
are precarious, and that causing irreparable damage to property
in that context can cause “irreparable damage to persons.”
In May 2003, the Inter-American Commission awarded
precautionary measures to members of the Sarayaku indigenous
community in Ecuador. These measures were originally awarded because community members who opposed the presence of
petroleum companies in the area were being threatened and
assaulted. In October 2003, the community once again requested a hearing due to the Ecuadorian Government’s failure to
comply with the original order.40 In that hearing, counsel for the
community highlighted Article 84 of the Ecuadorian
Constitution, which articulates the responsibility of the state to
consult with indigenous communities about the exploitation of
non-renewable resources located in their traditional territories.
Counsel for the Sarayaku emphasized that the rights of the community included the right to participate in the government decision to award contracts for petroleum exploration and exploitation so as to attempt to prevent their own exposure to oil activities. The Inter-American Commission extended the precautionary measures for an additional six months at the hearing.
It is important to note that the argument made by counsel
for the Sarayaku community is analogous to the argument under
ILO 169 suggested by this paper. The single difference is that
the measures awarded were awarded primarily on the basis of
the threats to the physical integrity of the community members.
The goal is to have measures awarded on the sole basis of a failure to consult indigenous peoples at the initiation of a development project that will affect their environment. It would appear
from the decisions cited throughout this paper that the
Commission and the Court are prepared to award measures on
this basis. Bringing the authority of the inter-American adjudicatory bodies to bear would provide another important outlet for
the efforts of indigenous rights advocates, already very active on
the domestic level.

CONCLUSION: DEMANDING A SEAT AT THE TABLE
As Latin American governments struggle with the question
of development, simultaneously struggling with internal strife
and the notes for overwhelming debts held by foreign lenders,
they must constantly be reminded that some casualties are unacceptable. Prior informed consent represents the balancing of
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indigenous rights to land and culture and the state’s right to
develop. This solution should be promoted on all levels of civil
and political society.
As mentioned above, environmental and indigenous rights
activists are already very active on the local level promoting
positive legislation and urging governments to consult and
negotiate with indigenous peoples. Currently, the UN and the
OAS are drafting declarations on the rights of indigenous peoples. These declarations once adopted and opened for ratification, will provide additional international legal sources for the
articulation of the rights and responsibilities implicated by prior
informed consent. However, this problem cannot wait for the
slow process of treaty negotiations. This is a problem of an
urgent nature because destructive development projects cause
irreversible damage to indigenous communities. This is the concern with resorting solely to the ILO Committee to resolve
issues involving prior informed consent. A lengthy petitioning
process simply takes too long. Similarly, this is not the type of
problem that can endure the admissibility and merits phase of
the Inter-American Commission, only to reach the Court years
after filing the original petition. Indeed, it was in anticipation of
immediate threats to fundamental rights like those that implicate
prior informed consent that precautionary and provisional measures were created.
Consulting indigenous peoples before and during the
implementation of development projects is essential to promote
and protect indigenous rights within a workable model of sustainable development. By using ILO 169 as a basis for soliciting
precautionary and provisional measures in the inter-American
human rights system, advocates can educate the international
community about their oppression, help articulate indigenous
rights under the law, inform governments of their responsibilities to indigenous communities, shame governments that do not
respect those rights, and pressure those governments to live up
to their responsibilities.
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INDIGENOUS PEOPLES’ FREE PRIOR AND
INFORMED CONSENT IN THE INTER-AMERICAN
HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM
by Alex Page*
INTRODUCTION

I

n a series of recent opinions, the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights and the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights have emphatically affirmed the internationally-protected rights of indigenous peoples to their traditional
lands and resources and have called upon the states of the hemisphere to uphold their obligations to protect those rights in
domestic law and practice. In so doing, the Court and
Commission have acknowledged the interrelationship between
indigenous land tenure, culture, and self-determination. As an
incident of their rights protected by the American Convention on
Human Rights and the American Declaration on the Rights and
Duties of Man, the Court and Commission have found that
indigenous peoples have the right to give or withhold their free,
prior informed consent to activities affecting their lands and territories. This right attaches whether or not domestic law protects
property or self-determination rights of indigenous peoples.1
In the jurisprudence of the Inter-American Human Rights
system, the conceptual underpinnings for indigenous peoples’
right to free prior informed consent (“FPIC”) lie in the right to
property, on one hand, and rights to self-determination and culture, on the other. This understanding of the two distinct bases
for FPIC is shared by international experts and adjudicatory
bodies outside of the hemisphere2 but perhaps most clearly
explicated in Inter-American jurisprudence. The three leading
cases discussed below articulate this right of indigenous peoples
and illustrate its roots in rights to property, to self-determination, and culture.

COMMUNITY OF AWAS TINGNI V. NICARAGUA
In the early 1990s, the Nicaraguan government granted
licenses (or “concessions”) to a multinational corporation to log on
the traditional lands of the Mayagna Community of Awas Tingni.3
Community members first learned of these concessions when they
awoke one day to find loggers encroaching on their territories. The
logging resulted not only in severe damage to the natural environment, but also in a wide range of social problems related to the
uninvited presence of outsiders and harm to communal resources.
Ultimately, the concessions raised the threat of serious violence
and damage to the community’s cultural integrity.4
At the time of granting logging concessions, Nicaraguan
law provided that indigenous communities located on the
Atlantic Coast were to have some regional autonomy and protection for their land rights.5 This law was not enforced, however, and provided no practical protection to the Awas Tingi
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community against the incursion of multinational resource
extraction interests. With the help of a group of environmental
experts and indigenous rights lawyers, the Awas Tingi community filed a challenge to these incursions on its lands in the
domestic courts of Nicaragua.
When the Nicaraguan courts failed to provide any relief, the
Community filed a petition in the Inter-American Commission
seeking a ruling that Nicaragua’s actions violated the American
Convention on Human Rights, to which Nicaragua is a party.6
The Commission agreed with the Community and took the case
to the Inter-American Court on Human Rights, which issued a
preliminary finding based on Article XXI of the American
Convention on Human Rights, which provides a general protection for the human right to property and protects the rights of
indigenous communities to their traditionally occupied lands
and territories. By issuing concessions without the consent of
the Community, the Court found Nicaragua had violated this
right to property.7
In its final ruling, the Court reaffirmed the principle that
indigenous peoples have rights to their traditionally used and
occupied territory, and that these rights arise autonomously under
international law.8 Without using the word consent, the Court held
that the Community’s right to its own property prevent the
Nicaraguan Government from unilaterally exploiting community
natural resources. To fulfill its obligations under the American
Convention, the Commission found that Nicaragua was required
to “officially delimit, demarcate, and title the lands belonging to
the Awas Tingni Community within a maximum period of 15
months, with the full participation of, and considering the customary law, values, usage, and customs of, the Community.”9
The role of culture was particularly important to the court,
which noted that “[f]or indigenous communities, the relationship with the land is not merely one of possession and production, but also a material and spiritual element that they should
fully enjoy, as well as a means through which to preserve their
cultural heritage and pass it on to further generations.”10 The
Court’s conclusion that demarcation could proceed only with
the participation of the Awas Tingni community and in accordance with the Community’s customary law, values, and practices also indicates the central role played in its decision by the
principle of self-determination. Under the Court’s interpretation,
*Alex Page is an attorney with the Indian Law Resource Center in Washington,
D.C., a non-profit law organization that has represented the Community of Awas
Tingni, the Maya Communities of Southern Belize, and the Dann Band of
Western Shoshone, among other indigenous peoples.
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the American Convention on Human Rights protects indigenous
communities’ rights to property such that the right of each community to govern itself and to collectively organize its landholding is also protected.
The dual concepts of collective rights and self-determination for indigenous peoples are essential in understanding how
FPIC may be properly implemented. Because the community as
a whole must decide how it is governed, consent must also come
from the community as a whole. The Awas Tingni court found
that whether a community granted its consent can only be determined by considering and respecting the customary law and
practices of the community.

MARY AND CARRIE DANN V. UNITED STATES
In 1993, two leaders of a Western Shoshone band filed a
petition in the Inter-American Commission against the United
States. Their recourse to the inter-American human rights system followed decades of struggle on the ground and in the
Federal courts of the United States.
Western Shoshone, or “Newe” people, used and occupied a
vast area of the American West for many years prior to
European colonization. During this time, Western Shoshone
society developed a decentralized structure. Small family
groups occupied large areas of
rugged, arid land, and came
together periodically to make
decisions for the greater
Western Shoshone community.
In 1863, the federal government
signed a treaty with the Western
Shoshone confirming their
rights to the land they had traditionally used and occupied.11
Despite the treaty, non-Indians
subsequently moved on to portions of Western Shoshone
lands, and the government took
no action to stop them. Indeed,
many of these incursions were
by the government itself.
While the Dann band fought successfully to prevent
encroachment on the lands it traditionally used and occupied,
the greater Western Shoshone resistance could not stop all incursions onto Western Shoshone lands. Efforts to challenge nonIndian intrusions under law were unsuccessful, in large part
because the federal courts of the United States did not generally recognize Indian tribes’ right to bring lawsuits. In 1946, under
pressure to address the rapidly declining health and welfare of
Indian communities within its borders, the United States established a quasi-judicial administrative body, the Indian Claims
Commission (“ICC”), to provide financial relief to Indian tribes
and nations whose lands and territories had been taken.12
Although many tribes and nations were led to believe that ICC
would provide a forum in which to vindicate their continuing
land rights, the ICC was authorized only to issue money judg-

ments. While the ICC had no authority to confirm or return land
to tribes, it did have the power to discharge the legal obligations
of the United States to Indian nations and thereby to extinguish
title as a practical matter, stripping land from Indian nations and
preventing further recourse against the federal government.
Indian nations seeking redress in the ICC were not allowed to
argue that their land rights should be maintained and protected,
but instead could get relief only if they conceded that their land
rights had been extinguished.13
In 1951 a small group of leaders from the Te-moak Band of
the Western Shoshone filed a case in the Claims Commission.14
Early in the proceedings, other Western Shoshone, including the
Danns, attempted to intervene in order to remove their traditional treaty-protected lands from the claim.15 The ICC rejected
the intervention.16
In order to be eligible for a money judgment, lawyers for
the Te-moak Band stipulated that Western Shoshone land rights
had been extinguished as of 1872.17 The Te-moak Band subsequently informed the ICC that they had fired their lawyers and
sought to revise their pleadings to clarify that title to their lands
had never been extinguished.
At the same time, the Dann Band of Western Shoshone faced
an increasing challenge by the federal government to their longstanding traditional use of lands
protected by the 1863 Treaty. In
1974, the United States sued the
Danns for trespass, claiming that
despite the fact that the 1863
Treaty confirmed Western
Shoshone rights to the land at
issue, subsequent encroachment
by non-Indian settlers made
those rights meaningless.18
The Danns insisted that the
United States had no rights to
their traditional lands and that
its efforts to establish those
rights were unlawful.19 As this
legal battle proceeded, the ICC
issued a ruling in the case before
it. The ICC rejected the Te-moak Band’s efforts to suspend the
litigation and ignored its decision to terminate representation by
its lawyers.20 The ICC held, based on the stipulation made by
Te-moak’s lawyers, that Western Shoshone land rights had been
extinguished and that compensation would be paid.21
Thus, as the Dann Band fought the federal trespass action
against them in federal district court, they faced an adverse
judgment on the case litigated in the ICC without their permission or participation and without the approval of any Western
Shoshone community. Based on the ICC judgment, the United
States Supreme Court later ruled in the Dann’s trespass action –
without deciding whether the Treaty of Ruby Valley continued
to protect the Western Shoshone lands at issue – that the Danns
were prohibited from asserting their land rights against the
United States.22 Despite the Western Shoshones’ refusal to

The dual concepts of
collective rights and selfdetermination for
indigenous peoples are
essential in understanding
how FPIC may be
properly implemented.
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accept the ICC money award23 and despite the fact that the
question of extinguishment was never actually litigated in the
ICC, the Supreme Court’s decision thus left the Western
Shoshone with no judicially confirmed land rights and no apparent means of further recourse to secure those rights.
With no recourse available to them in the federal courts, in
1993 the Danns took their case to the Inter-American Commission
on Human Rights. There, they invoked the same international legal
rights later established in the Awas Tingi case, including the right
to equality, the right to property, and the right to judicial protection.
Because the United States is not a party to the American
Convention on Human Rights, the Danns based their arguments on
the American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man, which
applies to all states in the hemisphere and articulates state obligations vis-a-vis these rights. The Danns argued that the US had violated their rights and had failed to uphold the obligations expressed
in the American Declaration by failing to provide a forum for the
proper adjudication of their land rights.
The Commission agreed, finding that the processes
employed by the United States to adjudicate Western Shoshone
land rights “were not sufficient to comply with contemporary
international human rights norms, principles and standards that
govern the determination of indigenous property interests.”24
The Commission examined these norms, principles, and
standards in the context of “evolving rules and principles of
human rights law in the Americas and in the international community more broadly, as reflected in treaties, custom and other
sources of international law” related to indigenous peoples.25
These norms, the Commission found, required “consideration of
[indigenous peoples’] particular historical, cultural, social, and
economic situation and experience” and special attention to the
“connection between communities of indigenous peoples and
the lands and resources that they have traditionally occupied and
used, the preservation of which is fundamental to the effective
realization of the human rights of indigenous peoples more generally and therefore warrants special measures of protection.”26
Looking to the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Racial Discrimination, the International Labour
Organisation’s Convention No. 169, and the Draft American
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, the
Commission found these general international legal principles
applicable in the context of indigenous human rights to include
state “recognition...of the permanent and inalienable title of
indigenous peoples” and the right “to have such title changed
only by mutual consent between the state and respective indigenous peoples when they have full knowledge and appreciation
of the nature or attributes of such property.”27
The Commission also found that the American Declaration
provisions on fair trial and property require that any determination of indigenous land rights be based on the fully informed
consent of the whole community, meaning that all members
must be fully and accurately informed and have the chance to
participate.28 In the Dann band’s case, the Commission found,
there was no consultation with the community, and no mandate
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from the Western Shoshone for the actions taken in the ICC that
resulted in what the Commission called “the ICC’s finding that
the entirety of the Western Shoshone interest in their ancestral
lands...was extinguished at some point in the past.”29
The Dann ruling demonstrates the challenges attendant to
the implementation of indigenous peoples’ right to FPIC in even
those national systems with complex and relatively sophisticated legal structures. Despite the legitimate reputation of the
United States judicial system as a leading example of strong rule
of law, the Commission found the flaws in the United States system for resolving indigenous land rights to be so egregious that
they constituted human rights violations.
Efforts to implement FPIC for indigenous peoples must
therefore take account of not only developing countries, where
rule of law is often weak, but also countries in which legal
frameworks protecting basic rights to equality and access to the
courts are usually strong. Even in such countries, the Dann case
makes clear, indigenous people may by law be treated in ways
that violate their human rights.
The Commission’s Dann ruling also suggests that a central
inquiry in assessing the efficacy of protections for FPIC will relate
to the issue of who has the authority to give consent for actions
impacting the property rights of indigenous communities. The Temoak Band’s initial decision to take the case to the ICC might reasonably lead one to question whether consent can ever be characterized as free when an indigenous people faces extremely limited options. The subsequent development of the ICC case without
the Danns’ involvement and contrary to the instructions of the Temoak Band suggests that another critical inquiry will relate to the
issue of what procedures are adopted for determining when a
group of individuals has authority to speak for a community or
nation. And special measures will almost certainly be required to
ensure that there is full information and conditions necessary for
indigenous peoples to exercise free choice.

MAYA COMMUNITIES OF SOUTHERN
BELIZE V. BELIZE
At the time of this writing, the case of The Maya Indigenous
Communities of the Toledo District v. Belize was still pending in
the Inter-American Commission. In January 2004, however, the
Government of Belize took the unusual step of making public
the Commission’s preliminary report on the merits in the case,
which had been released to Belize confidentially under the
Commission’s rules several months earlier.30
The Maya case arose when the Belizean government granted logging and oil extraction concessions on Maya lands without obtaining the consent of the Maya communities.31 Despite
the longstanding use and occupancy of these lands by traditional Maya communities, Belizean law considers them to be
national lands under the discretionary authority of the government.32 The actions taken by the Belizean government threatened severe harm to more than three dozen Maya villages in
Southern Belize, and the Maya communities filed a suit in
Belizean courts in 1996 challenging these actions. When the
domestic courts failed to act on their complaint, they filed a peti18

tion with the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights.
In their petition, filed in 1998, the Maya claimed that the
Government’s unilateral issuance of concessions without their
consent violated Maya rights to property, equality, judicial protection, consultation, and self-determination, among other rights.33
The Maya argued that the American Declaration on the Rights and
Duties of Man protected these rights and imposed affirmative obligations on the Government of Belize to protect them.
In its preliminary report on the case, the Commission relied
on its conclusion in the Dann case that determinations about the
scope or existence of indigenous peoples’ property rights cannot
be made without the free and informed consent of the peoples
concerned.34 The Commission noted that its application of this
principle in the Dann case related to a judicial determination,
and clarified that the principle also applied in cases of direct natural resource exploitation on indigenous territories: “Articles
XVIII [judicial protection] and XXIII [right to property] of the
American Declaration,” the Commission found, “specially
oblige a member state to ensure that any determination of the
extent to which indigenous claimants maintain interests in the
lands to which they have traditionally held title and have occupied and used is based upon a process of fully informed consent
on the part of the indigenous community as a whole.”35 Given
the Commission’s conclusion that the right to FPIC flows from
the right to property, this conclusion can hardly be controversial.
The ability to decide whether and how the resources on one’s
own property are exploited is an obvious and well-accepted
incident of property ownership.
While confirming that consultation and consent are
required for the protection of indigenous property rights, the
Commission declined to find an independent basis for FPIC in
international law protecting rights to consultation and self-determination, however. Instead, the Commission acknowledged the
arguments put forward by the Maya and held that “the duty to
consult is a fundamental component of the State’s obligations in
giving effect to the communal property right of the Maya people in the lands they have traditionally used and occupied.”36
The Commission reemphasized “the distinct nature of the right
to property as it applies to indigenous people, whereby the land
traditionally used and occupied by these communities plays a
central role in their physical, cultural, and spiritual vitality.”37
For these reasons, the Commission found, violations of separate
provisions of the American Declaration alleged by the Maya
were “subsumed within the broad violations of Article XXIII”
and therefore did not need to be determined.38
In this way, the Commission acknowledged the interrelationship between indigenous self-determination and property
ownership, and found that a proper conception of indigenous
property rights comprehends rights to culture, self-determination, and consultation and consent. Neither indigenous property
rights generally nor FPIC specifically can be properly understood without acknowledgment of this interrelationship, since
communal ownership and self-governance have profound implications for the way indigenous people make decisions related to
land or other property. It is this understanding of the role of self19

determination and cultural integrity that must provide the basis
for the implementation of FPIC.

IMPLEMENTATION OF FREE PRIOR
INFORMED CONSENT
Despite strong rulings from the Inter-American
Commission and Court on indigenous peoples’ right to FPIC,
significant barriers to implementing that right on the ground
remain. Foremost among these, perhaps, is the unequal bargaining power of the vast majority of indigenous communities visa-vis national governments and extractive industries. Typically,
indigenous peoples are poor and lack training, experience, or
access to information about international business. Many
nonetheless hold lands and territories with a wealth of natural
resources. Indigenous peoples often lack access to broader markets and economic alternatives to resource extraction. They typically lack political power within the national system and access
to effective judicial protection, in part because national and
local courts and lawyers are often hostile to or ignorant of the
rightful place of indigenous peoples in the law. Implementing an
effective regime under which indigenous peoples can give or
withhold their FPIC to development activities affecting them
thus requires attention to a wide range of broader social and economic issues. In the absence of true equality, it remains an open
question whether the right of indigenous peoples to give or
withhold consent will be adequately protected.
In the face of such concerns, some commentators advocate
for flat prohibitions on alienation of indigenous lands and
resources without the express permission of the national government. Indeed, several countries in the hemisphere have
adopted laws to this effect, though enforcement is inconsistent.39 This approach, however, may perpetuate the paternalism
toward indigenous peoples still rife in many countries, and may
accomplish little toward redressing the fundamental conditions
of inequality that hamper just application of the principle of
FPIC. Furthermore, national governments are frequently principal wrongdoers in efforts to wrest lands and resources from
indigenous control.40
The international arena holds some promise for properly
implementing indigenous peoples’ right to give or withhold consent to development activities affecting their lands and territories, though questions remain whether international institutions
are properly situated to fulfill this promise. Regardless of the
mechanism, proper implementation of FPIC will require a solid
understanding of indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination
and cultural integrity, as well as to property and equality. There
must be a firm basis in the customary laws and practices of the
indigenous people concerned. Indigenous peoples must determine the standards by which to gauge whether consent is sought
from a legitimate authority within their communities and
whether conditions are such that their consent is in fact free and
informed. The Inter-American Commission’s rulings in the
Awas Tingni, Dann, and Belize cases suggest that inquiries
regarding proper implementation of FPIC must therefore be
directed at indigenous peoples themselves.
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FACILITATING PRIOR INFORMED CONSENT IN THE
CONTEXT OF GENETIC RESOURCES AND
TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE
by Anne Perrault*
INTRODUCTION

T

his paper traces the evolution of free prior informed
consent (“FPIC”) and describes the importance of FPIC
to achieving the objectives of the Convention on
Biological Diversity (“CBD”). It briefly highlights elements of
current approaches to obtaining FPIC from national governments and local communities, identifies limitations to obtaining
FPIC, and provides examples of how the Bonn Guidelines do
and do not respond to these limitations. The paper does not provide a detailed analysis of all issues related to implementation
of FPIC, but rather highlights issues that will, hopefully, promote constructive discussions to advance progress on the
implementation of FPIC.

EVOLUTION OF THE CONCEPT OF FREE PRIOR
INFORMED CONSENT
The concept of free prior informed consent originated in the
medical field as a dialogue between individuals (doctor and
patient) to ensure that doctors provided patients with sufficient
information to allow each patient to make an informed decision
regarding an important health matter.
Subsequently, FPIC came to be viewed as central to securing State sovereignty rights in relations between States.
Beginning in 1987, States began to employ FPIC as a tool to
control the movement of potentially harmful materials into their
territories from exporting States.1 Currently, in the contexts of
hazardous and toxic materials, genetically-engineered organisms, and persistent organic pollutants, States generally have a
right to some form of free prior informed consent before these
materials are transported into the State. In the context of access
to genetic resources, States have a right to free prior informed
consent for transport of genetic resources out of the country.2
Most recently, discussions relating to free prior informed
consent have centered largely on the rights of indigenous peoples and other local communities to FPIC in various contexts,
including logging, mining, resettlement, dam building, and
access to genetic resources. These communities view FPIC as
central to securing their rights and protecting their vital interests
when these activities may affect their interests. Official interpretations of several international instruments, including the
Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination; the
American Convention on Human Rights; the International
Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights; and the
International Labor Organization Convention 169 Concerning
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Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, indicate that free prior informed consent of indigenous peoples is
central to effectuating rights within these conventions, including
the rights to culture, self-determination, and property.3
Additionally, in the last few decades, FPIC has been promoted
by voluntary guidelines, social and environmental codes, contractual agreements, and political referendums.4

FREE PRIOR INFORMED CONSENT IN THE
CONTEXT OF ACCESS TO GENETIC RESOURCES
RIGHTS OF NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS AND LOCAL
COMMUNITIES TO FREE PRIOR INFORMED CONSENT
Concerns exist about companies, research institutions,
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other entities, and individuals acquiring and using genetic
resources and traditional knowledge from biodiversity-rich
countries without obtaining free prior informed consent and
making arrangements for benefit sharing. Several cases of “biopiracy” have been documented, including cases in which patents
have been obtained in “user” countries.5
Discussions concerning the rights of national governments
and local communities to manage access to genetic resources
and associated traditional knowledge are active within the CBD,
the World Intellectual Property Organization (“WIPO”), and the
Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights (“TRIPS”). In these fora, however, existing measures
relating to these rights may conflict with one another.
The CBD embraces three main objectives: the conservation
of biological diversity, the sustainable use of its components,
and the fair and equitable sharing of benefits resulting from use
of genetic resources. The ability to manage access to genetic
resources is central to achieving each of these objectives.
The CBD requires that free prior informed consent be
obtained from contracting Parties providing access to genetic
resources and that these Parties, in turn, “respect, preserve and
maintain knowledge, innovations and practices of . . . communities . . . and promote their wider application with the approval
and involvement of the holders of such knowledge . . .”6 The
Bonn Guidelines on Access to Genetic Resources and Fair and
Equitable Sharing of the Benefits Arising Out of their
Utilization (the “Bonn Guidelines”) are voluntary guidelines
recently adopted by Parties to elaborate on their obligations and
rights with respect to genetic resources and traditional knowledge. The Bonn Guidelines encourage Parties to ensure that free
prior informed consent is obtained from communities for access
to genetic resources and associated traditional knowledge.7
Neither WIPO nor TRIPS recognize the rights of national
governments and local communities to free prior informed consent. Current interpretations of the TRIPS Agreement suggest
that governments may be violating the TRIPS Agreement when
imposing requirements on those seeking a patent to disclose the
origin of the genetic resource and provide evidence of FPIC
before a patent is issued.8 Yet some experts have proposed interpretations of TRIPS provisions that would provide the space for
national governments to require evidence of PIC in a manner
that is consistent with TRIPS.9 Some countries advocate recognition of these requirements.10 The failure of WIPO and TRIPS
to require evidence of FPIC and disclosure of origin could
undermine the FPIC requirements in other instruments.

ELEMENTS OF FREE PRIOR INFORMED CONSENT
RELATED TO ACCESS TO GENETIC RESOURCES
The application of FPIC in the context of access to genetic
resources is distinct from its application in the context of hazardous/toxic wastes and that of genetically-engineered organisms. In the context of access to genetic resources, the country
facing potential harm and having the right to free prior informed
consent is the country out of which substances may be transSUMMER 2004

ported. Rather than trying to prevent adverse impacts of movement of materials into a country, FPIC instead focuses on preventing exploitation and movement of potentially beneficial
materials out of the country, as well as ensuring that benefits
derived from use of the materials accrue to the provider country.
Such distinctions necessitate different approaches to
implementing free prior informed consent for States.
Nevertheless, activities to elaborate FPIC requirements in a
hazardous waste or genetically-engineered organism context
can inform development of the rights of national governments
to FPIC in the genetic resources context. Information concerning what FPIC means, when information should be provided,
how responsibilities for developing and providing information
are allocated, and how due process concerns are addressed may
be used to shape approaches to implementing the rights of
national governments to FPIC in the genetic resources context.
Additionally, the Bonn Guidelines provide some guidance on
possible elements of FPIC procedures, including: consent of the

[In the context of genetic
resources,] FPIC instead
focuses on preventing
exploitation and
movement of potentially
beneficial materials out of
the country…
national authority and indigenous and local communities; mechanisms for the involvement of stakeholders; reasonable timing and
deadlines; specification of the type of uses; direct linkage with
mutually agreed terms; detailed procedures for obtaining consent;
and a description of the general process for access.
For local communities, FPIC in the context of genetic
resources and FPIC in other contexts basically involve the same
rights, i.e., the rights of local communities to participate in management of resources on lands they occupy. However, approaches to FPIC in the context of genetic resources are likely to differ from approaches to FPIC in other contexts due to differences
between contexts. These include, for example, differences in the
abilities of communities to be aware of and physically control
the activities (i.e., use of genetic resources may be much more
difficult to detect and prevent than the other activities), and differences in the complexities of legal structures that govern use
of the resources (i.e., intellectual property laws that may govern
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use of certain genetic resources/traditional knowledge may be
more complex and rely more on foreign laws than laws that govern use of other resources).
While the definition of FPIC for local communities varies
by context, it is generally described as a consultative process
whereby the potentially affected community engages in an open
dialogue with individuals interested in conducting activities in
the area(s) occupied or traditionally used by the affected community. Discussions should occur prior to, and continue
throughout, the time that the activity is conducted. Although
FPIC procedures may have culturally specific variations, a number of commonalities or “best practices” can be identified from
the genetic resources, traditional knowledge, and extractive
industries fields.11 Many communities have articulated these
procedures. Some ideas include:

process must include a substantive dialogue
through which the community may choose to give
or not to give consent.

• Community leaders may revoke consent for legitimate, good faith reasons.

LIMITATIONS TO OBTAINING FREE PRIOR
INFORMED CONSENT
Interrelated legal, political, and economic barriers exist for
obtaining free prior informed consent. They include, for example, a lack of relevant or effective laws and regulations, burdensome procedures and transaction costs, lack of articulated community procedures, a lack of desire of many communities and
some governments to facilitate access, and, perhaps, unrealistic
expectations.

• The person seeking access must obtain consent
from every affected community in the traditionally
recognized manner – according to the customary
laws and practices of the concerned community.

• Before seeking consent, the person requesting access
should distribute and hold community discussions
regarding all relevant information in a culturally
appropriate manner – both written and oral, in a language understandable to the local community.

• Relevant information includes: (1) disclosure of
proposed objectives, including what one hopes to
obtain and the foreseeable consequences of the
research, such as social, economic, and environmental effects on the local community, the potential
for commercial applications, the quantity of the
resource sought, the duration of the activity, and the
specific geographical prospecting area; (2) disclosure of legal and financial information, including
any affiliations, where money will be coming from,
who is in charge, and what/how benefits will be
shared with the local community; (3) disclosure of
any impact statements (environmental and other)
concerning the local activity; (4) disclosure of previous or related activities undertaken by the person
seeking access (and by affiliated organizations),
including a description of any previous consent
plans, how the objective was met, any effects on the
community, etc.

• The community at large should be notified of the
proposed activities, and informed decisions should
be made in a traditionally recognized, culturally
appropriate manner. Discussions should be inclusive
so that all affected local populations have an opportunity to participate actively.

• Consent should be part of an ongoing process conducted throughout the planning, design, implementation, and evaluation of the project. The
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Because these resources
may serve vital spiritual,
cultural, and sustenance
needs, the overriding
interest of the community
may be to protect the
resources and ensure
continued community
access to them.
Despite the rights of national governments to manage
access to genetic resources and to require free prior informed
consent, many have not acted to adopt or implement national
access laws and regulations. Many of the following concerns
may prompt this government inaction:

Lack of certainty about approaches to institutional
structures, processes, and information
Many governments lack certainty about the institutional
structures, processes, and information needed to achieve the
dual objectives of facilitating access while ensuring benefit
sharing. Uncertainty exists, for example, about how to address
the information needed to make informed decisions, and how,
when, and from whom consent should be obtained. Additionally,
questions remain about what mechanisms are available for
enforcement of FPIC requirements and how effective these
mechanisms are.
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT LAW & POLICY

Unwillingness to address divisive issues
Some governments are unwilling to address issues when
different groups call for actions that appear antithetical to one
another. In many situations, for example, one faction of the population may want to work within the existing intellectual property system, while another (frequently including local communities) may demand that genetic resources and traditional
knowledge not be subject to this system.

Lack of certainty about how to address
community rights
For some governments, uncertainties exist about how to
address local community rights to prior informed consent.
Issues raised include those related to what free prior informed
consent means in the context of access to genetic resources. Do
local communities have the absolute right to say no in every situation? Can this right ever be qualified by a larger public interest, and, if so, under what circumstances and how should this
larger public interest be identified?

Lack of security in benefits
Governments may be uncertain about costs to them and
benefits to be derived from providing access to genetic
resources, particularly when patents will be sought. Benefits for
genetic resources may be less obvious or quantifiable than benefits in other resource use contexts, and the issues related to
determining these benefits are more complex. Will technology
be transferred? How will a patent obtained in another country
limit the State’s ability to benefit from these genetic resources?
Intellectual property issues are very technical and involve legal
systems in other countries – systems over which relatively little
control exists.

BARRIERS TO OBTAINING FREE PRIOR
INFORMED CONSENT
Even when laws and regulations do exist, barriers to obtaining FPIC sometimes persist. These barriers include:

Inadequacy of laws and regulations
Some laws and regulations regulating access respond inadequately to issues related to implementation of FPIC, providing
insufficient detail and direction to governments and potential
participants.

Lack of articulated community procedures
While most communities have well-established decisionmaking processes, some communities have not articulated in
writing a process by which consent may be obtained from them
by outside groups. Articulating these procedures often requires
additional financial, personnel, and technical resources.

Lack of desire to facilitate access
Many local communities simply have no interest in facilitating greater access to genetic resources and traditional knowledge, particularly when a patent might be sought for use of the
resource. Because these resources may serve vital spiritual, culSUMMER 2004

tural, and sustenance needs, the overriding interest of the community may be to protect the resources and ensure continued
community access to them. Additionally, many communities
worry that efforts to facilitate access will not adequately consider their interests nor respect their rights.

Burdensome procedures and excessive costs
Many entities seeking access to genetic resources and traditional knowledge believe that laws, regulations, and procedures
– particularly those relating to FPIC from local communities –
impose unnecessary barriers to access that generate excessive
costs. Many scientific institutions, in particular, believe that
laws and regulations are too complicated and transaction costs
too high, given that their research activities likely pose relatively modest adverse impacts to biodiversity and that their proposed uses are almost always non-commercial. These institutions believe laws and regulations should distinguish between
uses and treat them differently.

Unrealistic expectations
Sometimes those seeking access to genetic resources and
traditional knowledge expect that the process to obtain consent
will be modeled after “Northern” consent processes. These
expectations are likely to be unrealistic, particularly when dealing with indigenous communities, given the cultural and value
differences between those providing and those using resources.
Sometimes governments providing resources expect that fortunes will be made by those seeking to use the resources.
Accordingly, they may excessively regulate access to the
resources.

EXAMPLES OF HOW THE
TO LIMITATIONS

BONN GUIDELINES RESPOND

The Bonn Guidelines provide governments with a set of
options for responding to many of the limitations to obtaining
consent. These include provisions that:

Address institution, process, and information issues
The Guidelines address government uncertainties over how
to structure institutions and processes to satisfy queries about
how FPIC can be obtained. The Guidelines suggest that a
national focal point be established to respond to queries about
how FPIC can be acquired, and they embrace recognition of a
single national authority from which FPIC can be obtained.
Furthermore, they identify and describe possible elements of a
free prior informed consent system.

Address some benefit and enforcement issues
To respond to limitations related to trust and enforcement
issues, the guidelines identify and promote measures that “user”
countries can adopt to help secure sovereignty for provider
states over their resources as well as help secure the rights of
local communities. The Guidelines raise awareness about the
significance of requirements for disclosure of origin and evidence of prior informed consent, which may provide some
assurance to governments that their concerns are being heard.
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Additionally, the Guidelines require users to ensure “fair and
equitable” sharing of benefits, including technology transfer.

Describe and encourage approaches to reducing
regulatory obstacles and costs
Several provisions, including those relating to the “basic
principles” of an FPIC system, attempt to promote reduction
in costs and regulatory obstacles. The Guidelines note, for
example, “access to genetic resources should be facilitated at
minimum cost.”

Respond to some of the concerns of local
communities
The Guidelines respond to some concerns of indigenous
and local communities by promoting respect for their customs,
traditions, and values as well as encouraging support for capacity building.

OUTSTANDING LIMITATIONS
Despite the potential of the Bonn Guidelines to respond to
limitations to obtaining free prior informed consent, many
issues remain outstanding. Some of these include:

Addressing indigenous issues
Despite provisions in the Guidelines that support local communities, many indigenous representatives have significant concerns about the phrasing of the Guidelines and how the
Guidelines might adversely impact their rights. Several limitations to obtaining consent are rooted in the lack of certainty for
indigenous peoples. Indigenous peoples are concerned that the
phrasing, “the consent of relevant stakeholders, such as indigenous and local communities, as appropriate to the circumstances
and subject to domestic law, should also be obtained,” fails to
recognize that their rights to free prior informed consent are recognized by international law and are not derived from national
recognition of these rights. The term “stakeholders” fails to recognize that indigenous peoples are “rights holders.”

not be sought, than it is for genetic resources. Additionally, these
users suggest that the focus on disclosure of origin is misplaced,
because most patent applications already disclose origin.

Enforcing PIC requirements
The Guidelines provide little guidance on how enforcement
mechanisms and measures might be structured, and, by virtue of
being voluntary, do not provide any mechanism pursuant to
which FPIC requirements could be enforced.

CONCLUSION
User and Provider parties share an interest in developing
regulations and guidelines for prior informed consent involving the use of genetic material and traditional knowledge.
While the interested parties may look to previously established
guidelines for free prior informed consent, such as the Bonn
Guidelines from the CBD, these guidelines are often more tailored for the original uses of free prior informed consent, such
as in the contexts of hazardous and toxic materials and genetically-engineered organisms. The development of effective
free prior informed consent in the context of genetic material
requires constructive discussions including, though not limited
to, user and provider states, user scientists, and provider
indigenous communities.

Recognizing different uses
Scientific institutions and other users suggest that FPIC
provisions of the Guidelines do not adequately reflect differences in uses of the resources. As a result, requirements imposed
on institutions seeking non-commercial uses of resources may
be disproportionate to potential adverse impacts.

Understanding implementation difficulties and the
need for user measures
Many collectors/users of genetic resources believe that the
guidelines do not evidence an understanding of difficulties associated with implementing user measures. Users point to the difficulties of disclosing origin or providing evidence of FPIC
when the user has obtained the resource from someone else or
has had the resource for a long period of time in a collection.
Furthermore, many users believe that the guidelines fail to capture the essence of the “bio-piracy” problem, which they assert
is more acute regarding seeds and animals for which patents will
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ENDNOTES: PIC in the Context of Genetic Resources
1 Cairo Guidelines and Principles for the Environmentally Sound
Management and Disposal of Hazardous Wastes, June 17, 1987, available at
http://www.unep.org/Documents/Default.asp?DocumentID=100&ArticleID
=1663 (last visited July 28, 2004). The Cairo Guidelines and Principles,
which later served to inform development of the Basel Convention on the
Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their
Disposal, adopted by the United Nations Environment Program in 1987,
first embraced FPIC in the hazardous waste context.
2 See Convention on Biological DiversitY, June 5, 1992, available at
http://www.biodiv.org/doc/legal/cbd-en.pdf (last visited July 28, 2004). As
defined in Article 2 of the Convention on Biological Diversity, genetic
resources include “any material of plant, animal, microbial or other origin containing functional units of heredity.”
3 For example, within the last two years, the Committee interpreting the
Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination issued
Recommendation XXIII, which calls for all Parties to the Convention to
obtain informed consent of indigenous peoples in all decisions that may
concern their rights or interests. Rights of Indigenous Peoples,
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, 51st Sess.,
General Recommendation 23, annex V, at 122, U.N. Doc. A/52/18
(1987), reprinted in U.N. Doc. HRI\GEN\1\Rev.6 at 212 (2003). In
March 2003, the Committee censured Ecuador for “falling short” of
meeting prior informed consent requirements for indigenous communities, finding that in the context of resource exploitation on traditional
lands, mere consultation was insufficient. Consideration of Reports
Submitted by States Parties Under Article 9 of the Convention:
Concluding Observations on Ecuador, Committee on the Elimination of
Racial Discrimination, 62nd Sess., U.N. Doc. CERD/C/62/CO/2 (2003).
Botswana was censured the previous year for failing to ensure that prior
informed consent was secured prior to resettlement of indigenous communities. Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under
Article 9 of the Convention: Concluding Observations on Botswana,
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, 61st Sess., U.N.
Doc. A/57/18 (2002). Additionally, in several recent cases interpreting the
American Convention on Human Rights, the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights determined that an indigenous community’s right to property was violated by the failure of the State to ensure that prior informed
consent had been obtained from the community prior to logging. See e.g.,
Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, Case 11.555,
(ser. C) no. 79 (Aug. 31, 2001)
4 For example, in 2000, the World Commission on Dams issued a set of
voluntary FPIC guidelines recognizing the need for “all people whose
rights are involved and who bear the risks” to have a role in negotiations.
Report of the World Commission on Dams, ch. 9 (2000), at
http://www.dams.org/; In 2004, the Extractive Industries Review, commissioned by the World Bank, recommended implementation of the
rights of local communities to prior informed consent as a precondition
to World Bank funding of extractive industry projects. See Final Report
of the Extractive Industries Review, The World Bank Group and
Extractive Industries (2004), at http://www.eireview.org/.
5 Stephen A. Hansen & Justin W. Van Fleet, Traditional Knowledge and
Intellectual Property: A Handbook on Issues and Options for Traditional
Knowledge Holders in Protecting their Intellectual Property and
Maintaining Biological Diversity, available at
http://shr.aaas.org/tek/handbook/handbook_1.pdf (last visited July 28,
2004). Some well-known cases of patent applications over naturally
occurring genetic resources, biological discoveries or biological inven-
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tions using genetic resources being filed and, in some cases, already
granted include: Neem tree (Azadirachta indica), Turmeric (Curcuma
longa), Maca (Lepidium meyenii), and the Ayahuasca plant
(Banisteriopsis caapi).
6 Convention on Biological Diversity (“CBD”), June 5, 1992, Art. 8(j),
available at http://www.biodiv.org/doc/legal/cbd-en.pdf (last visited June
25, 2004). Article 15.5 of the CBD states, “access to genetic resources
shall be subject to prior informed consent of the contracting party providing such resources, unless otherwise determined by that Party.”
Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, Art. 15.5. Article 8(j)
directs States to “respect, preserve and maintain knowledge, innovations
and practices of indigenous and local communities embodying traditional
lifestyles relevant for the conservation and sustainable use of biological
diversity and promote their wider application with the approval and
involvement of the holders of such knowledgeº”
7 For example, Paragraph 26 of the Guidelines notes that the “consent of
stakeholders, such as indigenous and local communities, as appropriate to
the circumstances and subject .to domestic law, should also be obtained.”
See Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, COP Decision
VI/24, UNEP/CBD/COP/6/6, available at http://www.biodiv.org/decisions/default.aspx?lg=0&dec=VI/24.
8 These interpretations suggest that the requirements would violate
TRIPS Article 27.1, which establishes the substantive conditions of
patentability, Article 29, which establishes the formal conditions for
granting a patent, and Article 62, which establishes the proceedings for
patent acquisition. David Vivas, Strategies and Experiences to Implement
Legal Origin Provisions on Genetic Resources and Traditional
Knowledge (2001) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Center for
International Environmental Law).
9 See e.g., Nuno Pires de Carvalho, Requiring Disclosure of the Origin of
Genetic Resources and Prior Informed Consent in Patent Applications
Without Infringing the TRIPS Agreement: The Problem and the Solution,
available at http://www.law.wustl.edu/Journal/2/p371carvalho.pdf (last
visited June 25, 2004).
10 See Submission by Brazil, Bolivia, Cuba, Dominican Republic,
Ecuador, India, Thailand, Peru and Venezuela to the TRIPs Council on 28
May 2003), “The Relationship between the TRIPS Agreement and the
Convention on Biological Diversity and the Protection of Traditional
Knowledge,” at http://www.iprsonline.org/ictsd/docs/wto_IPCW403.pdf,
last visited July 5, 2004. A recent proposal by India, on behalf of a number of other countries, may ensure that this process is recognized as an
important aspect of patent applications. The relevant portion of the June
2003 submission reads: “An applicant for a patent relating to biological
materials or to traditional knowledge should provide, as a condition to
acquiring patent rights: (i) disclosure of the source and country of origin
of the biological resource and of the traditional knowledge used in the
invention; (ii) evidence of prior informed consent through approval of
authorities under the relevant national regimes; and (iii) evidence of fair
and equitable benefit sharing under the national regime of the country of
origin.”
11 Biodiversity and Traditional Knowledge: Equitable Partnerships in
Practice, in DAMS AND DEVELOPMENT: A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR DECISION
(Sarah Laird, ed., 2001), available at http://www.dams.org/report/. See
also, World Commission on Dams, World Commission on Dams
Guidelines, in DAMS AND DEVELOPMENT: A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR
DECISION (Sarah Laird, ed., 2001), available at
http://www.dams.org/report/ (last visited May 19, 2004).
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PRIOR INFORMED CONSENT IN THE CONVENTION
ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY-BONN GUIDELINES:
NATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION IN COLOMBIA
by Adriana Casas*
INTRODUCTION

T

he UN Convention on Biological Diversity (“CBD”)
has been ratified by more than 170 countries around the
world. This multilateral agreement serves as a global
framework for biodiversity conservation, sustainable use, and
equitable sharing of benefits derived from its use. This convention has been a source for the development of biodiversity laws
at the national level, including Colombia.
Colombia has 10% of the world’s biodiversity in only 0.8%
of the world’s land surface. It has 15% of the world’s orchids,
and is number one in diversity of amphibians, with more than
583 species. Colombia has more than 81 indigenous groups, as
well as many Afro-Colombian communities, and has established
almost 300 hundred resguardos for indigenous peoples to live
on across the country. With the wide range of diversity that is
found in Colombia, the CBD has been recognized as a strategic
and relevant treaty for the future development of the country.

ELEMENTS OF IMPLEMENTATION
Free and Prior Informed Consent (“FPIC”) under the CBD
is intended to facilitate a transparent exchange of information,
and aids in achieving the goals of the Convention: conservation,
sustainable use, and equitable benefit sharing. FPIC is a direct
consequence of the countries’ sovereignty over their territories
Chart 1

and is implemented by each country’s national competent
authorities (“NCA”) and institutions.
There are three elements to implementation, as shown in
Chart 1. Most of the advances seen in Colombia so far are in
the realm of laws and regulations. Colombia has a consistent
legal framework for access and benefit sharing activities.
Table 1 compares the voluntary Bonn Guidelines of the CBD
(“CBD-BG”) to what is already in place within the legal
framework of Colombia. Law 165 of 1994 ratified the CBD in
Colombia so that the articles of the CBD are now part of the
national legal system. Further, the Andean Decision 391,
passed in Colombia in 1996, recognizes the self-determination
of indigenous people, not only concerning their resources, but
also to their traditional knowledge.

CONCLUSION: ACHIEVEMENTS AND CHALLENGES
The most prominent achievements that have come from
Colombia’s cooperation with the principles of the CBD include
a legal framework that is consistent and has decentralized power
through the increase of participation of indigenous groups in
local and national politics. Many groups have been able to
empower themselves through this legal framework without losing their indigenous identities. This legal framework includes
the Constitution of 1991, Law 21/91 that ratifies ILO-169, Law
99/93 that creates the environment ministry, Law 165/94 that
ratifies the CBD, the Andean Decision 391/96, the national biodiversity policy adopted in 1997, and its action program adopted in 1998. Another recognizable achievement is that some
institutional capacity has been established to carry out FPIC,
including cases of indigenous people’s territories where natural
resources such as oil and gas are involved.
However, Colombia still has many challenges it must meet
in order to fully implement free and prior informed consent. The
definition of free and prior informed consent must be defined in
terms of accessing traditional knowledge: what is it, when is it
obtained, who decides how to use it and for what purposes, and
how to compensate the owners of traditional knowledge.
Institutional capacity is still a challenge, and there is a need to

* Adriana Casas practices environmental law at a private firm in Colombia. She
has been a guest lecturer in biodiversity law and policy seminars at law schools
in Colombia and Mexico. She worked for over six years in biodiversity and
legal issues with the Legal Council Ministry of the Environment in Colombia,
and she is a visiting research fellow at the World Resources Institute.
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develop it at a greater scale for the efficient and effective implementation of the CBD and Andean Decision 391 at the national
level in Colombia.
Implementation and enforcement costs need to be
addressed. If FPIC must impose high costs in order to preserve
traditional knowledge and biodiversity in a highly effective
manner, then these costs will be justified. Currently, though, the
high costs are difficult for actors to accept and are causing a perverse incentive for participating in FPIC. Conditions need to be
created that enable local informed participation and allocate
well-defined rights over local and indigenous groups’ rights to
their knowledge. Colombia also needs to consider the difficulty
of treating information as an economic resource or asset. There

is a need to increase scientific collaboration and control over
resources in order to maximize and capture the benefits derived
from the use of biodiversity. Finally, more specific rights and
implementation structures should be designed in terms of FPIC
in the areas of traditional knowledge, biodiversity, and genetic
resources.
Colombia has established a consistent legal framework for
the implementation of FPIC. This toolkit of laws should now be
used to focus on the other two areas of implementation, institutional capacity and the regulated sector, which still require work
in order to meet full implementation of FPIC at the national
Colombian level.

TABLE 1: COMPARISON OF GUIDELINES PRESENT IN CBD – BG AND COLOMBIAN LEGAL FRAMEWORK
Description of Guideline

UN Convention of Biological
Diversity – Bonn Guidelines

Colombian Legal Framework

Access to Genetic Resources

Consent of NCA and relevant stakeholders (i.e. indigenous and local communities) to grant access to genetic resources
and associated knowledge must be facilitated through consultation and due
process

Andean Regime 391: Consent of NCA
through administrative procedure (Arts.
16 - 31) and access contract (Art. 32),
Consent of local communities through
annex contract (Art. 35) and consultation procedure (Law 99/93 Art. 76 and
Decree 1320/98)

Specification of Use of Resources

Specification of use of resources accessed
as well of the knowledge associated with
those resources

Andean 391: Application requires specification of use including restrictions on
third party uses

Procedure to Obtain PIC from
Indigenous Groups

Stated in CBD – BG

Andean 391: Art. 35
Decree 1320/98

Procedure to Obtain PIC from NCA

Stated in CBD – BG

Andean 391: Procedure established in
Art. 16 & 31

Access to Ex Situ Collections

Requires PIC

Andean 391: art. 41.b mandates agreements with ex situ collections

Timing and Deadlines for PIC

Stated in CBD – BG

Andean 391: Art. 29 establishes a period
of 90 days for PIC before access granted
or denied
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NATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
INTERNATIONAL PRIOR INFORMED CONSENT
PROCEDURES CONCERNING HAZARDOUS
CHEMICALS AND WASTES
by Masa Nagai*
INTRODUCTION

H

ealth and environmental risks associated with hazardous chemicals or hazardous wastes move across
international borders through trade or transboundary
shipments. Lack of the knowledge of such risks could result in
serious injuries or damages. Yet, it is not always easy to collect
and manage information on such risks. Evaluations of acceptable levels of risk or the threshold of determining unacceptable
risks in local environments require expertise, resources, and
time. Integrating the results of such risk evaluations into policies
and adequate legislation tailored to unique circumstances of a
given country, would be a further challenge. Effective implementation and enforcement of those policies and legislation
require appropriate institutional arrangements with lasting
capacity and resources.
Targeted at such challenges, an international prior informed
consent procedure is set out in the Rotterdam Convention on the
Prior Informed Consent Procedure for Certain Hazardous
Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade1 in the field of
hazardous chemicals, as well as in the Basel Convention on the
Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and
Their Disposal2 in the field of hazardous wastes.
Under the international prior informed consent procedures
of the Rotterdam and Basel Conventions, authoritative information is exchanged between Parties as well as within each Party.
It provides a knowledge-based, decision-making tool and helps
relevant national authorities in those countries evaluate risks
associated with certain hazardous chemicals in international
trade or hazardous or other wastes in transboundary movements,
and to make necessary decisions.

REQUIRED NATIONAL ACTIONS
The international prior informed consent procedures contained in the Rotterdam Convention and the Basel Convention provide for the respective notification procedures to be followed by
Parties to those conventions. In principle, these procedures provide
each Party to the respective Conventions with an opportunity to
make its own decisions on whether it permits or prohibits to bring
into the country, by trade or transboundary movements, certain
hazardous chemicals or hazardous wastes, with the knowledge of
those chemicals or wastes (except, in the case of the Basel
Convention’s 1995 Amendment not permitting the transboundary
movements of hazardous wastes and other wastes within the scope
of the Convention from a certain group of developed countries).
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There are certain differences, however, between the international prior informed consent procedure of the Rotterdam
Convention and that of the Basel Convention, because of the
difference in the respective scopes of those conventions.
Regarding the Rotterdam Convention, in return for better protection from potential hazards from certain hazardous chemicals, the procedure of the Convention requires each Party to take
certain national actions on a regular basis to keep the flow of relevant authoritative information. 3
In order to make a chemical subject to the prior informed
consent procedure under the Rotterdam Convention, each Party
is to notify the Secretariat in writing of a final regulatory action
adopted by the Party to ban or severely restrict chemicals.4 For
developing countries or transitional countries with problems
caused by a severely hazardous pesticides formulation under
conditions of use in its territory, a proposal to include into the
procedure is to submit to the Secretariat the severely hazardous
pesticides formulation.5 The notifications or proposals provided
by the respective Parties are checked by the Secretariat to determine whether they conform to the format and contain the information required by the Convention, and subsequently submitted
to the Chemicals Review Committee for consideration.
Decision guidance documents, to be prepared by the Chemicals
Review Committee and approved by the Conference of the
Parties, provide authoritative information sources on certain
hazardous chemicals made subject to the procedure. Official circulation to all Parties of the decision guidance document on a
chemical triggers the prior informed consent procedure with
respect to that chemical. 6
With regard to the application of the prior informed consent
procedure for imports and exports, each Party is to implement
appropriate legislative or administrative measures to ensure
timely decisions with respect to the importation of chemicals
under the prior informed consent procedure.7
In addition, each Party is to undertake the following actions
regarding imports:

• Transmit to the Secretariat a response concerning
the future import of the chemical concerned. A
response is to consist of either: (a) a final decision,
*Masa Nagai is Head of the International Legal Instruments Unit Division of
Policy Development & Law at United Nations Environment Programme
(“UNEP”) in Nairobi, Kenya. The views expressed in this article are those of
the author and do not necessarily represent the views of UNEP.
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pursuant to legislative or administrative measures to
consent to import, not to consent to import, or to
consent to import only subject to specified conditions; or (b) an interim response, which may include
an interim decision consenting to import with or
without specified conditions, or not consenting to
import during the interim period (in the form of a
statement that a final decision is under active consideration, a request to the Secretariat, or to the
Party that notified the final regulatory action, for further information) or, a request to the Secretariat for
assistance in evaluating the chemical. A response is
required to relate to the category or categories specified for the chemical (i.e. pesticide, industrial or
severely hazardous pesticide formulation). A final
decision should be accompanied by a description of
any legislative or administrative measures upon
which it is based. If this response is modified, submit the revised response to the Secretariat. Make its
responses available to those concerned within its
jurisdiction, in accordance with its legislative or
administrative measures.8

• In the case of a Party that decides not to consent to
the import of a chemical, or to consent to its import
only under specified conditions, that party is
required to simultaneously prohibit or to make subject to the same conditions, import of the chemical
from any source, and domestic production of the
chemical for domestic use.9
In addition, each Party is to undertake the following actions
regarding exports:

ing Party and in relation to which no regulatory
action to prohibit its use has been taken, or explicit consent to the import has been sought and
received by the exporter through a designated
national authority of the importing Party.11
Under the Basel Convention, the control measures concerning transboundary movements of hazardous wastes and other
wastes are set out together with the obligations to each Party to
take appropriate measures to minimize the generation of such
wastes, ensure disposal of such wastes in an environmentally
sound manner, and reduce the transboundary movements of
such wastes. With this background, the prior informed consent
procedure of the Basel Convention is linked to stringent measures to control transboundary movements of hazardous wastes

Implementation of the
international prior
informed consent
procedure at the national
level requires evaluating
potential risks and
considering multiple
unique factors…

• Implement appropriate legislative or administrative
measures to communicate the import responses, forwarded by the Secretariat, to those concerned within
its jurisdiction; take appropriate legislative or administrative measures to ensure that exporters within its
jurisdiction comply with decisions in each response;
advise and assist importing Parties, upon request and
as appropriate, to obtain further information to help
them make decisions concerning imports, and to
strengthen their capacities and capabilities to manage
chemicals safely during their life-cycle.10

• Ensure that a chemical subject to the prior
informed consent procedure is not exported from
its territory to any importing Party that, in exceptional circumstances, has failed to transmit a
response or has transmitted an interim response
that does not contain an interim decision, unless it
is a chemical that, at the time of import, is registered as a chemical in the importing Party, or it is a
chemical for which evidence exists that it has previously been used in, or imported into, the importSUMMER 2004

and other wastes on a shipment-by-shipment basis, which might
be highlighted as follows:

• Parties exercising their right to prohibit the import
of hazardous wastes or other wastes for disposal are
required to inform the other Parties. Parties are
required to prohibit or to not permit the export of
hazardous wastes and other wastes to the Parties
that have prohibited the import of such wastes,
when notified. 12

• Parties are required to prohibit or not to permit the
export of hazardous wastes and other wastes if the
importing State does not consent in writing to the
specific import, in the case where that importing
State has prohibited the import of such wastes.13

• Each Party is required not to allow the export of hazardous wastes or other wastes to a State or a group
of States, which have prohibited by their legislation
all imports, or if it has reason to believe that wastes
in question will not be managed in an environmen30

tally sound manner according to criteria decided by
the Conference of the Parties.14

• Each Party is required to prevent the importation of
hazardous wastes and other wastes if it has reason to
believe that the wastes in question will not be managed in an environmentally sound manner.15
Each Party must do the following regarding exports, imports,
and transit:

• The exporting State is to notify, or to require the
generator of wastes or exporters to notify, in writing,
through the channels of the competent authority of
the exporting State, the competent authority of the
States concerned of any proposed transboundary
movements of hazardous wastes and other wastes.
The notification needs to contain the declarations
and information on the wastes as well as details of
modalities of shipment.16

• The importing State is to respond to the notifier in
writing, consenting to the movement with or without
conditions, denying permission for the movement,
or requesting additional information. A copy of the
final response of the importing State is to be sent to
the competent authorities of the States concerned
that are Parties.17

• The exporting State is not to allow the generator or
exporter of the wastes to commence the transboundary movement until it has received written confirmation that the notifier has received the written consent of the importing State; and the notifier has
received from the importing State confirmation of
the existence of a contract between the exporter and
the disposer specifying environmentally sound management of the wastes in question.18

• Each State of transit which is a Party is required to
promptly acknowledge to the notifier receipt of the
notification, and may subsequently respond to the
notifier in writing, consenting to the movement with
or without conditions, denying permission for the
movement, or requesting additional information. The
exporting State is not to allow the transboundary
movements to commence until it has received the
written consent of the State of transit. If at any time
a Party decides not to require prior written consent,
either generally or under specific conditions, for transit of transboundary movements of hazardous wastes
or other wastes, or modifies its requirements in this
respect, the Party is required to inform the other
Parties of its decision. In this latter case, if no
response is received by the exporting State within a
given period, the exporting State may allow the
export to proceed through the State of transit.19
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• The exporting State may, subject to the written consent of
the State concerned, allow the generator or the exporter
to use a general notification where hazardous wastes or
other wastes having the same physical and chemical
characteristics are shipped regularly to the same disposer
via the customs office of exit of the exporting State via
the same customs office of entry of the importing State,
and in the case of transit, via the same customs office of
entry and exit of the State or States of transit. Such written consent to the use of general notification is subject to
the supply of certain relevant information, such as the
exact quantities or periodical lists of such wastes to be
shipped. The general notification and written consent
may cover multiple shipments of such wastes for a maximum period of one year. 20
Each Party to the Basel Convention is required to take
appropriate legal, administrative, and other measures to implement and enforce the provisions of the Convention, including
those referred to above.21

INSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
To implement the international prior informed consent procedures, certain institutional arrangements are required at the
national level. For the Rotterdam Convention, each Party is
required to designate one or more national authorities that are
authorized to act, on behalf of that Party, in the performance of
the administrative functions required by the Convention.22 Each
Party is required to seek to ensure that such authority or authorities have sufficient resources to perform their tasks effectively.23 The name and address of such authority or authorities are
given to the Secretariat of the Convention, which will transmit
that notification to all Parties.24 Thus, the contact points of each
Party are made known to other Parties as well as to the
Convention Secretariat, establishing an international network of
formal channels of communications for Parties to exchange official notifications and other relevant information.
Under the Basel Convention, each Party is required to designate or establish one or more competent authorities and one
focal point to facilitate the implementation of the Convention. 25
For a State of transit, one competent authority is required to be
designed to receive the notification.26 Each Party is required to
inform the Convention Secretariat about the agencies designated as their focal points and their competent authorities.27
Official notifications are exchanged between those competent
authorities of Parties, which is facilitated by the Secretariat of
the convention.
Management of the international trade of hazardous chemicals involves a number of sectoral areas, such as environment,
public health, agriculture, industry, and trade, which is normally addressed by different government ministries or agencies. Similarly, transboundary movements of hazardous wastes
would involve a number of government bodies and agencies,
such as those responsible for the environment, public health,
transport, industry, trade, customs, and enforcement. While one
or a few authorities are expected to act as the focal points for
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT LAW & POLICY

international exchange of notifications and other relevant
information under the prior informed consent procedure,
domestic institutional arrangements are likely to involve multiple ministries, government agencies, and other relevant
national entities.
Given the multiplicity of those issues and a host of actors
involved, regular consultations and coordination among those
agencies and entities would help facilitate exchange of relevant
information within a country and establish coherent policies and
implementation of relevant activities. It is important to institute
coordinating arrangements among all those who share interest in
the subject. This might take the form of, for example, an interministerial coordinating body within the national Government,
which has been established in a number of countries during the
period for implementing the voluntary prior informed consent
procedures on certain hazardous chemicals.
Implementation of the international prior informed consent
procedure at the national level requires each Party to consider
and evaluate potential risks for the country and make its own
decision concerning international trade in chemicals or transboundary movements in hazardous wastes and other wastes, on
the basis of the information given through the procedure (such
as decision guidance documents, in the case of the Rotterdam
Convention, or relevant information contained in the shipmentbased notifications under the Basel Convention) and other
means of information exchange as well as relevant information
generated by itself. This may involve multiple factors to be
taken into account during decision-making, which arise from
unique situations of each country, such as climate, components
of local ecosystems, population, technology, patterns of economic activities (such as agriculture or industrial processes),
and social needs (for example, public health needs in combating
diseases vectors, such as malaria). Sustainable institutional
capacity to undertake such tasks is called for. Ability to ensure
timely flow of relevant information among the authorities concerned would be important.
For effective flow of authoritative information under the
procedure and achieving its intended objective of enabling better informed decision-making, it is important also to clearly
define the responsibilities and roles of the respective agencies
and bodies, which should be made known to each other and to
the public.
Since the circumstances surrounding hazardous chemicals in international trade or hazardous wastes and other
wastes in transboundary movements are likely to continuously evolve as scientific knowledge and technology progresses,
and human activities related to those areas constantly develop, institutional arrangements addressing those issues also
need to be kept updated. Provisions for adequate training as
well as opportunities to exchange relevant experiences among
those who are involved might be necessary with a view to sustaining effectiveness of the procedures. Overall, the relevant
authorities need to be provided with adequate human and
financial resources in order for them to be able to carry out
necessary functions.
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LEGISLATIVE ISSUES
National implementation of the international prior informed
consent procedure needs corresponding national laws or regulatory frameworks, depending upon the legal system of each
country. Both the Rotterdam and Basel Conventions require
their respective Parties to implement appropriate legislative or
administrative measures to ensure timely decisions and compliance with the requirements under the prior informed consent
procedure.28
Since the status of development in environmental and environmentally-related laws and regulations is varied among countries, each country needs to assess its own legal requirements
and take necessary actions to bring its legislation in line with the
requirements under the prior informed consent procedure of the
Rotterdam Convention and the Basel Convention. In some
countries, existing laws and regulations, with minimal adjustments, might be adequate to accommodate such needs. In some
other countries, however, it might be necessary to amend the
existing legislation or develop new ones.
Because of such uniqueness and diversity in the status of
the development of laws and regulations in countries, there
appears to be no single definitive model for legislating the
required action for the national implementation of the international prior informed consent procedures. However, several
aspects might be considered common to such requirements for
national legislation.
First, clearly identified flow of information with specific
requirements that are tailored to the requirements of the international procedure would facilitate decision-making by the relevant authorities and implementation of legislation. There
should be a clear statement of the authority responsible for taking necessary decisions and actions (such as a Minister of the
lead Ministry), together with the identification of other relevant
entities that might share certain responsibilities in implementing the legislation (for example, the agencies or bodies that are
to receive or disseminate relevant notifications, or to lead
enforcement measures). In addition, all relevant actors, especially those who may introduce into the country potential risks
associated with trade in hazardous chemicals or transboundary
movements in hazardous wastes or other wastes, need to be
identified in order for them to share responsibilities and be held
accountable for the required procedures (for example, exporters
or importers).
Second, countries need to build and utilize a knowledge
base for decision-making. In a country where relatively
advanced chemical management schemes are in place (for
instance in many member countries of the Organisation for
Economic Cooperation and Development (“OECD”)) relevant
chemicals legislation might provide for measures to systematically collect health and environmental data of chemicals for
evaluating potential risks to health and the environment, before
they are produced and traded. Existence of chemicals in the
country might be recorded in an inventory or register. Such data
may be supplemented by further information on use of such
chemicals, including reports on incidents causing injuries to
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human health or the environment. Regarding hazardous wastes,
information on the generation and generators of such wastes,
data on their characteristics or categories, documented record of
their shipment and disposal, and information on those who are
involved in such activities might be collected under relevant
legislation. Information made available from such a knowledge
base may be fed into the international prior informed consent
procedures and also be utilized to implement the requirements
of those procedures.
In many developing countries, however, chemicals or waste
management schemes are often not well developed due to the
lack of necessary resources and expertise, and a knowledge base
on those issues might not be adequate to enable sound decisionmaking. This could make those countries vulnerable to the
threats of potential risks from hazardous chemicals or hazardous
wastes that might be imported into the country without knowing
much about them. This was the main background of developing
the international prior informed consent procedures on those
subjects. With the legally binding procedure of the Rotterdam
and Basel Conventions, the Parties to those Conventions are to
be provided with such knowledge base, through the procedures,
as may be required for them to take necessary action concerning
international trade in certain hazardous chemicals or transboundary movements of hazardous wastes and other wastes.
Legislation or certain administrative actions might be required
to enact what is required for the national implementation of the
procedures, including those governing procedures for making
necessary decisions on the basis of the country’s own evaluation
of risks and other related factors. Development of legislation in
this targeted area, in turn, could become a basis for strengthening the legal basis for developing the knowledge base on those
subjects in the country.
Third, consistency and harmonization between relevant
legislation may need to be considered. In many countries,
sectoral laws and regulations are commonly developed and
used to address such issues. For instance, most countries
have pesticides legislation, and some of those countries also
have legislation on chemicals in general or certain categories
of chemicals, while they also have customs and other regulations concerning imports or exports. Management and control of hazardous wastes might be addressed in legislation for
which health and environmental authorities are responsible,
while their transport might be regulated under legislation
governing transport of dangerous goods. In general, a review
of the relevant existing laws and regulations would help clarify appropriate measures to bring the country’s legislation
into line with the requirements for implementing the international prior informed consent procedure. Inter-sectoral
issues, such as mutually supportive trade and environmental
policies as noted in the Rotterdam Convention,29 for instance
in the form of regulating non-discrimination between domestic production and importation of chemicals, will need to be
examined during such exercises. Synergies in national implementation measures among the Rotterdam Convention, the
Basel Convention and the Stockholm Convention on
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Persistent Organic Pollutants might also be a pertinent issue
to consider in this context.
Fourth, measures to ensure compliance and enforcement
deserve due consideration. The international prior informed
consent procedures of the Rotterdam Convention and the Basel
Convention require the respective Parties to take necessary legislative or other measures to ensure compliance with the decisions on the concerned Parties. An important step in this respect
is to inform, possibly through a process instituted for this purpose, all those who are involved in the relevant activities about
the requirements under the prior informed consent procedure as
well as the relevant decisions of Parties, and relevant national
measures for their implementation. Legislative measures for
ensuring such compliance, combined with established modalities of enforcement, would also be an important backup for the
decisions made. Combination of disincentive measures and
incentive measures might be also considered.
Fifth, consideration of resource base to sustain the implementation of relevant legislative or other measures needs to be
made. Relevant legislation may contain provisions for securing
necessary resources for this purpose (for example, establishing
fees for certain administrative actions). In addition to financial
resources, securing competent human resources would be also
an important point to consider.

PERSPECTIVES
The international prior informed consent procedures of the
Rotterdam and Basel Conventions provide important collective
measures operated among the respective Parties to prevent the
risks associated with certain hazardous chemicals or hazardous
wastes from being introduced into a Party by international trade
or transboundary shipment without its knowledge and consent.
In retrospect, this is a remarkable milestone since the question
of possible hazards of chemicals in developing countries that do
not have the knowledge of such chemicals was first debated at
the Governing Council of UNEP in 1977. The Montevideo
Programme for the Development and Periodic Review of
Environmental Law30 is a long-term strategic guidance for
UNEP in the field of environmental law. On the basis of this, the
Basel Convention was concluded in 1989 and the legally binding instrument for applying the prior informed consent procedure, the need of which was identified also in chapter 19 of
Agenda 21, was concluded in 1998 through the negotiating
process jointly organized by UNEP and FAO. The binding international legal frameworks for the prior informed consent procedure are now in place in the fields of international trade in certain hazardous chemicals and transboundary movements of hazardous wastes and other wastes. To advance the implementation
of the prior informed consent procedure and achieving its objectives at the national level, further strengthening of international
cooperation, in the context of the Rotterdam Convention and the
Basel Convention, would be desired in order to further address
needs and shortcoming in relevant legislation and institutions
particularly in developing countries and countries with
economies in transition.
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THE “EQUATOR PRINCIPLES”:
IMPROVED SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY IN THE PRIVATE FINANCE SECTOR
by Miki Kamijyo*
INTRODUCTION

I

n a time of growing need for emphasis on social issues in
developing countries, a group of leading private financial
institutions established common environmental and social
standards for project financing called the Equator Principles (the
“Principles”).1 The Principles provide a voluntary set of guidelines in an effort to better manage socially and environmentally
complex investments in emerging markets. June 2004 marked
the one year anniversary2 of this bank-led initiative, which has
moved the global investment and finance industry a step forward in promoting sustainability. The Principles are innovative
in that the guidelines bring the notion of prior informed consent
into every private industry sector, from mining and forestry to
manufacturing and construction.
This initiative is a constructive attempt for banks that have
adopted the Principles, “Equator Banks”,3 to learn about social
and environmental issues in project finance. This education in
turn will lead to greater expertise in these issues across all industry sectors, which will better enable the Banks to control their
risks. Equator Banks recognize that environmental and social
controversies over a project can impact the bottom line, and the
Principles are essentially good for business.
The private finance sector is critical to influencing major
infrastructure projects. By establishing environmental and
social standards in the finance industry, Equators Banks have the
impressive ability to positively affect sustainable development
and human rights principles at the international, national, and
local levels.

HISTORY OF THE EQUATOR PRINCIPLES
The concept of the Equator Principles emerged in October
2002, at a meeting between the International Finance
Corporation (“IFC”) and leading banks to discuss social and
environmental issues in project finance.4 About five years ago,
environmental groups and socially responsible investment funds
started to focus on commercial banks and private institutions
that funded controversial projects typically avoided by the
World Bank and other public institutions.5 On June 4, 2003, ten
leading banks from seven countries announced the adoption of
the Principles6 and agreed to abide by the World Bank’s voluntary code of environmental standards. The name was originally
the “Greenwich Principles”, but changed to reflect the global
initiative in which the equator represented balance.7

THE PREAMBLE
The Equator Banks that have adopted the Principles pledge
to only provide loans to projects which have undergone the
screening process and are able to comply with the Principles’
policies and processes. The Preamble is a statement of commitment from financiers to address environmental and social
policy issues in project financing.8 To uphold these Principles,
these financiers agree to assess and manage environmental and
social risk by carefully reviewing all proposals that request
project financing.9

THE STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES
The Statement of Principles is a set of concrete steps for
the Equator Banks to classify projects into high, medium, and
low risk categories.10 The Banks will then require the borrower to complete an environmental and social review in which
they have demonstrated that they complied with the World
Bank and IFC Policies and Guidelines as well as local host
country laws.11 The borrower is also required to make this
review, the Environmental Assessment (“EA”), available to the
public in the local language and in a culturally appropriate
manner. The particularly high risk projects will be subject to
independent expert review.12 In a situation where the borrower
is not complying with the environmental and social obligations
of the loan agreement, lending institutions may declare the
project loan in default.13
The Equator Principles include a screening process, based
on the IFC’s environmental and social screening process, which
describes the high, medium, and low risk classifications of proposed projects.14 This process determines the extent and type of
EA a project should undergo according to the project’s level of
risk and adverse environmental impacts.15 A high or medium
risk project calls for an EA that examines negative and positive
impacts, and also recommends measures needed to prevent,
minimize, mitigate, or compensate for those adverse impacts.16
The purpose of the screening process is to require borrowers to
reveal to the lending institution all possible and anticipated
impacts, as well as considering any feasible alternatives including a “without project” situation.17

THE EXHIBITS

COMPONENTS OF THE EQUATOR PRINCIPLES

The exhibits in the Principles adopt the World Bank Group
Guidelines and Policies,18 using the same terminology and categorization that the World Bank Group does, thereby creating
consistent approaches to assessing a potential project’s risk.

The Principles include a Preamble, a Statement of Principles,
and three exhibits: an environmental and social screening process,
the International Finance Corporation (“IFC”) Safeguard Policies,
and the World Bank Group Specific Guidelines.

*Miki Kamijyo is a J.D. candidate, May 2006, American University,
Washington College of Law. The author wishes to thank Professor Daniel
Bradlow for his guidance and advice.
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The Guidelines are sector-specific standards that apply to the
technology and processes of specific industries, such as oil and
gas, rail transit systems, or pesticide handling.19 On the other
hand, the Safeguard Policies are a general approach to critical
issues that apply to all sectors, such as assessing environmental
impact and preserving cultural property.20 In adopting both the
Policies and Guidelines, the Principles provide a comprehensive approach applicable to almost any investment in the
emerging markets.
The Principles are the finance industry’s approach to “promote responsible environmental stewardship and socially
responsible development.”21 Any endorsing entity of the
Principles, including multilateral institutions, may establish
internal policies and processes consistent with the Principles.
The Principles are a significant step in implementing socially
responsible principles at the private sector level. National governments, local communities, and indigenous people will benefit from the Equator Banks’ proactive movement to minimize
environmental and social risk. At the same time, borrowers and
industries will benefit from the positive move away from harmful and high-risk projects. The Equator Banks themselves gain
the advantage over peer institutions by introducing better corporate practices and providing their clients with improved
accountability and sound financial management.

IMPLEMENTATION AND EFFICACY OF THE
PRINCIPLES
CRITICISMS OF THE PRINCIPLES
To date, twenty-five institutions in Europe, North America,
Asia, Australia, and South America have voluntarily adopted
these Principles.22 But critics point to the Principles’ purpose as
being one without substance. The Principles may be seen merely as good PR or an attempt by banks to manage their reputational risks with clients and shareholders. NGOs have argued
that the Principles are inadequate because they lack accountability mechanisms,23 contain critical loopholes, and are weak on
social issues.24 Banks in the past have funded controversial
projects, and the goal of financial institutions is to reduce financial risk and liability. Nevertheless, both the Equator Banks and
the NGOs should view the Principles as an opportunity for the
financial industry to take a self-initiated step towards a globally
responsible agenda.

EFFECTIVENESS WITHOUT ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS
While there are no formal mechanisms to enforce the
Principles, Equator Banks should utilize the Principles as a
learning tool in which the Banks improve their portfolio of
potential projects. The Principles are not simply a tool to exploit
the project’s problems after the project has already been completed. They should also not be used just as a compliance instrument by which to criticize banks. Instead, the goal of the
Principles is to create a process for Equator Banks to scrutinize
potential projects before agreeing to finance them.
By adopting these voluntary standards as an accepted
methodology to establish sustainable development practices,
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banks will not only realize anticipated financial gains, but also
receive intangible benefits such as improved relations with
investors, a more conscientious corporate goal, and decreased
exposure to liability. In setting environmentally sound practices,
companies recognize that such practices bring value to company identity and future stability in the marketplace, ultimately
helping to strengthen the economy.25

SELF – IMPOSED ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS
An effective social and environmental standard will be one
that requires financial reporting, regular periodic compliance
audits, and staff resources. In the Statement of Principles, environmental assessment of a possible project will report a long
list of issues, including major hazards, use of dangerous substances, and consideration of environmentally and socially
preferable alternatives. With this list of issues, Banks can set
practical standards by which to reject unsuitable projects.
These Banks should incorporate the Principles as a natural
learning loop and create self-imposed fiscal responsibility and
transparency. The Banks should not use the Principles to avoid
public scrutiny and self-evaluation, but use it to create a viable
and efficient implementation mechanism within the Banks’
everyday financial practices.

. . . the goal of the
Principles is to create a
process for Equator Banks
to scrutinize potential
projects before agreeing to
finance them.
THE PRINCIPLES’ EFFECT ON INDIGENOUS
PEOPLES
In its list of Safeguard Policies, the Principles address the
concerns surrounding effects on indigenous peoples.26 The
Principles call for an EA that considers socioeconomic impacts
as well as impacts on indigenous peoples and communities.27
The Principles call for participation of affected parties in the
design, review, and implementation of the project.28
The Equator Banks’ adoption of the Principles is in
response to mounting pressure from those who publicly accuse
large entities of “poisoning the air and water, denuding the
forests, and destroying the livelihood of locals who get in the
way.”29 In its Safeguard Policies, the World Bank emphasizes
that issues pertaining to indigenous peoples must be based on
the “informed partici-pation [sic] of the indigenous peoples
themselves.”30 By adopting these Safeguard Policies, the
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Equator Banks have acknowledged the unique anthropological
and sociological status that indigenous peoples and tribal
groups possess.

UNLIKELY ALLIES: GLOBAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
& INDIGENOUS PEOPLES
Affected indigenous peoples have now found an ally in the
unlikeliest of places: large, global financial institutions. In
applying the Principles to bank financing, the Equator Banks
have provided powerful support for developing social standards.
For example, Citigroup strengthened its policies on respecting
indigenous rights31 and did not renew its financial advising contract with a controversial Camisea Gas Project in Peru.32 The
Camisea Gas Project exposed indigenous peoples to diseases
such as small pox and influenza, killing an estimated 50% of the
indigenous Nahua population.33 Bank of America, another leading U.S. bank, has a lending criteria for developing countries in
which it will evaluate not only
a borrower’s capacity for
repayment, but also the purpose
of the transaction and the
impact on the local populace.34
Bank of America also recently
adopted new environmental initiatives, which include refusals
to lend to projects where
indigenous land claims are
unresolved.35

ENSURING THE
PARTICIPATION OF
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES

STRENGTHENING THE PRINCIPLES
NGOs have assessed the implementation and effectiveness
of the Principles and recommended various measures to ensure
they are implemented in a meaningful and transparent way. 41

CREATING ACCOUNTABILITY
To enforce the Principles, one option is to require that
Equator Banks create an annual reporting format to demonstrate
they are implementing the Principles, and to measure how the
Principles are making a difference. In this way, stakeholders
and investors of Equator Banks
can hold these banks accountable
for
upholding
the
Principles.
Applying
the
Principles to bank projects will
minimize risk liabilities and ultimately affect financial profits.
However, as with any policy
implementation, there is a need
for transparency in order to
monitor and ensure proper compliance. Public disclosures,
internal controls, and external
reporting are some of the
approaches to establish this transparency so that endorsing institutions and the public may observe the Equator Banks’ implementation processes.
Multilateral and global institutions have used independent
inspection mechanisms to facilitate public reporting of violations.42 However, the emphasis in the Principles is not on the
recourse measures, but on a bank’s ability to operate responsibly from the initial onset of a project, thereby avoiding violations down the line.

In applying the Principles
to bank financing, the
Equator Banks have
provided powerful support
for developing social
standards.

The Principles acknowledge that issues concerning the rights of indigenous peoples and
local communities arise in a variety of sectors, including dams,
extractive industries, tourism, education, and use of dangerous
substances. The Principles detail prerequisites of a development
plan for indigenous peoples.36 These prerequisites necessitate a
thorough and qualified study of the indigenous peoples affected
by the project: taking into account, for instance, local patterns of
social organization, religious beliefs and resource use, the legal
status of the affected groups in the host country’s legislation,
and the government institutions assigned responsibility for the
groups.37 These prerequisites listed here are not exhaustive, and
Equator Banks are free to implement policies that best fit their
own company infrastructure. But the clear purpose of the
Principles is to ensure full local-level participation of indigenous peoples in project preparation and development. The borrower must ensure that indigenous peoples benefit from development investments, and the Banks do not even have to appraise
potential projects until the borrower develops suitable mitigation plans.38
The Principles obligate the borrower to implement a development plan, and banks are given benchmarks that can be monitored during supervision of the project.39 This gives the Banks
constructive control over large-scale projects, but most impor37

tantly, involves indigenous peoples more prominently in the
project’s development. As with many social policies, the
Principles’ objective is to foster full respect for indigenous peoples’ dignity, human rights, and cultural uniqueness.40 In
embracing this objective, global financial institutions have now
lent their support and influence to the same cause. Human rights
has become an integral part of global finance and development.

AVOIDING POLITICAL EXPLOITATION
As more banks and institutions adopt the Principles and join
the group of Equator Banks,43 some may see opportunities for
powerful joint lobbying or political exploitation of their association.44 However, adoption of the Principles should not entitle
Equator Banks to hold any type of lobbying position that might
undermine the Banks’ good faith efforts and progress. Nor
should Equator Banks take advantage of borrowers and countries that legitimately need project loans. It is important to
remember that the Principles and their implementation are
designed to protect the natural environment and indigenous and
cultural populations. The Equator Banks must exercise judgment in determining how best to utilize its social policies. This
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heavy burden will inherently cause the Banks to seriously evaluate their financial goals and the means used to achieve those
goals. The Principles are a way to reflect on the socially useful
value of a project and how it will improve markets and countries
that strive to advance and compete in the global economy.

LEADING THE FINANCE INDUSTRY
Through voluntary adoption of the Principles, the Equator
Banks are compelling themselves to substantially change the
way they conduct business. The Principles provide a framework for these Banks to critically evaluate how their financial
decisions may harm or damage the environment and its local
communities. Banks are accountable to their stakeholders, and
their portfolio of bank projects will reveal the social value of a
project in a developing country. We must understand that
extractive industries, manufacturing, and dam projects will
continued to be financed, and these projects will continue to
present numerous environmental and social threats. Therefore,
Equator Banks should not only minimize a single project’s risk,
but guide the financing industry towards more socially responsible goals, potentially persuading all financing institutions to
adopt the Principles.

CONCLUSION: THE FUTURE OF THE PRINCIPLES
The Principles were intended to integrate social, environmental, and ethical decisions into global project financing and
development. The Principles are by no means a complete solu-

tion to the development industry’s questions, and the Equator
Banks will not have the capability to remove all risk from future
projects. However, in agreeing to enforce the Principles for all
loans above $50 million, these Banks are utilizing their influential roles to force borrowers to reconsider their project’s viability. The executive vice president of the IFC has acknowledged
that “this will change the rules of the road for about $100 billion
in global investment over the next 10 years.”45 By making such
a bold move in the private sector, the Equator Banks are sending a clear message to developing countries, stakeholders, and
local communities that they will only support those projects
complying with these social policies and processes. Their
majority in the market share46 will also force other banks to
adopt the Principles, which in turn will transform financial borrowing and dictate the social goals of the entire private sector
financing community.
We should continue to closely watch the progress of the
Equator Banks and keep open the dialogue between these institutions and the public community. But more importantly, we should
optimistically anticipate the positive ripple effects that these
Principles have already begun to create. The circle of Equator
Banks will grow, support for the Principles will strengthen, and
the global investment climate will reflect the move towards environmental, social, and economic sustainability.
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PERCEIVED CHALLENGES TO RECOGNITION OF
PRIOR AND INFORMED CONSENT OF INDIGENOUS
PEOPLES AND OTHER LOCAL COMMUNITIES:
THE EXPERIENCES OF THE INTER–AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK
by Anne Deruyttere*
INTRODUCTION

W

hile the term “Prior Informed Consent” (“PIC”) is
relatively new to the Inter-American Development
Bank (“IADB”), many of its aspects related to consultation and participation have been recognized and endorsed
in the normative framework of the Bank. Of special importance
is the recently approved strategy on “[c]itizen participation in
the activities of the IADB,” the Involuntary Resettlement Policy
adopted in 1998, which requires prior informed consent in the
case of indigenous people possibly affected by involuntary
resettlement, and the new Operational Policy on Indigenous
Peoples, currently under preparation, the Board-approved profile of which includes a reference to prior informed consent.

THE CONTEXT OF INDIGENOUS ISSUES
AT THE IADB
In the early eighties, the Bank began to focus on indigenous
issues when addressing environmental and social impacts of
infrastructure projects in areas of high biodiversity, particularly
tropical lowland areas inhabited by indigenous peoples. As a
result, the Bank has developed some procedures and guidelines
on environmental and social issues, including involuntary resettlement as well as indigenous peoples’ issues. During those
early years, because of the close link to fragile ecosystems in
tropical areas, there was a focus on tribal indigenous groups,
which are a minority in Latin America, comprising only 5 to
10% of all indigenous peoples on the continent (there are 40 to
50 million indigenous people in Latin America, about 10% of
the entire population).
In 1994, the IADB began to take a much more proactive
focus in developing projects where the focus would be on benefiting indigenous peoples rather than mitigating impacts. The
Bank now proactively seeks out opportunities to benefit indigenous peoples across a wide range of operations, including projects to improve health, education, and access to productive
opportunities. This shifting approach also implied a new concern for the needs and rights of peasant indigenous communities, the majority of which are in the Andes and in MesoAmerica. In addition, indigenous issues are no longer addressed
mainly through small grants but rather as an issue to be mainstreamed in the entire portfolio of bank projects and in policy
dialogue with its borrowing countries.
Drawing on the lessons learned from earlier stages, now, in
2004, the IADB is preparing an Indigenous Development
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Strategy and an Operational Policy on Indigenous Peoples, to
systematically promote: (1) “development with identity” of
indigenous peoples in a way that recognizes the fundamental
connection between culture and sustainable development; and
(2) the safeguarding of indigenous rights in all its operations.
This safeguarding aspect of the policy is becoming increasingly
important again, since the IADB portfolio will likely include
more infrastructure projects that require a strong normative
framework for protection and mitigation.

PIC CONSULTATION AND PARTICIPATION
AT THE IADB
While the terminology of PIC is relatively new at the
IADB, for a long time the IADB has applied consultation, participation, and information dissemination as important require-

Indigenous peoples are
increasingly interested in
using their assets for
improving their social and
economic conditions.
ments in its projects, as reflected in a new Strategy on Citizen
Participation in the Activities of the IADB (See
http://www.iadb.org/sds/SCS/publication_1470_1885_e.htm).
Since 1990, the IADB has followed Environment and Social
Impact Guidelines, which include the condition that tribal
indigenous groups have to be in agreement for projects affecting their territories. In 1998, the principle of PIC was included for indigenous peoples as part of the involuntary resettlement policy. Now, the recently approved Profile for the
Operational Policy on Indigenous Peoples includes PIC as one
of the principles to be addressed in the policy document currently under preparation.
*Anne Deruyttere is Chief of the Indigenous Peoples and Community
Development Unit (of the Sustainable Development Unit) at the Inter-American
Development Bank.
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It is important to consider a continuum of levels of participation in projects. A tentative ordering of the continuum spans
the following concepts from least to greatest participation: information-sharing, meaningful consultation, prior and informed
consent, participation in decision-making, co-management, and
self-management. The level of participation depends on the type
of project and its purpose. It also depends on whether the project is approaching indigenous communities from a mitigation
perspective, i.e. compensating for negative impacts, or from a
proactive perspective. But the idea is that these concepts, when
applied in practice, lead to the empowerment of indigenous peoples in the specific context in which they are operating.
Following the approval of the citizen participation strategy, the
IADB is developing a typology to determine the participation
requirements for a project. Among the factors considered are:
complexity of the project; the number of people impacted; the
impact and sustainability risks of the project itself; and the type
of population, whether it’s a very vulnerable indigenous population or a population more able to defend its rights.

The new Bank strategy
includes a focus on how
indigenous peoples are
inserted into market
economies by viewing the
intercultural economy as a
vehicle of social and
economic development.
THE EVOLVING CONCEPT OF INDIGENOUS
DEVELOPMENT
Over the years, the IADB has learned by working with
indigenous peoples that sustainable development is development with identity. Culture and identity cannot be separated
from sustainable economic and social development. Both are
part of the same coin, and both reinforce each other.
Indigenous peoples are increasingly interested in using their
assets of natural resources, cultural heritage, and social capital
as vehicles for improving their social and economic conditions.
As a result, the new Bank strategy will focus on: (1) creating
opportunities based on assets in addition to the conventional
focus on poverty reduction, (2) developing a strategy to
strengthen traditional territories, (3) looking at the way in
which indigenous peoples are inserted into market economies,
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and (4) focusing on the intercultural economy as a vehicle of
social and economic development, as well as a means of
strengthening identity and culture.

TABLE 1: FOCUS OF THE NEW IADB STRATEGY

PRECONDITIONS FOR PARTICIPATION AND
INFORMED CONSENT
It is important to have sound socio-cultural diagnostic
assessments when engaging in a project that involves indigenous peoples in order to facilitate the participation process. It is
important to understand the way indigenous peoples use their
territories and what concepts they apply to their territories. How
do they organize themselves in relation to those territories and
its resources? How can these concepts be articulated into sustainable land use planning and participatory community development processes?
A new type of project supporting integrated territoriallybased community development is becoming increasingly important in the Bank’s portfolio of projects. These projects start with
indigenous communities’ own plans for the future. In this context, consultation and participatory planning leads to the
empowerment of communities, which must take a leadership
role in their own development processes in order to be sustainable over the long term.
In order to support these territorially based projects, and
others that are focused on increasing community participation in
project design and execution, the IADB as an intergovernmental agency faces special challenges related to the promotion of
decentralized execution mechanisms, necessary to promote
greater involvement of local communities. This requires often
highly-centralized governments to implement mechanisms that
encourage local community development on the ground, while
at the same time ensuring inter-agency coordination and efficient resource allocation.
The Indigenous Development Strategy is drawing on the
lessons learned from earlier projects. This includes the need to
adopt more flexible funding mechanisms as opposed to the traSUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT LAW & POLICY

ditional project-based approach, which typically requires execution within a short four or five year period and no guarantees for
continuity. Also, institutional strengthening, capacity building,
and conflict resolution are now being included as key concepts
in projects, especially in local community development projects
with indigenous peoples. In some cases, the IADB has even
taken on the role of facilitator in what is often a very difficult
dialogue between the government and indigenous peoples.

GOOD PRACTICE AT THE BANK
Over the years, the IADB has developed a number of projects incorporating good practices such as participatory planning,
socio-cultural issues, decentralized execution mechanisms, the
linkages between the strengthening of environmentally- and territorially-based aspects to local participation in management
and decision-making. Examples of these approaches include
the PAPIN ethnoengineering project in Honduras, the Darién
Sustainable Development Project in Panamá and the Origenes
indigenous community development program in Chile. (For
more information about specific projects, please visit
http://www.iadb.org/sds/IND/index_ind_e.htm.)
During initial project design, these projects employed a relatively simple but effective methodology helping communities
to define their problems and aspirations, assess their alternatives, and then identify and prioritize the community infrastructure they want built, as in the case of the ethnoengineering project in Honduras. Afterwards, the design process involves communities in deciding the site and location of the project, direction of the infrastructure, and respecting local customs in terms
of its location and structural elements. In addition to this, the
methodology implies taking into account the community
dynamics and potential conflicts, the function of the infrastruc-
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ture, the environmental adequacy, use of local materials and
local workforce, and the cultural aesthetic.
During the execution and operation phase, implementation agreements are signed that include consent of local communities, and also consider market forces, the availability of
specialists in the area, the advantage of economies of scale,
and the combination of efforts in different communities.
There is also a sustainability plan for local materials, because
in many communities, local resources disappear fast as a result
of environmental pressures, so there is a concern to maintain a
supply of local materials while working with the government
to implement the project. Most importantly, execution and
operation requires local participation and a concerted effort to
get everyone to agree.
The maintenance agreement was established between several different segments of the indigenous community. Often,
indigenous communities are not homogenous, and different sectors may benefit more or less from the infrastructure that is built.
One of the problems with maintenance is that these different
segments are not equally interested in ensuring long term maintenance. The methodology therefore calls for baseline studies of
social organization and traditional economy, the concepts of cultural land use, the availability of natural resources and local
materials, and the “world view” of indigenous peoples related to
infrastructure.
By drawing on local values and aspirations, achieving consensus among the different stakeholders, empowering communities to direct their own processes and ensuring local ownership, the long term maintenance and sustainability of the development effort is ensured.
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INDIGENOUS PEOPLES’ RIGHT TO FREE, PRIOR
AND INFORMED CONSENT AND THE WORLD
BANK’S EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES REVIEW
by Fergus MacKay*
INTRODUCTION

I

ndigenous peoples’ right to free, prior and informed consent
(“FPIC”) is gaining increasing currency in international
law, particularly in the jurisprudence of international human
rights bodies and pursuant to the Convention on Biological
Diversity. In some areas, such as use of traditional knowledge,
resettlement and certain development-related activities affecting
indigenous peoples’ traditional lands, the law is clear: indigenous peoples have the right to give or withhold their consent.
FPIC has also been recognized and accepted by a number of
intergovernmental organizations and international bodies (see
Box 1) and increasingly in domestic laws and jurisprudence.
The World Bank Group (“WBG”) is a notable exception
despite two major reviews, both commissioned by the WBG,
which recommend incorporation of FPIC into WBG policy and
practice with special reference to indigenous peoples. The first
was the World Commission on Dams, which made detailed recommendations in relation to FPIC,1 all of which were rejected
by the WBG.2 The second, and focus of this article, the World
Bank’s Extractive Industries Review (“EIR”), is presently under
consideration by WBG management prior to submission to the
Board of Directors.3 In a leaked January 2004 WBG management response to the EIR’s Final Report, the WBG again rejected FPIC. The WBG has also stated its opposition to FPIC on a
number occasions in the past eight years in response to indigenous peoples’ long standing demands that FPIC must be a fundamental component of WBG safeguard policies. This short
article provides an overview of the EIR and its implications for
the WBG, and takes a closer look at FPIC, its components and
its bases in international law.

THE EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES REVIEW
The EIR was commissioned in 2001 by the President of the
WBG, James Wolfensohn, to examine what role, if any, the
WBG has in the oil, gas, and mining sectors, generically known
as extractive industries (“EI”). This was done largely in
response to a concerted campaign by non-governmental organizations, Friends of the Earth in particular, who rallied around the
slogan “World Bank Get Your Ass out of Oil and Gas”.
President Wolfensohn appointed Dr. Emil Salim, former
Indonesian minister for the environment, as the “Eminent
Person” charged with conducting the EIR in July 2001.
The EIR comprised a two year-long process of regional
“stakeholder” meetings, project site visits, commissioned
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research on particular issues, consideration of two internal
WBG evaluations relating to extractive industries,4 and dialogue with World Bank staff.5 The EIR’s Final Report, presented to the WBG in January 2004, was authored by Dr. Salim and
contains a number of potentially far reaching recommendations
about how the WBG conducts business and how human rights,
including indigenous peoples’ rights and FPIC, should be
accounted for and respected in WBG policies and operations.6
While restricted to EI, these recommendations affect a wide
range of WBG operations in other sectors as well as cross-cutting policy issues.

THE EIR’S RECOMMENDATIONS
Poverty Alleviation and Sustainable Development
The WBG’s professed mission and mandate is poverty alleviation through sustainable development.7 The EIR assessed
WBG involvement in EI primarily along these lines: can EI
projects be compatible with the WBG’s goals of sustainable
development and poverty reduction? The Final Report defines
poverty from a human rights perspective, adopting the views of
the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,8
and centres sustainable development on human beings, communities, and societies rather than on purely economic grounds
(various forms of capital).9 It also recognizes that for indigenous peoples, poverty alleviation and sustainable development
may have additional or nuanced interpretations and requirements and must include effective guarantees for territorial rights
and the right to self-determination.10
Noting that EI projects do not necessarily contribute to
poverty alleviation,11 the Final Report recommends that the
WBG should not increase its involvement in EI projects without
addressing a series of prior conditions.12 These conditions
relate both to borrower and corporate governance as well as
institutional reforms within the WBG. The three main
“enabling conditions” for EI to contribute to poverty alleviation
are defined as: 1) pro-poor public and corporate governance,
including proactive planning and management to maximize
poverty alleviation through sustainable development; 2) respect
for human rights; and 3) much more effective WBG social and
environmental policies.13
*Fergus MacKay is Coordinator of the Legal and Human Rights Programme at
Forest Peoples Programme (fergus@euronet.nl). He was also a member of the
Eminent Person’s Advisory Panel, which advised on the contents of the EIR
Report.
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Governance Criteria
The Final Report asserts that, if the WBG is to comply with
its poverty alleviation mandate, strict conditions must be applied
to EI projects. One of these (pre)conditions is the need to assess
and strengthen governance. In addition to issues such as revenue
sharing and corruption, specified governance criteria include (at
the macro level): the quality of the rule of law; the absence of
armed conflict or a high risk of such conflict; the government’s
respect for labour standards and human rights, as indicated by its
ratification of and adherence to international human rights
treaties; and recognition of and willingness to protect the internationally guaranteed rights of indigenous peoples.14

Human Rights
Quoting from the Final Declaration of the 1993 Vienna
World Conference on Human Rights, the Final Report concludes, “while development facilitates the enjoyment of all
human rights, the lack of development may not be invoked to

The [World Bank Group]
cannot hope to gain “broad
community acceptance” if
indigenous peoples . . . are
from the outset told that
their agreement is not an
issue. . .
justify the abridgement of internationally recognized human
rights.”15 It further concludes that that the “WBG must internalize and respect this principle, both in terms of its operating
polices and in its relations with borrowers and clients;”16 and,
highlighting labour rights, indigenous peoples’ rights, and
women’s rights, this “must reflect and be consistent with the
WBG’s obligations as a subject of international law and
account for the obligations incumbent upon its borrowers by
virtue of ratified human rights instruments and customary international law.”17
Following these conclusions, the Final Report recommends
that, among others, the WBG:

• Develops a system-wide policy that integrates and
mainstreams human rights into all areas of WBG
policy and practice and ensures that its polices and
operations are, at a minimum, consistent with its
obligations, as a subject of international law, in relation to international human rights law;
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• Ensures that it does not undermine the ability of its
member countries to faithfully fulfil their international obligations or facilitate or assist violation of
those obligations. … At a minimum, the WBG
should assess state obligations and ensure that its
operations, including macro-level intervention such
as structural adjustment, do not violate those obligations;

• Systematically incorporates experienced, independent, and reputable third parties to verify the status of
human rights in all relevant projects;

• Establishes a central human rights unit, with regional counterparts, with a clear policy and a mandate
for monitoring, verification, and transparent annual
audits;

• Should assess the human rights records of companies, particularly regarding the International Finance
Corporation (“IFC”) and the Multilateral Investment
Guarantee Agency (“MIGA”) including their policies on human rights and indigenous peoples, and
should ensure that funded projects are designed and
implemented in a manner consistent with applicable
international human rights standards.18 Adoption of
and demonstrated compliance with human rights
principles should be a prerequisite for companies
seeking IFC and MIGA support for extractive industries;

• Should ideally adopt a rights-based approach to
development and ensure that its support for projects
is directed toward fulfilling internationally guaranteed human rights, and, in particular, it should
address power imbalances that affect the full exercise and enjoyment of all human rights by the poor
and most vulnerable.19
These recommendations partly coincide with the findings
of the WBG’s Compliance Advisor Ombudsman in a report on
IFC and MIGA involvement with EI done for the EIR.
Observing that neither IFC nor MIGA systematically consider
human rights and labour rights in relation to EI projects, the
report stated that:
This is not to suggest that wider human rights concerns
in individual countries should serve as a barrier to
entry of IFC or MIGA (unless this is the stated policy
of the World Bank group). Instead, IFC and MIGA
should more systematically consider potential risks to
human rights at the project level, take appropriate steps
to mitigate them, and provide clear guidance to clients
on both of these aspects. Where relevant, these aspects
should be reported on at the project level.20
Another internal evaluation also recommended increased
attention to human rights in the context of WBG safeguard and
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other policies, particularly where these policies lag behind
industry best practice.21

Indigenous Peoples’ Rights
The Final Report acknowledges indigenous peoples’ largely negative experiences with EI and observes that “[f]ailure to
recognize and respect [their] rights undermines efforts to alleviate indigenous peoples’ poverty and to achieve sustainable
development.”22 Recommendations are made on a number of
issues including the right to free, prior and informed consent;
the right to be free from involuntary resettlement; prior recognition of and respect for indigenous peoples’ rights to own and
control their traditional lands, territories and resources; and the
revision of the current World Bank safeguard policy on indigenous peoples.

Free, Prior and Informed Consent
The Final Report concludes that “indigenous peoples and
other affected parties do have the right to participate in decisionmaking and to give their free,
prior and informed consent
throughout each phase of a project cycle. FPIC should be seen
as the principal determinant of
whether there is a “social license
to operate” and hence is a major
tool for deciding whether to support
an
operation.”23
Accordingly, the Final Report
recommends that the “WBG
should ensure that borrowers
and clients engage in consent
processes with indigenous peoples and local communities
directly affected by oil, gas, and
mining projects, to obtain their
free, prior and informed consent.”24 It specifies that FPIC is
an internationally guaranteed right for indigenous peoples and
part of “obtaining social license and demonstrable public
acceptance for the project [in the case of non-indigenous local
communities].”25 The Final Report further recommends that
“the WBG should ensure that indigenous peoples’ right to FPIC
is incorporated and respected in its Safeguard Policies and project related instruments;”26 and “[r]esettlement should only be
allowed if the indigenous community has given free and prior
informed consent, there are guarantees of a right to return once
the reason for resettlement ceases to exist, and subsequent to
agreement on resettlement benefits.”27
With regard to the nature of FPIC, the Final Report states:

and companies may come to mutual agreements in a
forum that gives affected communities enough leverage
to negotiate conditions under which they may proceed
and an outcome leaving the community clearly better
off. Companies have to make the offer attractive
enough for host communities to prefer that the project
happen and negotiate agreements on how the project
can take place and therefore give the company a “social
license” to operate. Clearly, such consent processes
ought to take different forms in different cultural settings. However, they should always be undertaken in a
way that incorporates and requires the FPIC of affected
indigenous peoples and local communities.28
Finally, the Final Report recommends that it is “necessary
to include covenants in project agreements that provide for multiparty negotiated and enforceable agreements that govern various project activities, should indigenous peoples and local communities consent to the project.”29 This is an interesting
idea that deserves consideration, particularly given the documented deficiencies in the
WBG’s implementation of its
safeguard policies.30 The project agreement is the primary
legal document pertaining to a
project and would presumably
accord indigenous peoples
standing to challenge (further)
implementation of the project
in cases of alleged breach.

Without secure and
enforceable rights to
lands, territories and
resources, indigenous
peoples’ means of
subsistence, their identity
and survival, are
permanently threatened.

Free prior and informed consent should not be understood as a one-off, yes-no vote or as a veto power for a
single person or group. Rather, it is a process by which
indigenous peoples, local communities, government,
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Prior Recognition of
Rights to Lands,
Territories, and Resources

The Final Report emphasizes the importance to indigenous peoples of secure and effective territorial rights and concludes that failure to recognize
these rights “undermines efforts to alleviate indigenous peoples’
poverty and to achieve sustainable development” and “jeopardize[s] the potential for development and poverty alleviation
It further concludes that
from the extractives sector.”31
“[s]tructural reforms and legal codes that provide for automatic
approval of exploration and development concessions on
indigenous lands, territories, and resources without the participation and the free prior and informed consent of these peoples
and communities only exacerbate the problem.”32
The corresponding recommendations state that “the WBG
should not support extractive industry projects that affect
indigenous peoples without prior recognition of and effective
guarantees for indigenous peoples’ rights to own, control, and
manage their lands, territories, and resources” and “the WBG
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should promote only those “sector reforms” that concomitantly
recognize and guarantee indigenous peoples’ rights to lands, territories, and resources traditionally owned or otherwise occupied and used by them.”33
The WBG’s own internal review of its safeguard policy on
indigenous peoples reached the same conclusion in April 2003:
It is important to consider the customary rights of
[indigenous peoples] to land when determining adverse
effects, especially where such land is not yet legally
titled. This is important even in technical assistance projects that involve institutional and regulatory changes to
facilitate increased investment in exploitation of natural
resources. In such cases there may be need for
[Indigenous Peoples Development Plans] that ensure
adequate measures or regulatory frameworks are in
place to protect legitimate [indigenous peoples’] interests, should such commercial exploitation materialize.34

Compensatory Off-sets
Compensatory offsets are required under the World Bank’s
safeguard policy on Natural Habitats for projects that cause a
significant conversion of natural habitat.35 Should this occur,
borrowers are required to establish “off-sets,” such as national
parks and other protected areas to compensate for habitat loss.
Indigenous peoples have complained that in some cases they are
negatively affected by an extractive project and that their rights
are further infringed by the establishment of an off-set.36 The
Final Report therefore recommends that “[s]pecial attention
must always be paid to ensuring that the rights of indigenous
peoples to their lands, territories, and resources traditionally
owned or otherwise occupied and used are respected when
choosing and designing an offset.”37

Submarine and Riverine Tailings Disposal
The EIR Report notes that submarine and riverine disposal
of mining wastes has had a sometimes severe, negative impact
on indigenous peoples and local communities. Consequently, it
“recommends that submarine and riverine tailings disposal not
be used in areas such as coral reefs that have important ecological functions or cultural significance or in coastal waters used
by indigenous peoples and local communities for subsistence
purposes.”38

Draft Operational Policy 4.10 on Indigenous Peoples
The Final Report notes that Operational Directive 4.20 on
Indigenous Peoples 1991, the WBG’s current safeguard policy, is
presently being converted to a new format known as draft
Operational Policy/Best Practice 4.10 on Indigenous Peoples.39 It
also observes that the present draft has been “repeatedly repudiated by indigenous peoples” and concludes that “[t]o be legitimate
and effective, a Safeguard Policy must be seen by the intended
beneficiaries to provide adequate safeguards and must be consistent with their internationally guaranteed rights. This is presently
not the case [with draft OP 4.10].”40 It recommends that:
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• With the meaningful participation of indigenous people, the WBG should revise its safeguard policy on
indigenous peoples and ensure that it is consistent
with indigenous peoples’ rights in international law;

• The WBG must also ensure that there is consensus
among indigenous peoples about the contents of the
policy – the policy’s beneficiaries must consider that
it provides adequate safeguards; and

• The WBG should refrain from approving the current draft OP 4.10 before high-level discussions
with indigenous peoples, including a legal roundtable discussion between WBG lawyers, indigenous
representatives, and legal experts on the consistency of the policy with internationally guaranteed
human rights.41
Highlighting the importance of attention to indigenous peoples’ rights in relation to OP 4.10, Dr. Salim’s letter to President
Wolfensohn submitted with the Final Report in January 2004
states that “the revision of the safeguard policy on indigenous
peoples is a fundamental test of the World Bank’s commitment
to poverty alleviation through sustainable development.”42

“Phase Out” of Oil and Coal by 2008
The EIR recommends that the WBG “phases out” investment in oil production and maintains its current freeze on new
coal projects, and, instead, focuses on investment in and promotion of renewable energy sources.43 For many indigenous
peoples, especially those in the Artic and small island states, climate change is a pressing and very real concern.44 Therefore,
this recommendation is seen as a valuable step in assisting states
to meet the targets set by the Kyoto Protocol, particularly as the
WBG has a strong influence on policy development and legislative reform initiatives in many of its borrower countries.45 It
has been correctly noted that this recommendation will not
affect some of the major producers of greenhouse gasses, such
as the United States.

WBG Accountability/Institutional Issues
The preceding issues are all in someway related to larger
issues about the role of the WBG, particularly in light of its
mandate of poverty alleviation through sustainable development, its institutional standards and procedures and its accountability to not only its member states, but also to those affected
by its operations. In the Final Report, particular attention is
given to the WBG’s safeguard policies as these are held up by
the WBG as front line protection for persons, communities and
peoples who may be affected by its operations.
On safeguard policies, the Final Report concludes that
“[t]he reality in the field suggests that the current Safeguard
Policies have been unable to ensure that ‘no harm is done’ and
that this is due to both poor implementation rates and deficiencies in the policies themselves.”46 In so concluding, it quotes a
2002 World Bank Operations Evaluation Department report,
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which states that “performance in the area of safeguards has
been only partially satisfactory. Fundamental reform of implementation and accountability processes is crucial. . . . The current system does not provide the appropriate accountability
structure to meet the WBG’s commitments to incorporate environmental sustainability into its core objectives and to mainstream the environment into its operations.”47
Concerning safeguard policies and human rights, the Final
Report recommends that the “WBG should make explicit the
human rights basis for each Safeguard Policy; where a policy
may lie outside international human rights law, it should be
brought into line with current thinking and standards. The
Safeguard Policies should become an explicit tool for ensuring
that the WBG respects human rights, and the staff in extractive
industries should receive adequate training to be able to implement the human rights dimensions of these policies.”48 It adds
that “[c]ompliance rates with existing Safeguard Policies are
often far below acceptable and, in some cases, the substance of
the policies is inconsistent with internationally recognized
rights. Much greater emphasis needs to be placed on ensuring
compliance with Safeguard Policies and the consistency of these
policies with human rights.”49
Discussing institutional issues in general, the Final Report
concludes that “crucially, WBG does not appear to be set up to
effectively facilitate and promote poverty alleviation through
sustainable development;”50 and “the institution itself needs to
implement a number of serious reforms—changes in the composition of its portfolio, improvements and reinforced implementation of its Safeguard Policies, increased coordination across the
arms of the WBG, and changes in WBG staff incentives.”51

None of these three arguments is tenable. First, some governments and some industry groups do in fact support FPIC. A
number of governments have included the right in their domestic legislation and have supported it in international fora.56
Industry groups such as the International Petroleum Industry
Environmental Conservation Association and the International
Association of Oil & Gas Producers have stated, as quoted in the
Final Report, that “it is important for communities to be able to
give free and informed consent.”57 While a number of governments and EI companies are vociferously opposed to FPIC, the
WBG should be questioned about whether the EI companies and
governments should be allowed to veto indigenous peoples’
human rights.
Second, the WBG cannot hope to gain “broad community
acceptance” if indigenous peoples and communities are from
the outset told that their agreement is not an issue. As the Final

[World Bank Group]
studies . . . have
recognised the economic
costs of discrimination
against indigenous
peoples.

THE DRAFT MANAGEMENT RESPONSE TO THE EIR
As part of the terms of reference for the EIR, WBG management committed to providing a response to the recommendations developed by Dr. Salim prior to submitting the Final
Report to its Board of Executive Directors. A draft Management
Response (“dMR”) was “leaked” in January 2004.52 The dMR
is not encouraging for those who believe that respect for human
rights, including indigenous peoples’ rights, is fundamental to
poverty alleviation and sustainable development and requires
much greater attention by the WBG. For the most part there is
no substantive response to EIR recommendations on human
rights and indigenous peoples’ rights; the dMR repeatedly says
that these are under consideration as part of other ongoing internal reviews and that a formal response or position is dependent
on their outcomes. On certain specific issues, however, a
response is proffered. The dMR, for instance, rejects FPIC, stating that “[g]overnments and industry do not support free prior
informed consent, where this would represent a veto on development.”53 Instead, “[t]he WBG will continue to aim for broad
community acceptance of developments that impact them…”54
and “[d]iscussions with communities need to take place in the
context of local law which may or may not give rights [of] prior
informed consent ….”55
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Report concludes, FPIC should be seen as the principal determinant of whether there is community acceptance, or in industry terms, a social license to operate, and hence is a principal
tool to be used in deciding whether to support the operation.
This is all the more important given that the WBG’s own performance evaluations have found that indigenous peoples’ participation in WBG projects is typically “low,”58 and that only 38
percent of a sample of WBG projects which applied the safeguard policy on indigenous peoples satisfactorily mitigated
adverse impacts and ensured benefits for indigenous peoples.59
Moreover, one review found that “project results for [indigenous peoples] were not as satisfactory in the energy and mining,
transportation, and environment sectors, which comprised 65
percent of Bank commitments evaluated for this second phase,
and include projects with significant potential to harm IP. The
majority of these projects neither mitigated adverse effects on
[indigenous peoples] nor ensured that they received an equitable
share of benefits.”60 Sustainability of results for indigenous
peoples in all project types was also generally much lower than
overall project sustainability indicators.61
As to the third argument, it is ironic that WBG management
justifies rejection of FPIC on the basis of compliance with the
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law. As discussed below, FPIC is an internationally guaranteed
right for indigenous peoples that is a source of obligation for the
vast majority of the Bank’s borrowers, obligations the Bank is
bound by international law not to undermine.62 International
law protects the rights of indigenous peoples to their traditionally used and occupied lands. These rights include FPIC regardless of whether a state’s domestic law recognizes those rights.
Furthermore, existing WBG policies rightfully require borrowers to comply with conditions not established by domestic law.
Indigenous peoples’ right to participate, for instance, is not recognized in the laws of a number of countries, yet the WBG’s
present policy requires such participation in WBG-financed
operations. Also, WBG policy is not to support a project that
employs forced or child labour irrespective of whether national
law prohibits these practices.
Finally, it is relevant in this context to note that the Bank’s
Operational Policy 4.01 on Environmental Assessment clearly
states that “the Bank takes into account … the obligations of the
country, pertaining to project activities, under relevant international environmental treaties and agreements. The Bank does not
finance project activities that would contravene such country obligations, as identified during the [Environmental Assessment].”63
OP 4.36 on Forestry similarly states that “the Bank does not
finance projects that contravene applicable international environmental agreements.”64 If this is possible with regard to environmental obligations, is there a compelling reason why human
rights obligations should not be accorded equal status?

THE JUNE 2004 MANAGEMENT RESPONSE
On 17 June 2004, the WBG released its formal
Management Response (“MR”) to the EIR, along with a notice
that its Board of Executive Directors had delayed consideration
of the Final Report and Management Response pending conclusion of a 30 day period of public comment.65 While the MR as
a whole deserves consideration, particularly as much of it fails
to adequately address the EIR’s recommendations, I will focus
here only on how it addresses FPIC.
As discussed above, the EIR clearly recommends that the
Bank should not fund projects unless indigenous peoples’
free, prior and informed consent has been obtained. However,
the standard proposed in the MR can be boiled down to free,
prior and informed consultation resulting in informed participation that leads to “broad community acceptance” of the
project. The MR adds that the “Bank Group will only support
extractive industry projects that have the broad support of
affected communities (including Indigenous Peoples communities). This does not mean a veto power for individuals or
any group, but it does mean that the Bank Group requires a
process of free, prior, and informed consultation with affected communities that leads to broad acceptance by them of the
project.”66 This point is repeated in the Annex, which says
that “[d]iscussions with communities should provide meaningful consultation and result in informed participation. The
Bank Group will support only those extractive industry projSUMMER 2004

ects that have the broad support of affected communities. …
Our Indigenous Peoples policy is being revised to reflect this
principle, and will be discussed by the Board of Executive
Directors shortly.”67
The only language in the draft Indigenous Peoples Policy
(“OP”) that could be construed to be consistent with the above
statements in the MR is in paragraph 15 (“Disclosure and Bank
Review”). Paragraph 15 reads:
Throughout this review, the Bank pays particular
attention to the record and outcomes of consultations
with the affected Indigenous Peoples and the social
assessment as a basis for determining whether the
Bank proceeds with project processing. In making
this determination, the Bank also pays particular
attention to the degree to which Indigenous Peoples
support the project.68
Moreover, with regard to commercial exploitation of natural resources – defined in the OP as “minerals, hydrocarbon
resources, forests, water, and hunting/fishing grounds” – in
indigenous peoples’ territories, paragraph 18 of the OP merely
requires that “the borrower ensures that as part of the consultation process these indigenous peoples are informed of (a) their
rights to such resources under statutory and customary law; (b)
the scope and nature of such proposed commercial development
and the parties involved or interested in such development; and
(c) the potential effects of such development on their livelihoods, environments, and use of natural resources.” Indigenous
peoples should also share equitably in the benefits in a culturally appropriate manner and the “benefits, compensation and
rights to due process are at least equivalent to what any
landowner would be entitled to in the case of commercial development on their land.”
Whether this language (“broad acceptance” or “broad support”) could amount to FPIC is dependent on how it will be
operationalized in the OP itself and whether a negative formulation – “will support only” or “will not support” – is
employed. It is equally dependent on interpreting the language
“broad acceptance” to include decisions reached pursuant to
indigenous peoples’ customary decision making processes and
whether demonstrable acceptance or support is the decisive
factor in determining whether the project moves forward. The
language in the OP does not presently allow for such an interpretation insofar as it requires only that the Bank “also pays
particular attention to the degree to which Indigenous Peoples
support the project,” thereby implying that their acceptance is
one of a number of factors that will be evaluated. That this
appears to be the position adopted in the MR is further illustrated in the language on involuntary resettlement, which states
that “[t]he WBG will commit to taking the community’s views
on the project into account in determining whether to proceed
with project processing.”69
While the MR may be viewed as an improvement over
the outright rejection of FPIC in the dMR, particularly the lat48

ter’s reference to domestic law, the WBG’s seemingly cynical
misappropriation and manipulation of FPIC as free, prior and
informed consultation will undoubtedly be condemned by
indigenous peoples. Concerns will also be raised that applying (as yet undefined) a “broad community acceptance” standard undermines indigenous peoples’ internationally guaranteed right to consent to activities that affect them and equates
indigenous peoples and their rights to those of any local community. In effect, this negates indigenous peoples’ self-determining status and rights by casting indigenous peoples as no
more than a sub-set of local communities, a term that has little meaning and few attendant rights in international law. As
discussed below, this is also contrary to a large body of
jurisprudence and international practice that holds that FPIC
is the standard that applies to activities affecting indigenous
peoples and their territories, particularly in the context of
extractive industries.

FREE, PRIOR AND INFORMED CONSENT
WHAT IS FPIC?
FPIC means the consensus/consent of indigenous peoples
determined in accordance with their customary laws and practices. This does not necessarily mean that every single member
must agree, but rather that consensus will be determined pursuant to customary law and practice. In some cases, indigenous
peoples may choose to express their consent through procedures
and institutions that are not formally or entirely based on customary law and practice, such as statutory councils or tribal governments. Regardless of the nature of the process, the affected
indigenous peoples retain the right to refuse consent or to withhold consent until certain conditions are met. Consent must be
obtained without coercion, prior to commencement of activities,
and after the project proponent’s full disclosure of the intent and
scope of the activity, in language and process understandable to
the affected indigenous peoples and communities.
In its procedural form, FPIC is an administrative process
which enables both the affected indigenous peoples and the project proponents to put all their concerns on the table and identify
solutions to problems before the affected groups decide on
whether to give consent. It may be required in a number of project stages, i.e., options assessment, social, cultural and environmental impact assessment, exploration, exploitation, or closure.70

WHY IS FPIC IMPORTANT?
Threats to indigenous peoples’ rights and well-being are particularly acute in relation to resource exploitation projects, regardless of whether the projects are state- or corporate-directed. Many
of these projects and operations have had and continue to have a
devastating impact on indigenous peoples, undermining their
ability to sustain themselves physically, spiritually, and culturally.71 Numerous reports confirm that this experience with EI is not
confined to the past and is “one of the major human rights problems faced by [indigenous peoples] in recent decades.”72
The WBG has also recognized that indigenous peoples
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“have often been on the losing end of the development process”
and that the vast majority of development benefits go to others.73
Indeed, the WBG’s first policy on indigenous peoples Operational Manual Statement 2.34 Tribal People in BankFinanced Projects – was adopted in response to “internal and
external condemnation of the disastrous experiences of indigenous groups in Bank-financed projects in the Amazon region.”74
Specifically on EI projects, an internal WBG review observes
that mining and energy projects: “risk and endanger the lives,
assets, and livelihoods of [indigenous peoples]. Moreover, modern technology allows interventions in hitherto remote areas,
causing significant displacement and irreparable damage to IP
land and assets. In this context, IP living on these remote and
resource rich lands are particularly vulnerable, because of their
weaker bargaining capacity, and because their customary rights
are not recognized in several countries.”75
Writing as UN Special Rapporteur on indigenous land
rights, Daes observes that:
The legacy of colonialism is probably most acute in the
area of expropriation of indigenous lands, territories
and resources for national economic and development
interests. In every sector of the globe, indigenous peoples are being impeded in every conceivable way from
proceeding with their own forms of development, consistent with their own values, perspectives and interests.
Much large-scale economic and industrial development
has taken place without recognition of and respect for
indigenous peoples’ rights to lands, territories and
resources. Economic development has been largely
imposed from outside, with complete disregard for the
right of indigenous peoples to participate in the control,
implementation and benefits of development.76
For indigenous peoples, secure and effective collective
property rights are fundamental to their economic and social
development, to their physical and cultural integrity, and to their
livelihoods and sustenance. Secure land and resource rights are
also essential for the maintenance of their worldviews and spirituality and, in short, to their very survival as viable territorial
and distinct cultural collectivities.77 The Inter-American Court
of Human Rights recognized this in 2001, stating that:
[T]he close ties of indigenous people with the land must
be recognized and understood as the fundamental basis
of their cultures, their spiritual life, their integrity, and
their economic survival. For indigenous communities,
relations to the land are not merely a matter of possession and production but a material and spiritual element
that they must fully enjoy, even to preserve their cultural legacy and transmit it to future generations.78
This multifaceted nature of indigenous peoples’ relationship to land, as well as the relationship between development
and territorial rights, was emphasized by Mary Robinson in her
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December 2001 Presidential Fellow’s Lecture at the World
Bank. She opines that, for indigenous peoples:
[E]conomic improvements cannot be envisaged without protection of land and resource rights. Rights over
land need to include recognition of the spiritual relation indigenous peoples have with their ancestral territories. And the economic base that land provides needs
to be accompanied by a recognition of indigenous peoples’ own political and legal institutions, cultural traditions and social organizations. Land and culture, development, spiritual values and knowledge are as one. To
fail to recognize one is to fail on all.79
In short, without secure and enforceable rights to lands, territories and resources, including the right to control activities
affecting them, indigenous peoples’ means of subsistence, their

The Extractive Industries
Review’s conclusion that
the World Bank Group is
not “set up to effectively
facilitate and promote
poverty alleviation. . .” is
sobering in light of the
WBG’s mandate.
identity and survival, and their socio-cultural integrity and economic security are permanently threatened. There is therefore a
complex of interdependent human rights all converging on and
inherent to indigenous peoples’ various relationships with their
traditional lands and territories – lands and territories that form
“the fundamental basis of their cultures, their spiritual life, their
integrity, and their economic survival”80 – as well as their status
as self-determining entities that necessitates a very high standard of affirmative protection.81 That standard is FPIC, which
is all the more necessary in relation to EI that have proved in
most cases to be highly prejudicial to indigenous peoples’ rights
and well being.
In addition to respect for human rights guarantees, there are
also a number of practical reasons why FPIC is necessary for
indigenous peoples. These are clearly related to human rights
guarantees and the underlying rationale for protection. For
example, decisions about whether and how to exploit natural
resources are normally justified in the national interest, which is
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generally interpreted as the interest of the majority. The result
is that the rights and interests of unrepresented groups, such as
indigenous peoples and others, will often be subordinated to the
majority interest. Conflict, sometimes violent, often ensues.82
FPIC (in theory at least) guarantees that the rights and interests
of indigenous peoples will be accounted for and respected and
minimizes potential for conflict. It also provides the basis for
ensuring that indigenous peoples will benefit from any extractive project on their lands and that negative impacts will be
properly assessed, avoided and mitigated.
Finally, it may be argued that FPIC makes economic sense
given the costs often incurred in forcing indigenous peoples (and
others) to accept EI projects (police and military expenditures, for
instance), and related to litigation. According to some estimates,
restarting the Panguna copper mine in Bouganville, “where corporate practices were directly implicated in provoking civil war,
allegedly cost [the mining company,] Rio Tinto, $3 billion.”83
WBG studies, as well as other studies, have recognised the economic costs of discrimination against indigenous peoples.84
Companies also often place an economic value on their reputation, i.e. reputational costs, which may be severely damaged in
conflicts with indigenous peoples. None of these costs are factored into cost-benefit analyses of WBG investments in EI.

INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INDIGENOUS PEOPLES’
RIGHTS TO FPIC
International human rights law places clear and substantial
obligations on states in connection with resource exploitation on
indigenous lands and territories. Consistent with the Final
Declaration of the 1993 Vienna World Conference on Human
Rights,85 the UN Human Rights Committee has stated that a
state’s freedom to encourage economic development is limited
by the obligations it has assumed under international human
rights law.86 The Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights has observed that state policy and practice concerning
resource exploitation cannot take place in a vacuum that ignores
its human rights obligations,87 as have the African Commission
on Human and Peoples’ Rights88 and other intergovernmental
human rights bodies.89
In contemporary international law, indigenous peoples have
the right to participate in decision making and to give or withhold their consent to activities affecting their traditional lands,
territories and resources. Consent must be freely given,
obtained prior to final authorization and implementation of
activities, and be founded upon an understanding of the full
range of issues implicated by the activity or decision in question. Hence the formulation – free, prior and informed consent
or prior informed consent.

Textual Expressions
Very few international instruments, expressly or impliedly,
contain language detailing the right of indigenous peoples to
FPIC. Although not spelled out, FPIC is certainly required pursuant to the right to self-determination as set forth in Common
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Article 1 of the International Covenants on Human Rights as
part of indigenous peoples’ right to freely determine their political status, freely pursue the economic, social and cultural development and freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources.
While the draft UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples, which restates the right to self-determination and specifies that this is also a right of indigenous peoples, has yet to be
approved, both the UN Human Rights Committee and the
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (“HRC”)
have applied the right to indigenous peoples with a particular
emphasis on resource rights. They have both found, for
instance, that unilateral extinguishment of indigenous peoples’
rights to lands and resources contravenes Article 1(2).90 The
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights also found
a violation of this right, as expressed in Article 21 of the African
Charter, in the 2002 Ogoni Case.91 In its complaints-based
jurisprudence, the HRC has also related the right to self-determination to the right of indigenous peoples (minorities) to enjoy
their culture under Article 27 of the ICCPR.92
International Labour Organization Convention No. 169,
presently the only binding instrument exclusively concerned
with indigenous peoples’ rights, employs different standards
ranging from consultation to participation and, in the case of
relocation, informed consent. Article 6(2) requires that consultation be undertaken “in good faith … in a form appropriate to
the circumstances, with the objective of achieving agreement or
consent.” This does not require consent, but does require that it
be the objective of consultations. This is often overlooked,
including by the ILO, when examining complaints filed by
indigenous peoples,93 but it is an important requirement of the
Convention that establishes, at a minimum, a moral obligation
to seek and obtain consent.94 This provision must be read in
connection with Article 7(1), which provides that “[t]he people
concerned shall have the right to decide their own priorities for
the process of development as it affects their lives, beliefs, institutions and spiritual well-being and the lands they occupy or
otherwise use, and to exercise control, to the extent possible,
over their own economic, social and cultural development.”
The Convention on Biological Diversity, Article 8(j),
requires that the traditional knowledge of indigenous and local
communities may only be used with their “approval”, which
has subsequently been interpreted to mean with their prior
informed consent or their FPIC.95 This principle has also
found its way into ongoing CBD work on Access and Benefit
Sharing,96 CBD guidelines on environmental and social impact
assessment97 as well as regional standards on access and benefit sharing adopted by the African Union98 and the Andean
Community.99 Similar language is also found in the
Convention to Combat Desertification.100

Jurisprudence
There is considerably more jurisprudence on FPIC than
there is text in international instruments. For example, observing that indigenous peoples “have lost their land and resources
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to colonists, commercial companies and State enterprises,”101
the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination
called upon state-parties to “ensure that members of indigenous
peoples have equal rights in respect of effective participation in
public life, and that no decisions directly relating to their rights
and interests are taken without their informed consent.”102 It
relates the right to informed consent to the right to participate
found in Article 5(c) of the Convention and has made repeated
reference to the preceding language in its decisions and concluding observations.103
In 2001, the UN Committee on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights noted “with regret that the traditional lands of
indigenous peoples have been reduced or occupied, without their
consent, by timber, mining and oil companies, at the expense of
the exercise of their culture and the equilibrium of the ecosystem.”104 It then recommended that the state “ensure the participation of indigenous peoples in decisions affecting their lives.
The Committee particularly urges the State party to consult and
seek the consent of the indigenous peoples concerned …”105
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
(“IACHR”) has developed considerable jurisprudence on FPIC.
In 1999, finding that Nicaragua had violated, among others, the
right to property by granting logging concessions on indigenous
lands in Nicaragua, the Commission held that the State “is
actively responsible for violations of the right to property … by
granting a concession … without the consent of the Awas Tingni
indigenous community.”106
In the 2002 Mary and Carrie Dann Case, the IACHR found
that Inter-American human rights law requires “special measures to ensure recognition of the particular and collective interest that indigenous people have in the occupation and use of
their traditional lands and resources and their right not to be
deprived of this interest except with fully informed consent,
under conditions of equality, and with fair compensation.”107 In
this case, the IACHR also declared the existence of a number of
“general international legal principles applicable in the context
of indigenous human rights,” including:
[W]here property and user rights of indigenous peoples
arise from rights existing prior to the creation of a state,
recognition by that state of the permanent and inalienable title of indigenous peoples relative thereto and to
have such title changed only by mutual consent
between the state and respective indigenous peoples
when they have full knowledge and appreciation of the
nature or attributes of such property.108
Most recently, the IACHR stated that:
Articles XVIII and XXIII of the American Declaration
specially oblige a member state to ensure that any
determination of the extent to which indigenous
claimants maintain interests in the lands to which they
have traditionally held title and have occupied and
used is based upon a process of fully informed consent
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elaborated upon this conclusion, stating in its conclusions that the
participants, which included industry representatives:

on the part of the indigenous community as a
whole.[109] This requires, at a minimum, that all of the
members of the community are fully and accurately
informed of the nature and consequences of the process
and provided with an effective opportunity to participate individually or as collectives. In the
Commission’s view, these requirements are equally
applicable to decisions by the State that will have an
impact upon indigenous lands and their communities,
such as the granting of concessions to exploit the natural resources of indigenous territories.110
Indigenous peoples’ right to free and informed consent is
also embraced in the draft declarations on the rights of indigenous peoples pending at the UN and OAS. Though still preliminary, these declarations are increasingly cited as expressions of
principles of customary international law. Article 30 of the UN
draft Declaration provides that:
Indigenous peoples have the right to determine and
develop priorities and strategies for the development or
use of their lands, territories and other resources,
including the right to require that states obtain their
free and informed consent prior to the approval of any
project affecting their lands, territories and other
resources, particularly in connection with
the development, utilization or exploitation
of mineral, water or other resources.
While the obligations incumbent on states
have traditionally been the focus of international
human rights law, there is strong evidence in contemporary law that obligations to respect human
rights can apply to non-state actors including
multinational corporations.111 This issue is very
relevant in relation to the private sector arm of the
WBG, IFC, and MIGA. It is also very relevant for
indigenous peoples as most of the EI projects
affecting them are conducted by private corporate
entities authorized by the state.
The approach adopted by the respective
instruments above is consistent with the observations of the UN Centre for Transnational
Corporations in a series of reports that examine
the investments and activities of multinational
corporations on indigenous territories.112 The
final report concluded that [multinational companies’] “performance was chiefly determined by
the quantity and quality of indigenous peoples’
participation in decision making” and “the extent
to which the laws of the host country gave indigenous peoples the right to withhold consent to
development….”113
A 2001 UN workshop on indigenous peoples
and natural resources development reiterated and
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recognized the link between indigenous peoples’ exercise of their right to self determination and rights over
their lands and resources and their capacity to enter into
equitable relationships with the private sector. It was
noted that indigenous peoples with recognized land and
resource rights and peoples with treaties, agreements or
other constructive arrangements with States, were better able to enter into fruitful relations with private sector natural resource companies on the basis of free,
prior, informed consent than peoples without such recognized rights.114
The recent UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and
Protection of Human Rights’ Norms on Transnational
Corporations are more direct:
Transnational corporations and other business enterprises
shall respect the rights of local communities affected by their
activities and the rights of indigenous peoples and communities consistent with international human rights standards…. They shall also respect the principle of free, prior
and informed consent of the indigenous peoples and communities to be affected by their development projects.115

BOX 1: INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS THAT HAVE
ACCEPTED INDIGENOUS PEOPLES’ RIGHT TO FPIC

UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination
UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
UN Sub-Commission on Promotion and Protection of Human Rights
UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues
UN Working Group on Indigenous Populations
UN Development Programme
UN Centre for Transnational Corporations
UN Commission on Human Rights, Special Rapporteur on situation of
the rights and fundamental freedoms of indigenous people
Convention on Biological Diversity
Convention to Combat Desertification, particularly in Africa
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
Inter-American Development Bank
Andean Community
European Council of Ministers
European Commission
Organization of African Unity
World Commission on Dams
World Bank Extractive Industries Review
IUCN Vth World Parks Congress
Forest Stewardship Council
World Wildlife Fund
International Petroleum Industry Environmental Conservation
Association and the International Association of Oil & Gas Producers
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Similar statements on FPIC have been made by UN Special
Rapporteurs on indigenous land rights, treaties concluded
between states and indigenous peoples, and indigenous peoples’
intellectual and cultural heritage, as well as by the Commission
on Human Rights’ Special Rapporteur on the rights and fundamental freedoms of indigenous people.116 The UN Working
Group on Indigenous Populations, pursuant to its standard setting mandate, is commencing the elaboration of a legal commentary on FPIC in relation to development activities affecting
indigenous peoples’ lands and natural resources.117 A working
paper will be submitted by one of its members and discussed at
the 22nd session in July 2004. The UN Permanent Forum on
Indigenous Issues has also supported the right of FPIC and has
proposed that a Working Group be established to provide guidance on its implementation.118
Finally, both general and treaty-based international law
requires indigenous peoples’ FPIC in connection with resettlement.120 As early as 1984, the IACHR found that “the preponderant doctrine” holds that the principle of consent is of general
application to cases involving relocation.121 Involuntary resettlement of indigenous peoples is not however prohibited by
WBG policy. OP 4.12 on Involuntary Resettlement provides
that the WBG will finance activities involving resettlement,
even resulting in “significant adverse impacts on [indigenous
peoples’] cultural survival,” if it is satisfied that the borrower
has explored all feasible project design alternatives.122
From the preceding it can be seen that FPIC is an established
feature of international human rights norms and standard setting
activities pertaining to indigenous peoples. Opponents of FPIC
argue that it conflicts with States’ powers of eminent domain and
is therefore unacceptable. However, eminent domain is subject
to human rights law in the same way as any other prerogative of
state and, therefore, should not be granted any special status or
exemption, in this case, to justify denial of the right of FPIC.123
The same may also be said of the argument that FPIC contravenes state sovereignty in general, including state sovereignty
over natural resources. As stated by Judge Weeramantry of the
International Court of Justice, “[i]n its ongoing development, the
concept of human rights has long passed the stage when it was a
narrow parochial concern between sovereign and subject. …
[T]here is not even the semblance of a suggestion in contemporary international law that [human rights] obligations amount to
a derogation of sovereignty.”124

FPIC IN DEVELOPMENT STANDARDS
A number of intergovernmental development agencies and
international financial institutions have incorporated FPIC language into their policies and programmes on indigenous peoples. I have included these here as they represent evidence of
state practice.
The United Nations Development Programme’s (“UNDP”)
official policy on indigenous peoples states unequivocally that
the “UNDP promotes and supports the right of indigenous peoples to free, prior informed consent with regard to development
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planning and programming that may affect them.”125 The policy grounds UNDP’s support for FPIC in international human
rights law. The Inter-American Development Bank’s (“IDB”)
1990 Strategies and Procedures on Socio-Cultural Issues as
Related to the Environment provides that “in general the IDB
will not support … projects affecting tribal lands, unless the
tribal society is in agreement….”126 The IDB is presently formulating a binding operational policy on indigenous peoples.
Preliminary strategy papers on this policy include FPIC.127
FPIC is already included in the IDB’s policy on Involuntary
Resettlement.128
The European Union (“EU”) Council of Ministers’ 1998
Resolution entitled Indigenous Peoples within the framework of
the development cooperation of the Community and Member
States provides that “indigenous peoples have the right to
choose their own development paths, which includes the right to
object to projects, in particular in their traditional areas.”129
The EU interprets this language to be the equivalent of FPIC.130
Additionally, in October 2003, the European Council and
Commission approved, as part of the Second Northern
Dimension Action Plan, the following language: “Strengthened
attention to be paid by all Northern Dimension partners to
indigenous interests in relation to economic activities, and in
particular extractive industry, with a view to protecting inherited rights of self-determination, land rights and cultural rights of
indigenous peoples of the region.”131 As noted above, FPIC is
implicit in and fundamental to the right to self-determination.
The UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues (“PFII”),
established in 2001 is mandated to coordinate system-wide
attention to indigenous peoples’ issues within the United
Nations. It has taken a strong interest in FPIC, which it says
“has emerged as the desired standard to be applied in protecting
and promoting [indigenous peoples’] rights in the development
process.”132 The PFII has also taken an interest in WBG policies as they relate to indigenous peoples, recommending in
2003, reiterated verbatim in 2004, that the WBG:
Continue to address issues currently outstanding,
including Bank implementation of international customary laws and standards, in particular human
rights instruments, full recognition of customary
land and resource rights of indigenous peoples,
recognition of the right of free, prior informed consent of indigenous peoples regarding development
projects that affect them, and prohibition of the involuntary resettlement of indigenous peoples.133
The EIR specifically proposed that the WBG collaborate
with the PFII to operationalize and incorporate FPIC into its
policies and practice.134
In preparation for its 3rd session, the PFII distributed a
questionnaire to all UN system “Indigenous Peoples Focal
Points” in order to gather information about “how the principle
of FPIC is understood and applied by United Nations proSUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT LAW & POLICY

grammes, funds, agencies.”135 Of the eighteen UN organs that
received the questionnaire, ten replied. The WBG was conspicuously absent, especially considering its membership in the
PFII’s Inter-Agency Support Group.136 While none of the
responding organs had an official, working definition of FPIC,
all recognized it as being embedded in the human rights framework and most maintained, while not without challenges, that
they “to a large extent implemented [FPIC] on an ad-hoc basis
in line with the general guidelines, legal instruments and principles through which they work.”137 A cursory reading of some
of the responses however shows that some of the organs confuse
FPIC with consultation and participation.

FPIC and Sub-Soil Rights
The preceding discussion of FPIC should be read in light of
the failure of most states to recognize the rights of indigenous
peoples to subsoil minerals and other resources pertaining to
their traditional lands and territories, particularly as FPIC is
viewed by some as a mechanism to avoid much more sensitive
and politically charged discussions about indigenous ownership
of the subsoil. As discussed below, international human rights
bodies and tribunals have consistently held that the collective
rights of indigenous peoples to their traditional lands and
resources must be recognized and protected. These rights exist
absent formal recognition by the state, are in large measure
determined by indigenous peoples’ laws, customs and usages,
and unilateral extinguishment has been determined to violate,
among others, the right to self-determination and the prohibition
of racial discrimination.138 These norms have been developed
in part to address the legacy of historic injustices dating back to
the early days of colonialism.
In the language employed in the various international
instruments and jurisprudence, the term “resources” is used
without qualification or explanation. Without evidence to the
contrary – ILO 169, Article 15(2), for instance, which provides
for “cases in which the State retains the ownership of mineral or
sub-surface resources” – “resources” should presumptively be
understood to include subsoil resources, particularly as these
resources were unilaterally expropriated by colonial powers and
their successors in the same manner that surface rights were
deemed vested in the sovereign in the colonial era.139
International law has rejected this unilateral expropriation with
regard to surface rights; the same analysis should be applied to
subsoil rights. The South African Constitutional Court, among
others, reached this conclusion in 2003, holding that under
indigenous law and by virtue of traditional occupation and use
ownership of subsoil minerals may also vest collectively in
indigenous peoples.140
In the absence of statutory or other arrangements providing
otherwise, recognition of indigenous ownership of subsoil minerals obviates any right of the state to issue concessions on
indigenous lands and the need for FPIC in relation thereto.141
Instead, indigenous peoples, should they so choose, would be
free to consent to arrangements with third parties, including the
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state, for the exploitation of their resources through mutually
acceptable agreements. Reviews and analyses of examples of
such agreements in the United States, Canada and elsewhere
would be useful for fully understanding the nature and functioning of FPIC generally.

“OPERATIONALIZATION”
While there is a need to ensure that FPIC is further
entrenched in human rights law, and in turn that human rights
law is better integrated into other areas of international law, particularly trade law, there is equally a need to develop international standards on the implementation or “operationalization” of
FPIC. It has sometimes been argued that the World Bank Group
cannot incorporate FPIC into its policies and projects because it
cannot be operationalized. This is a dubious assertion at best,
given the numerous examples of where the right has been operationalized by international organizations and in national laws.142
The IDB, for instance, requires indigenous peoples’ consent to
resettlement as do, among others, the domestic laws of most
states that have ratified ILO 169. With regard to access, benefit
sharing, and protection of indigenous knowledge, the Secretariat
of the Convention on Biological Diversity reported that as of
December 2000, FPIC was incorporated into the law, either draft
or existing, and practice of 62 countries.143
In the Philippines, indigenous peoples’ FPIC is required
by law for the following activities: exploration, development
and use of natural resources, research-bio-prospecting, displacement and relocation, archaeological explorations, policies affecting indigenous peoples, and entry of military personnel.144 FPIC is defined in the Indigenous Peoples’ Rights
Act 1997 as “the consensus of all members of the [Indigenous
Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples] to be determined
in accordance with their respective customary laws and practices, free from any external manipulation, interference and
coercion, and obtained after fully disclosing the intent and
scope of the activity, in a language and process understandable
to the community.”145
The consent provisions of the Indigenous Peoples’ Rights
Act of 1997 (“IPRA”) are operationalized in its Implementing
Rules and Regulations 1998.146 The “basic elements” of the
process for seeking FPIC include, at a minimum, information
dissemination to all members of the affected indigenous peoples, assessment of their concerns or issues in accordance with
their customs and traditions, an initial decision by the recognized council of elders, and affirmation of the decision of the
elders by the members of the community.147
Should consent be granted, a written memorandum of
agreement, signed by the proponent, affected indigenous
communities, and the National Commission on Indigenous
Peoples, is required. This agreement must be in the relevant
indigenous languages and stipulate, among other factors: (1)
the benefits due to the affected indigenous people/community, (2) measures to protect indigenous peoples’ rights and
value systems,148 (3) the responsibilities of the proponent, the
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indigenous people/community and the NCIP, (4) that the
agreement applies mutatis mutandis to any new parties as a
result of partnership, joint venture, merger, transfer of rights,
etc., and (5) penalties for non-compliance and or violation of
the agreement.149
FPIC also has been part of the law applying to mining in
Australia’s Northern Territory for almost 30 years150 and is
present in legislation applicable in New South Wales,151
Queensland, 152 and other states.153 Under the Aboriginal Land
Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976 (“ALRA”), consent is
obtained through statutory, indigenous-controlled Land
Councils, which may not consent to a mining license unless they
are satisfied that the traditional Aboriginal owners of the land in
question understand the nature of the activity and any terms or
conditions. As a group they must give consent after they are satisfied that the terms and conditions are reasonable and have
agreed upon these terms and conditions with the miner.154 With
regard to the traditional land owners, consent is considered to
have been obtained if:
(a) In a case where there is a particular process of
decision making that, under the tradition of those
Aboriginal owners or of the group to which they
belong, must be complied with in relation to decisions of that kind – the decision was made in
accordance with that process; or
(b) In a case where there is no such process of decision making – the decision was made in accordance with a process agreed to and adopted by traditional Aboriginal owners in relation to the decision or in relation to decisions of that kind.155
The procedure applied under the ALRA is roughly as follows: an application is made to the Department of Business,
Industry and Resource Development (“DBIRD”) for an exploration license; the DBIRD Minister approves the applicant to
enter into negotiations with a Land Council; the Land Council
has 12 months to complete its responsibilities under the ALRA,
(e.g., consultation with affected traditional Aboriginal land owners); and ultimately, if traditional owners agree, an agreement
for an exploration license is negotiated.156
These procedures were reviewed by the National Institute
of Economic and Industry Research in 1999,157 which, according to the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission,
found that the ALRA “has been successful in safeguarding
Aboriginal control over Aboriginal land … [and] has also provided a process of negotiation by which an increasing proportion of Aboriginal land in the Territory has been made available
for mineral exploration.”158 In 1991, there were 12 producing
mines on Aboriginal land in the Northern Territory, which
together produced more than A$1 billion of minerals or 80% of
the total value of the NT’s mineral production.159
Finally, it is important to note that the IFC’s Social and
Environmental Review Procedure (“Micro-Finance Exclusion
List”) already contains an “informed consent” requirement in
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relation to indigenous peoples stating that IFC funds may not be
used to finance “production or activities that impinge on the
lands owned, or claimed under adjudication, by indigenous peoples, without full documented consent of such peoples.”160
Therefore, there would seem to be no valid reason preventing
FPIC from being operationalized in other World Bank Group
settings and projects.

COMPONENTS OF FPIC
FPIC has a number of elements that need to be accounted
for in its operationalization: 1) free, 2) prior, 3) informed, and 4)
consent. To this obvious list, I would add a fifth component:
adequate recognition of indigenous peoples’ rights to their
lands, territories, and resources traditionally owned or otherwise
occupied and used. The following are examples of what may be
required under each component.

Free
A general principle of law is that consent is not valid if
obtained through coercion or manipulation. While no legislative or regulatory measure is foolproof, mechanisms need to be
established to verify that consent has been freely obtained. In
the Philippines, for instance, the National Commission of
Indigenous Peoples is charged with certifying the consent of
indigenous communities. Nonetheless, studies demonstrate that
in the Philippines, indigenous peoples’ consent is often still
manipulated and coerced.161 Similar complaints have been
raised in Australia.162
A. Goldzimer proposes that one way of ensuring that FPIC
is “freely” obtained is to ensure that the project proponent is not
the entity responsible for obtaining consent.163 Rather, the
responsibility should be vested in constitutionally recognized,
independent (politically and financially), centralized or regionalized bodies directly elected by indigenous peoples and additionally, indigenous peoples must have access to effective judicial remedies to further safeguard against misconduct in the
FPIC process.164
The Land Councils established in the Northern Territory
and elsewhere in Australia work largely along these lines.
Despite some initial problems – and allegations of co-optation,
not to mention that they derive part of their income from mining
royalties and are government-funded – they seem to have
worked well, at least in terms of providing a mechanism for
seeking FPIC and minimizing possibilities for coercion or
manipulation. Indigenous peoples in Guyana – whose right to
FPIC is contained in a policy on mining rather than legislation
– have also proposed that their National Toshaos Council (a
body representing all of the elected village chiefs) is involved in
either certifying or obtaining FPIC given allegations that companies have manipulated or bribed members of their Village
Councils, the bodies presently designated to provide consent.165
Whether such a system would work everywhere, however,
is debatable and presents particular challenges for countries and
regions where the rule of law is weak, corruption prevalent, and
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where indigenous peoples’ institutions and organizations are
weak or suppressed. Moreover, great care is required to ensure
that indigenous peoples’ traditional institutions and customary
laws are fully respected and not supplanted in such a system
unless they choose otherwise. The potential for this to occur
was noted in a WBG evaluation of its indigenous peoples policy, which concluded that “participation in the majority of projects took place through modern state structures, such as village
level health or education committees; field assessments indicate
that these project structures created new power relations, weakening traditional IP communities.”166

and operational phases (including local people,
research institutes, sponsors, commercial interests,
and partners as possible third parties and beneficiaries) of the development process;

• Specific procedures the development or activity
would entail;

• Potential risks involved (e.g., entry into sacred
areas, environmental pollution, partial destruction of
a significant site, disturbance of a breeding ground);

• The full implications that can realistically be foreseen
(e.g., commercial, economic environmental, cultural);

Prior
To be meaningful, informed consent must be sought sufficiently in advance of any final authorization by the State, third
parties, or commencement of activities by a company that
affects indigenous peoples and their lands, territories, and
resources. The consent process should also be time-bound so as
to ensure that the affected peoples have enough time to understand the information received, request additional information
or clarification, seek advice, determine or negotiate conditions,
and ensure that the process does not serve as an undue impediment for the proponent seeking consent. In Australia, for
example, a twelve month period has been legislated. The
appropriate amount of time needed, however, may vary
depending on such factors as the number of affected persons,
communities or peoples, the complexity of the proposed activity, and the amount of information provided or requested.
Whatever the amount of time needed, a pre-determined and
clear deadline is important.

Informed
An FPIC procedure must involve consultation and participation by affected indigenous peoples, which includes the full
and legally accurate disclosure of information concerning proposed developments in a form that is both accessible and understandable to them. Consultation, participation, and access to
information rights are well established in international human
rights law167 and international environmental law.168
A report done for the Convention on Biological Diversity’s
ad hoc inter-sessional Working Group on Article 8j and related
provisions includes the following list of information that must
be disclosed as part of an FPIC process:

• The nature, size, and scope of the proposed development or activity;

• The duration of the development (including the construction phase) or the activity;

• The locality of areas that will be affected;
• A preliminary assessment of the likely impact of the
development;

• The reasons/purpose for the development;
• Personnel likely to be involved in both construction
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• Conditions for third party involvement.169
The 1998 IPRA Implementing Rules and Regulations
adopted in the Philippines require that project proponents shall:

• Submit to the IP community a written undertaking in
a language spoken and understood by the community concerned, stating that it shall commit itself to full
disclosure of records and information relevant to the
policy, program, project or activity, and allow full
access to records, documents, material information
and facilities pertinent to the same;

• Submit to the IP community and the NCIP in a language understandable to the concerned community an
Environmental and Socio-cultural Impact Statement,
detailing all the possible impact of the policy, program, project or activity upon the ecological, economic, social and cultural aspect of the community as
a whole. Such document shall clearly indicate how
adverse impacts can be avoided or mitigated;

• Submit an undertaking in writing to answer for damages which the ICCs/IPs may suffer on account of
the policy, program, project, plan, or activity and
deposit a cash bond or post a surety bond with the
NCIP when required by the community equivalent
to a percentage of its investments, subject to progressive increase, depending upon the impact of the
project. The amount of bond shall be determined by
the NCIP with the concurrence of the ICCs/IPs concerned; and

• Underwrite all expenses attendant to securing the
free and prior informed consent of ICCs/IPs.170
In all cases, provision of misleading or false information
can result in a penalty or denial of consent for the proposed
development to proceed or revocation of consent if the activity
has commenced.

Consent
The process of arriving at a consent decision involves consultation and meaningful participation in all aspects of the
assessment, planning, implementation, monitoring, and closure
of a project. As such, consultation and meaningful participation
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are also fundamental components of a consent process.
Negotiation may also be needed to reach agreement on the proposal as a whole, certain components thereof, or conditions that
may be attached to the granting of FPIC. At all times, indigenous peoples have the right to participate through their own
freely chosen representatives and to identify the persons, communities, or other entities that may require special measures in
relation to consultation and participation. They also have the
right to secure and use the services of any advisors they may
require, including legal counsel of their choice.
Indigenous peoples should specify which entity will
express consent on their behalf. This may vary depending on
the activity in question. For example, under the relevant customary law, the entity to give or withhold consent may be the
traditional authorities of a particular landholding clan. In other
cases, it may be the indigenous people as a whole or a combination of entities. As with the Land Councils in Australia, this
may also be done through an extra-community/people institution. The IPRA Implementing Rules and Regulations contain
specific rules on this issue:
The scope of the ICCs/IPs whose free and prior
informed consent is required shall depend upon the
impact area of the proposed policy, program, projects
and plans, such that:
a) When the policy, program, project or plan affects
only the particular community within the ancestral
domain, only such community shall give their free and
prior informed consent;
b) When the policy, program, project or plan affects
the entire ancestral domain, the consent of the concerned ICCs/IPs within the ancestral domain shall be
secured; and
c) When the policy, program, project or plan affects a
whole range of territories covering two or more ancestral domains, the consent of all affected ICCs/IP communities shall be secured.171
FPIC should be documented in legally binding and enforceable agreements that set forth any associated terms and conditions, as well as the enforcement and reparations mechanisms to
address and remedy violations. Finally, FPIC must be based on
specific activities for which consent has been granted. While consent may initially be granted for one set of activities, any intended change of activities will require a new application for FPIC.

Recognition and Regularization of Rights to Lands,
Territories and Resources
FPIC is dependent on clear recognition and protection of
indigenous peoples’ rights, particularly to lands, territories and
resources traditionally owned or otherwise occupied and used.
Without full recognition of indigenous peoples’ territorial rights,
FPIC will not fully provide the protection is it designed to provide. In this sense, it is important to note that under interna57

tional law indigenous peoples’ territorial rights arise from and
are grounded in indigenous custom and practice and exist independently of formal recognition by the states.172 States are obligated to delimit, demarcate, and title indigenous lands and territories in accordance with their customary laws and values.
While this may seem an obvious point, it is not uncommon
for states to limit FPIC to lands that are legally recognized by
their own legal systems rather than the lands and territories traditionally owned by indigenous peoples. In many cases, there is
a large disparity between the two categories, and requiring FPIC
only in connection with the former potentially exempts large
areas of indigenous lands from the FPIC requirement. In
Guyana, for instance, FPIC applies only to “recognized” or
titled lands. Under this scheme, approximately three-quarters of
the lands traditionally owned and presently claimed by indigenous people are excluded. The same also applies in the case of
the Northern Territory, where FPIC applies to aboriginal lands
recognized under the ALRA, but not to lands that they may own
pursuant to the 1993 Native Title Act (Cth), as amended in 1998.
With regard to the latter, a “right to negotiate” applies, not FPIC,
subject to arbitration if agreement cannot be reached.173

CONCLUSION
The EIR review of the WBG raises fundamental questions
about the role, operations, and impact of the institution. Its conclusion that the WBG is not “set up to effectively facilitate and
promote poverty alleviation through sustainable development”
is sobering in light of the WBG’s professed mandate and indicates that major institutional changes are required.174 While the
issues raised by the EIR centre around the WBG’s involvement
in EI, they could apply equally to other sectors, as many of the
EIR’s main recommendations – respect for human rights, for
instance – are cross-cutting, affecting most if not all areas of
WBG activity.
The EIR also raises serious questions about the mining and
oil industries’ claims that their operations are sustainable and
contribute to poverty alleviation, rather than the well-being of
primarily urban elites in the source country and of company
shareholders, who are usually located far away from the extraction sites.175 As the EIR concludes in relation to the WBG, but
applying equally to industry, EI may contribute to poverty alleviation through sustainable development, but only if certain
conditions are met and strictly adhered to and enforced. These
conditions include respect for human rights broadly and indigenous peoples’ rights specifically.
The EIR is also the second major review of the WBG in the
past few years to have highlighted the need for the WBG to
incorporate and adhere to indigenous peoples’ right to FPIC in
its policies, programmes, and projects. This is framed by both a
general need to address human rights – something the WBG has
been unwilling to do to date, citing the prohibition of interference in political affairs contained in its Articles of Agreement –
and a specific recognition of the need to ensure that indigenous
peoples’ rights to lands, territories, and resources are guaranteed
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT LAW & POLICY

and respected, not only in specific WBG projects, but also in
relation to technical assistance loans and structural adjustment
programmes.176 The latter are arguably more important than
project conditionality, given the WBG’s role in promoting and
assisting with the liberalization of mining, investment, and other
laws across the world.
FPIC is both an internationally recognized right of indigenous peoples and a mechanism to ensure that their other rights
and interests will be respected. It is an indispensable guarantee
for indigenous peoples in connection with EI, given the devastating impact that most EI operations have had and in some
cases continue to have for their well being, territories, and cultural survival. FPIC is also increasingly being incorporated into
development-related policies and standards, and should be considered a fundamental component of development effectiveness
in much the same way that consultation and participation are
considered fundamental. The WBG MR appears to accept this
as true, stating that “[p]rojects that are accepted by communities
are going to be more effective both for communities and for
developers.”177 Examples from Australia, the Philippines and
elsewhere show that FPIC can be operationalized and work in
practice. This is not to say that there have not been and will not
continue to be problems with implementation of FPIC processes, but the same can also be said for consultation and participation in general, and this should not excuse failure to comply
with and implement the right.
As the author of UNDP’s 2004 Human Development Report
observes in a letter responding to criticism of the EIR’s recommendations sent by a prominent industry representative,178 FPIC
is both “practical and necessary.”179 She continues that:
Success stories exist in Alaska, Australia and Canada,
where local communities were brought into decisionmaking processes - they were able to preserve their
way of life even while sharing the profits from mining
projects. Why should similar initiatives not be adopted
for developing countries? As the Human Development
Report 2004 (which is due in July 2004) will demonstrate, ignoring demands of indigenous people may
have worked in earlier decades but cannot in today’s
political realities. There would be a high cost if local
communities were left out. Much of future investments
in extractive industries are expected to be in indigenous people’s territories. Investments that take away
the economic basis of their livelihoods threaten their
very existence. The Lihir gold mine’s operations in
Papua New Guinea destroyed sacred sites and led to
environmental degradation. Not surprisingly, many
communities increasingly oppose any further activity
in their territories because of their past experience of
misinformation and inadequate compensation. …In the
interest of long-term sustainability and profitability of
investments, empowering communities requires
explicitly recognising their rights, consulting them on
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project design and creating incentives for increasing
mutual benefits. This is a matter of respecting human
rights as well as a practical necessity.180
On the last point, the UN Millennium Declaration, which
laid the foundation for the Millennium Development Goals, one
of the primary focal points of development efforts and targets
today, proclaims that the world’s leaders “will spare no effort to
promote democracy and strengthen the rule of law, as well as
respect for all internationally recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the right to development.”181
One place they can do this is as shareholders in and board members of the WBG.
Finally, the EIR Report raises the important issue of
whether the World Bank, as a subject of international law, has
international legal obligations to promote and respect human
rights rather than simply moral- or policy-based obligations.
Much has been written on this issue in recent years, and many
scholars have concluded that the WBG does indeed have legal
obligations with regard to human rights.182 For example,
Bowett’s Law of International Institutions states that “[i]t has
been suggested, for example, that the World Bank is not subject
to general international norms for the protection of fundamental
human rights. In our view that conclusion is without merit, on
legal or policy grounds ….”183
A number of UN studies have also looked at this issue and
concluded that the WBG has obligations with respect to human
rights law, and that it has not paid sufficient attention to human
rights.184 One of these studies concluded with respect to the
WBG that “[n]o entity that claims international legal personality can claim exemption from that [human rights] regime. … If
such a claim were to be considered legitimate, it would seriously erode the international rule of law.”185
Irrespective of how the WBG eventually addresses the conclusions and recommendations made by Dr. Salim in the EIR, the
issue of WBG human rights obligations and the implications
thereof for its operations and policies requires further attention.
This is not to say that WBG practice cannot or should not exceed
any obligations it may have under international law, clearly there
are important policy reasons for addressing human rights issues,
not the least of which is improving development effectiveness
and poverty alleviation efforts. As the UN General Assembly
resolved in 1997: “democracy, respect for all human rights and
fundamental freedoms, including the right to development, transparent and accountable governance in all sectors of society, as
well as effective participation by civil society, are … an essential
part of the necessary foundations for the realization of social and
people-centred sustainable development.”186
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99 Andean Community, Decision 391, Common Regime of Access to
Genetic Resources, of the Commission of the Cartagena Agreement,
July 1996.
100 Convention to Combat Desertification, particularly in Africa (1994),

(Case 12.053 (Belize)), 24 October 2003, at para. 141 (footnotes omitted).
111 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights for instance, speaks of

methodology, and a draft questionnaire for distribution to Indigenous
Peoples ( UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.4/1990/6); a preliminary report
(UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1991/49); a report focusing on the Americas
(UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1992/54) and; a report focusing on Asia and
Africa, summarizing the findings of all reports and making recommendations “to mitigate the adverse impacts of TNCs on indigenous peoples’
lands, and increase indigenous peoples’ participation in relevant government and TNC decision-making.” (UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/40).
113 Report of the Commission on Transnational Corporations to the
Working Group on Indigenous Populations. UN Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/40, at para. 20.
114 Report of the Workshop on Indigenous Peoples, Private Sector

Article 16(g).
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Natural Resource, Energy, Mining Companies and Human Rights.
Geneva, 5-7 December 2001. E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.4/2002/3, 3 (2002).
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Peoples. Adopted at the Committee’s 1235th meeting, 18 August 1997.
UN Doc. CERD/C/51/Misc.13/Rev.4, at para. 3.
102 Id. at para. 4(d).

Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human
Rights, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/38/Rev.2, para. 10(c) (2003).
116 See, Indigenous people and their relationship to land. Final working

103 See for instance, Concluding observations of the Committee on the
Elimination of Racial Discrimination: Botswana. 23/08/2002 and,
Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination: United States of America. 14/08/2001.

paper prepared by Mrs. Erica-Irene A. Daes, Special Rapporteur, UN
Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/21; Study on treaties, agreements and other
constructive arrangements between States and indigenous populations.
Final report prepared by Miguel Alfonso Martinez, Special Rapporteur,
UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.4/1998/CRP.1 (1998); Study on the protection of the cultural and intellectual property of indigenous peoples, by
Erica-Irene Daes, Special Rapporteur of the Sub-Commission on the
Prevention of Discrimination and the Protection of Minorities and
Chairperson of the Working Group on Indigenous Populations, UN Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/28; Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights and fundamental freedoms of indigenous people, Mr.
Rodolfo Stavenhagen, submitted pursuant to Commission resolution
2001/57, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2002/97.
117 Report of the Working Group on Indigenous Populations on its twen-

104 Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights: Colombia. 30/11/2001. E/C.12/Add. 1/74, at para. 12.
105 Id. at para. 33.
106 Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 27/98 (Nicaragua), at para. 142, cited
in, The Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community Case, Judgment on the
Preliminary Objections of February 1, 2000; Inter-Am. C.H.R. Ser. C,
No. 66 (2000). See also Case 11.577 Inter-Am. C.H.R., (Awas Tingni
Indigenous Community - Nicaragua), ANNUAL REPORT OF THE IACHR.
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.102, Doc.6 rev., (Vol. II), 1067, para. 108 (April 16,
1999).
107 Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report Nº 75/02, Case Nº 11.140, Mary and Carrie
Dann (United States), Dec. 27, 2002. OEA/Ser.L/V/II.116, Doc. 46, at
para. 131.
108 Id. at para. 130. (footnotes omitted). General principles of interna-
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ty-first session, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/22, para. 111 (2003).
118 Report of the Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues on its Second
Session, UN Doc. E/2003/43; E/C.19/2003/22, at para. 36.
119 “Acceptance” here does not imply that these institutions have accepted the right across the board, but rather, that in at least one official instru-
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ment or policy, general and/or sectoral, the right is recognized. The InterAmerican Development Bank, for instance, has accepted the right in its
“Strategies and Procedures on Socio-Cultural Issues as Related to the
Environment” and its policy on involuntary resettlement, but not yet otherwise. It has also included FPIC in its Profile paper on an Operational
Policy on Indigenous Peoples, see infra, note 127.
120 Among others, ILO Convention 107, art. 12, ILO Convention No.

132 UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, Inter-agency Support
Group on Indigenous Issues Report on Free Prior and Informed
Consent* Advanced Version, 3rd Session, 2004, at para. 1, available at
http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/pfii/documents/other%20docs/Doc%20Rep
ort%20on%20FPIC.htm.
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Declaration, art. XVIII(6), and Committee on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination, General Recommendation XXIII.
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135 Id. at para. 3.

Session. UN Doc. E/2003/43; E/C.19/2003/22, at para. 33.
134 EIR Report, 50.
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(1984), 120.
122 OP 4.12 Involuntary Resettlement 2001 at para. 9, available at
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137 Supra note 132, at 7.
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123 See supra, notes 85-89 and accompanying text.
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para. 21 (1999).
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the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia (Serbia
and Montenegro)), Separate Opinion of Judge Weeramantry, § 2 (1996)
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population….” Concluding Observations of the Committee on the
Elimination of Racial Discrimination: Suriname.
CERD/C/64/CO/9/Rev.2, para. 15 (2004). The Committee also stated that
“[w]hile noting the principle set forth in article 41 of the Constitution that
natural resources are the property of the nation and must be used to promote economic, social and cultural development, the Committee points
out that this principle must be exercised consistently with the rights of
indigenous and tribal peoples.” Id. at para. 11.
125 UNDP and Indigenous Peoples: A Policy of Engagement, paras. 2630 (2001).
126 Inter-American Development Bank, IDB RESOURCE BOOK ON
PARTICIPATION, Annex, Strategies and Procedures on Socio-Cultural Issues
as Related to the Environment (1990).
127 Inter-American Development Bank, Profile on an Operational Policy
for Indigenous Peoples (13 February 2004) available at
http://www.iadb.org/sds/doc/ind-GN2296E.pdf (The profile states:
“Meaningful Consultation and Participation of Indigenous Stakeholders.
The policy would provide that indigenous peoples should participate
meaningfully in pertinent decisions that affect them throughout the project cycle, and should not intentionally or inadvertently be excluded from
projects that have the potential to benefit them. The policy would also
address consultation and participation requirements, consensus building
and conflict resolution mechanisms, and will consider the principle of
free, prior and informed consent of indigenous stakeholders, in a manner
consistent with international agreements in this area).
128 Inter-American Development Bank, Operational Policy 710 on
Involuntary Resettlement (1998), Section IV, para. 4.
129 European Union, Council of Ministers Resolution, Indigenous
Peoples within the framework of the development cooperation of the
Community and Member States (1998).
130 T. Griffiths, A Failure of Accountability. Indigenous peoples, human
rights and development agency standards: A reference tool and comparative review, Forest Peoples Programme (Moreton-in-Marsh 2003), 28, 29,
46, 62, available at http://www.forestpeoples.org/.
131 European Union, Second Northern Dimension Action Plan 2004-06,
18 October 2003, at 21 available at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/north_dim/ndap/ap2.htm.
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concludes that the “rights of indigenous peoples to the natural resources
of their lands are at first glance similar to those of States (to be) derived
from the principle of permanent sovereignty…. Yet, the essential difference is that indigenous peoples are still an object rather than a subject of
international law; at best they can be identified as an emerging subject of
international law.” N. Schrijver, SOVEREIGNTY OVER NATURAL
RESOURCES: BALANCING RIGHTS AND DUTIES, Cambridge Studies in
International Law Cambridge (Cambridge University Press 1997) at 318.
140 Alexkor Ltd and the Republic of South Africa v. The Richtersveld
Community and Others CCT 19/03, para. 64 (2003).
141 See, for instance, the scheme adopted in the United States under the
Indian Mineral Leasing Act 1938, which offered tribes little control over
mineral exploitation despite the recognition of their ownership of mineral
pertaining to reservations. On ownership rights, see, among others,
United States v. Shoshone Tribe of Indians 304 US 111 (1938). Contrast
with Indian Mineral Development Act 1982, which provides for tribes,
subject to secretarial approval, to “enter into any joint venture, operating,
production sharing, service, managerial, lease or other agreement” for
mining activities.
142 On national laws, see, among others, infra, notes 143-156 and
accompanying text. See also, Aotearoa-New Zealand, Crown Minerals
Act 1991 (N.Z.), which provides special protection for Maori land, as
defined by the Te Ture Whenua Maori Act 1993: 1) if the Maori land is
regarded as waahi tapu (sacred areas) by the affected tribe or sub-tribe,
access even for minimum impact activities can only be obtained if the
Maori landowners give their consent (sec. 51) and; for activities other than
minimum impact activities, the owners of Maori land also have a right to
consent (secs. 53-4) even where there may be public interest grounds that
would require arbitration in the case of non-Maori land owners.
143 Compilation and overview of existing instruments, guidelines, codes
and other activities relevant to the programme of work for the implementation of Article 8(j) and related provisions, note by the Executive
Secretary, UNEP/CBD/WG8J/2/INF/1 27, para. 11 (2001).
144 Among others, Indigenous Peoples Rights Act 1997, sec. 59 (Phil.)
and Mining Code 1995, sec. 16. (Phil.) See also, National Commission
on Indigenous Peoples, Administrative Order No. 1 Series of 1998. Rules
and Regulations Implementing Republic Act No. 8371, Otherwise Known
as “The Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Act of 1997”, Rule III, Pt. II, sec.
2(b)(2) – “The rights of ICCs/IPs to develop their territories including all
the natural resources therein shall further include, but not limited to, the
following: … (2) The right of ICCs/IPs through their Council of Elders/
Leaders, subject to the principle of Free and Prior Informed Consent provided in these Rules and Regulations, to enter into agreement with any
legal entity, for the utilization, extraction or development of natural
resources, subject to a limited term of 25 years, renewable at the option

SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT LAW & POLICY

of the ICCs/IPs for another 25 years, and to visitorial and monitoring
powers of the ICCs/IPs and the NCIP for purposes of ensuring that the
ICCs’/IPs’ rights and interests are adequately safeguarded and protected.”
145 IPRA, id. at sec. 3(g).
146 National Commission on Indigenous Peoples, Administrative Order
No. 1 Series of 1998. Rules and Regulations Implementing Republic Act
No. 8371 (Phil.), Otherwise known as “The Indigenous Peoples’ Rights
Act of 1997”, Rule IV, Pt. III, secs. 1-9 (Phil.).
147 Id. at sec. 5. Section 5 also provides that:
The following minimum requirements shall be strictly complied
with: a) For every meeting, notices thereof written in English or
Pilipino and in the IP language and authorized by community
elders/leaders shall be delivered and posted in conspicuous
places or announced in the area where the meeting shall be conducted at least two (2) weeks before the scheduled meeting;
b) All meetings and proceedings where the proponent shall submit and discuss all the necessary information on the proposed
policy, program, project or plan shall be conducted in a process
and language spoken and understood by the ICCs/IPs concerned;
c) The minutes of meetings or proceedings conducted shall be
written in English or Pilipino and in the language of the concerned ICCs/IPs and shall be validated with those who attended
the meeting or assembly before the finalization and distribution
of the minutes;
d) Consent or rejection by the ICC/IP community shall be signified by affixing signatures or thumb marks in a document written in their own language or dialect with corresponding English
or Pilipino translation. Signatures or thumb marks shall be considered valid, only when it is affixed on each and every page of
the document signifying consent or rejection. In case of rejection, the ICCs/IPs shall state in the document of rejection
whether or not they shall entertain alternative proposals of similar nature; and
e) Any alternative proposal shall be subject to the Free and Prior
Informed Consent of the ICCs/IPs in accordance with the foregoing procedures and requirements.
148 The rights and value systems referred to in point 2 are defined as:
“a) Ancestral domains/lands as the ICCs/IPs’ fundamental source of life;
b) Traditional support system of kinship, friendship, neighbourhood clusters, tribal and inter-tribal relationships rooted in cooperation, sharing and
caring; c) Sustainable and traditional agricultural cycles, community life,
village economy and livelihood activities such as swidden farming, communal forests, hunting grounds, watersheds, irrigation systems and other
indigenous management systems and practices; and d) Houses, properties, sacred and burial grounds.” Id. at sec. 3.
149 Id. at sec. 8.
150 Aboriginal Lands Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976, Pt. IV
(Austl.). Prior to 1987 the Act provided for FPIC by traditional aboriginal land owners as well as statutory Land Councils in relation to both
mineral exploration permits and mining permits. In 1987, the Act was
amended to remove the FPIC by traditional aboriginal landowners
requirement for mining permits; aboriginal land owner consent to mineral
exploration permits was maintained and the agreement of the relevant
Land Council is still required for the mining stage.
151 Aboriginal Lands Rights Act 1983 (NSW), sec. 45(5) (Austl.).
152 Aboriginal Land Act 1991 (Qld), sec. 42 (Austl.), and Torres Strait
Islander Land Act 1991 (Qld), sec. 80 (Austl.) See also, Mineral
Resources Act 1989 (Qld), sec. 54 (Austl.).
153 See, Mineral Resources Development Act 1995 (Tas), Pt. 7, and;
Aboriginal Land (Jervis Bay Territory) Act 1986 (Cth), sec. 43, 52A(1),
(2) (Austl.).
154 Aboriginal Lands Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976, at sec. 42(6)
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(Austl.).
155 Id. at sec. 77A.
156 For a detailed treatment of the workings of the ALRA, including in
the case of mining, see, Northern Territory Land Councils and the
Aboriginal Benefits Account. Performance Audit, Audit Report No. 28,
2002-03 (Austl.) available at http://www.anao.gov.au/WebSite.nsf/
Publications/6F305A0E51814A79CA256CC2000CAB4E.
157 The National Competition Policy Review of Part IV (the mining
provisions) of the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976.
NIEIR, 1999 (Austl).
158 Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission, Annual Report
1998-99 at 149.
159 P. Boyle, Behind the Mining Companies Hysteria about Mabo
(1993), available at
http://www.greenleft.org.au/back/1993/111/111p3.htm.
160 Procedure for Environmental and Social Review of Projects,
(International Finance Corporation, December 1998) at 36, available
athttp://www.ifc.org/ifcext/enviro.nsf/e11ffa331b366c54ca256921000698
2f/ESRP/$FILE/Env&SocReviewProc.pdf.
161 See, among others, Implementation of the Indigenous Peoples Rights
Act (IPRA) in the Philippines: Challenges and Opportunities.
Background paper prepared by Ms. Ruth Sidchogan-Batani Research
coordinator, Tebtebba (Indigenous Peoples’ International Centre for
Policy Research and Education). Expert Seminar on Treaties,
Agreements and other Constructive Arrangements between States and
Indigenous Peoples, Organized by the Office of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Human Rights Geneva, 15-17 December 2003. UN
Doc. HR/GENEVA/TSIP/SEM/2003/BP.4; and, Rovillos, Ramo and
Corpuz When the ‘Isles of Gold’ turn into Isles of Dissent: A Case Study
on the Philippine Mining Act of 1995, presented to the EIR’s Eminent
Person and participants at the meeting on Indigenous Peoples, Extractive
Industries and the World Bank Oxford, England, 15th April 2003, available at http://forestpeoples.gn.apc.org/Briefings/Private%20sector/
eir_internat_wshop_philippine_case_eng.pdf.
162 See, G. Triggs, The Rights of Indigenous Peoples to Participate in
Resource Development: An International Legal Perspective, HUMAN
RIGHTS IN NATURAL RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT. PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN
THE SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT OF MINING AND ENERGY RESOURCES.
(Zillman, Lucas and Pring eds. 2002); and, A. Goldzimer, Prior Informed
Consent of Project Affected Indigenous Peoples, 1 KENNEDY SCHOOL
REVIEW 2000. available at
http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/ksr/article_AG.htm.
163 Id. (“[i]n the Philippines, project sponsors are responsible for obtaining
prior informed consent from affected communities, which NCIP then certifies. The long history of deceit, manipulation, and abuse involved in agreements between indigenous peoples and interested parties—in the Philippines
and elsewhere—suggest that this approach is doomed to failure”).
164 Id.
165 Government’s Policy for Exploration and Development of Minerals
and Petroleum of Guyana. Georgetown: Government of Guyana (1997),
12 (“[t]here have been criticisms of the [Guyana Geology and Mines
Commission (GGMC)] entering into agreements for mineral prospecting
and other development over Amerindian lands without reference to the
Amerindians living there. Government has decided that recognized
Amerindian lands would stand exempted from any survey, prospecting or
mineral agreements unless the agreement of the Captain and Council for
the proposal is obtained by the GGMC in writing”).
166 Supra note 34, at 34.
167 Among others, Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Ecuador.
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.96, Doc. 10 rev. 1 1997, 92-5. According to the IACHR,
these rights are guaranteed by articles of the American Convention:
access to information, article 13 (right to freedom of thought and expression), article 23 (right to take part in the conduct of public affairs) and
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article 25 (right to judicial remedies) read in conjunction with article 8
(right to due process) and generic obligations under articles 1 and 2
(implementation without discrimination and effective remedies for violations of rights recognized in the Convention). See also, General
Comment No. 23 (50) (art. 27), adopted by the Human Rights Committee
at its 1314th meeting (fiftieth session), 6 April 1994. UN Doc.
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.5, para. 3; ILO 169, arts. 4(1), 7 and 15; and
Ogoni Case, at para. 67.
168 Among others, Pring and Noe, The Emerging International Law of
Public Participation Affecting Global Mining, Energy and Resources
Development, in, Zillman, Lucas and Pring (eds.), HUMAN RIGHTS IN
NATURAL RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT. PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN THE
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT OF MINING AND ENERGY RESOURCES. (Oxford
OUP 2002).
169 Report of the Second Meeting of the Ad Hoc, Open-Ended, InterSessional Working Group on Article 8(j) and Related Provisions of the
Convention on Biological Diversity. UNEP/CBD/WG8J/2/6/Add.1, 27
paras. 14-5 (2001).
170 Supra note 146, Rule IV, Pt. III, sec. 6.
171 Id. Rule IV, Pt. III, sec. 4.
172 Among others, Inter-Am. CH.R., Report Nº 96/03, Case No. 12.053
Maya Indigenous Communities and their Members (Belize), at para. 116
(2003).
173 NATIVE TITLE ACT (Cth) 1993, sec. 25-44. The right to negotiate
was substantially limited by the Native Title Amendment Act (Cth) 1998,
which exempted entire categories of lands from the right to negotiate
and, in some situations, authorised States and Territories to substitute
reduced procedural rights. See G Nettheim, The Search for Certainty and
the Native Title Amendment Act 1998 (Cth)”, 22 U. OF NEW SOUTH
WALES L. J. 564 (1999). For CERD’s finding that the 1998 amendments
contravened Australia’s obligations under the Convention, among others,
because of the “restrictions concerning the right of indigenous title holders to negotiate non-indigenous land uses,” see, CERD/C/54/Misc.
40/Rev 2 (1 1999) and, CERD/C/56/Misc.42/Rev 3 (2000).
174 EIR Report, at 41.
175 The WBG’s review of EIs, for instance, notes that EI dependent
countries were less likely to achieve all but one of the Millennium
Development Goals than other developing countries. Extractive
Industries and Sustainable Development. An Evaluation of World Bank
Group Experience. OED/OEG/OEU (World Bank, Washington DC,
2003), 86.
176 The World Bank, International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development, Articles of Agreement, art. IV, sec.10, available at
http://www.worldbank.org/html/extdr/backgrd/ibrd/arttoc.htm See also,
Development and Human Rights: The Role of the World Bank. World
Bank: Washington D.C.,(1998), the Bank’s submission to the 1993
Vienna World Conference on Human Rights, The World Bank and the
Promotion of Human Rights. UN Doc. A/CONF.157/PC/61/Add.19
(1993), I. Shihata, Human Rights, Development and International
Financial Institutions, 8 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 27, 28 (1992) and I.
Shihata, The World Bank and Human Rights: An Analysis of the Legal
Issues and the Record, 17 DENVER J INT’L LAW & POLICY 39 (1988).
177 Supra note 65.

happen. Wholly accountable governments may thereby be prevented from undertaking projects key to their national development.
179 Sakiko Fukuda-Parr, Prior consent of indigenous communities vital
if developing nation projects are to succeed, THE FINANCIAL TIMES (7
May 2004).
180 Id.
181 G.A. Res. 55/2, UN Millennium Declaration 2000. at para. 24. See
also, Id., at para. 8 (“[w]e rededicate ourselves to support all efforts to
uphold the sovereign equality of all States, respect for their territorial
integrity and political independence, resolution of disputes by peaceful
means and in conformity with the principles of justice and international
law, the right to self-determination of peoples which remain under colonial domination and foreign occupation, non-interference in the internal
affairs of States, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms,
respect for the equal rights of all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion and international cooperation in solving international
problems of an economic, social, cultural or humanitarian character”).
182 Among others, C.F. Amerasinghe, PRINCIPLES OF THE INSTITUTIONAL
Law OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS (1996); H.G. Schermers and
N.M. Blokker, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL LAW: UNITY WITHIN
DIVERSITY (3d rev. ed.) Martinus Nijhoff, THE HAGUE (1995); S. Skogly,
THE HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS OF THE WORLD BANK AND IMF (2001)
84-87, P. Sands & P. Klein (eds.), BOWETT’S LAW OF INTERNATIONAL
INSTITUTIONS (5th ed.)(London, Sweet & Maxwell 2001), 458-59; and,
M. Darrow, BETWEEN LIGHT AND SHADOW. THE WORLD BANK, THE
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
LAW (2003).
183 Id.
184 Among others, Human rights as the primary objective of international trade, investment and finance policy and practice, working paper submitted by J. Oloka-Onyango and Deepika Udagama, in accordance with
Sub-Commission resolution 1998/12. UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1999/11,
para. 37; Globalisation and its impact on the full enjoyment of human
right, preliminary report submitted by J. Oloka-Onyango and Deepika
Udagama, in accordance with Sub-Commission resolution 1999/8. UN
Doc. E/CN.4/sub.2/2000/13 and; The Highly Indebted Poor Countries
(HIPC) Initiative: a human rights assessment of the Poverty Reduction
Strategy Papers (PRSP). Report submitted by Mr. Fantu Cheru, independent expert on the effects of structural adjustment policies and foreign
debt on the full enjoyment of all human rights, particularly economic,
social and cultural rights, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2001/56.
185 Globalization and it full impact on human rights, final report submitted by J. Oloka-Onyango and Deepika Udagama, in accordance with
Sub-Commission decision 2000/105, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/14, at
para. 37.
186 Programme for the Further Implementation of Agenda 21, GA Res.
S-19/2, Annex (June 28, 1997).

178 Mark Moody-Stuart, A Warning for the World Bank, THE FINANCIAL
TIMES (3 May 2004). Moody-Stuart, Chairman of Anglo-American mining
company and a member of Dr. Salim’s EIR Advisory Panel, argues that:
Another potentially counter-productive proposal is that extractive projects should require the “free prior and informed consent” of local communities. Without doubt, the rights of local
and indigenous peoples need to be carefully protected. But
requiring that all elements of a community are able to show benefit raises the bar to a level that, if observed in developed countries, would mean no road or major development would ever
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FREE, PRIOR AND INFORMED CONSENT AND THE
WORLD BANK GROUP
by Robert Goodland*
FROM PARTICIPATION TO CONSENT
ommunity participation1 is part of the trust-building
process necessary for developers to earn a social license
to operate and is a standard component of corporate
social responsibility. The World Bank Group (“WBG”) now
requires meaningful participation. Effective participation
means agreement on precautions, mitigation, and compensation.
The distribution of benefits between the developer, local and
central government, and affected communities is also a central
element of participation. This process starts well before permitting and licensing, and leads to public acceptance and consent.
“Meaningful participation” if properly implemented, can
achieve free, prior informed consent. However, the term “meaningful participation” is open to various interpretations, depending on who is managing the participation.2 While the WBG
requires meaningful participation, the Bank has not completely
implemented actual consent as a prerequisite to all projects.

C

FREE PRIOR INFORMED CONSENT
Free, prior informed consent (“FPIC”), here abbreviated to
“consent”, is a process to improve development. While not perfect, FPIC is a vast improvement on using force in development
or imposing involuntary conditions on impacted people.
Consent provides potentially impacted communities with information about a proposed development and fosters their consent.
It begins with the provision of details on the nature of a proposed action, as well as the risks, benefits, and alternatives to the
proposed action. FPIC can be a process to protect consumers by
providing relevant information for them to make informed
choices, and it is a tool to provide developers with a “social
license” to operate. The FPIC process is the main means of
ensuring that potentially affected communities have all necessary information at their disposal in order to negotiate on equal
terms with project proponents. Balanced negotiation demands
education of stakeholders (governments, proponents, affected
communities) on their rights and responsibilities. Such negotiations between asymmetrical parties usually need advocates,
facilitators, and technical assistance.
FPIC requires affected communities to agree to a project
before it goes ahead. The seeds for this position have been gradually strengthening since the early 1980s, when there was the
first international acceptance of the idea that displacement of
people should not go ahead if the potentially affected communities found it unacceptable. The goal is that all displacement
should be so attractive that it would be entirely voluntary; “general acceptance” would be the norm. Oustees would become
project beneficiaries.
According to the concept of FPIC, any form of developSUMMER 2004

ment that depends on the use of force, involuntary action, and
increasing poverty has become unacceptable. The form of
development must change so that it is consensual and democratic. If there is significant broad-based opposition, a project is
likely to fail. Consequently, development projects, such as
reservoirs in densely populated farmland that depend on mass
involuntary displacement3, should be redesigned. Alternatively,
FPIC might be achieved by guaranteeing benefits to the impacted communities through insurance, performance bonds, or
escrowed trust funds.
In the mid-1990s, the WBG ruled that “meaningful consultation” must be interpreted as the possibility of saying no. With
the veto power comes the correlative power to negotiate on
equal terms with the project proponent. This does not mean a
single obdurate family can cancel a project; eminent domain
should remain available for such cases, but resorted to only
sparingly.
FPIC helps the poor more than the rich, who usually are not
pressured into accepting potentially harmful actions, partly
because the rich have more power. The poor tend to accept
riskier jobs and less safe labor conditions, and may provide consent more readily than the rich because of need. Therefore, even
though consent is a necessary condition for a development project to be permitted, it may not be sufficient.

HISTORY OF FPIC
THE WORLD BANK GROUP AND “MEANINGFUL
CONSULTATION”
Giving consideration to people affected by development is
a relatively new process. In the 1950s and 1960s, people potentially harmed by a project might be warned, but rarely helped.
“You can’t make an omelet without breaking eggs” was often
heard, even within the WBG. By the late 1980s, though, “meaningful consultation” became mandatory in WBG-assisted projects. Meaningful stakeholder participation became mandatory
in 1992. The WBG’s Legal Department interpreted the term
“meaningful” to mean that the communities being consulted had
a right to say “no” to the proposal. Consultation and participation ring hollow if the potentially affected communities can say
anything except “no”.

*Robert Goodland (Ph.D. in Tropical Ecology) served the World Bank Group
for twenty-five years, during which time he drafted and persuaded the Bank to
adopt most of its current environmental and social safeguard policies. He was
elected President of the International Association of Impact Assessment
Association, and Metropolitan Chair of the Ecological Society of America. He
has authored twenty-five books mainly on the environment and development,
and received the Millenial Conservation Award before retiring in 2001. Dr.
Goodland welcomes comments and questions at RbtGoodland@aol.com.
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CODIFICATIONS OF FREE PRIOR INFORMED CONSENT
One of the earliest formal codifications of FPIC was in the
Nuremberg Code of 1947 concerning the conditions under which
research and experimentation could be carried out on human
beings. Consent is still intensively discussed in the field of medical ethics. The International Bill of Rights, International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and
International Covenant on Political and Civil Rights all clearly
provide for self-determination and free pursuit of people’s own
development4. The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and
Development (“OECD”) and United Nations systems have
increasingly relied on consent. The UN Declaration on the Rights
of Indigenous Peoples and the Inter-American Declaration on the
Rights of Indigenous Peoples explicitly recognize FPIC. The UN
International Labor Organization’s (“ILO”) Convention 169 provides for free prior informed consent in cases of displacement.
The UN Food and Agricultural Organization’s (“FAO”) Code of
Conduct was amended in 1989 to make consent mandatory. The
1989 Basel Convention on hazardous wastes, the 2001 Stockholm
Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants (“POPs”), and the
2002 Convention on Biological Diversity all contain strict FPIC
requirements. The Rotterdam Convention on Free Prior Informed
Consent was adopted in 1998. Consent has long been a requirement for indigenous peoples who may potentially be impacted by
a development project.5

IMPLEMENTING FPIC IN THE
WORLD BANK GROUP
FPIC is still not always accepted as a requirement for
development projects:

(a) In 2000, the World Commission on Dams
(“WCD”) called for FPIC to be applied for
indigenous peoples involved in dam projects.6
WCD amplified adjudication procedures and
did not mention veto power. WCD’s recommendation was rejected by the WBG.

(b) A call for FPIC for non-indigenous peoples to
be included in the 2001 revision of the WBG’s
involuntary resettlement policy was similarly
rejected by the WBG.

(c) In February 2003, the WBG announced its
“high risk/high reward” policy of resuming
finance for big infrastructure projects and a new
water strategy paper emphasizing big dams,
after a decade-long suspension. Civil Society
responded with “Gambling with Peoples’
Lives: What the World Bank’s New ‘High
Risk/High Reward’ Strategy Means for the
Poor and the Environment”7, urging the WBG
to adopt FPIC.

(d) Nevertheless, FPIC is sought these days in
some WBG projects, though it is not yet clearly mandated by WBG policies.8
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CHARACTERISTICS OF FPIC
The main characteristics of FPIC are that it is: (1) freely
given; (2) fully informed; (3) obtained before permission is
granted to a proponent to proceed with the project; and (4) is
consensual.

“FREELY – GIVEN”
“Freely-given” means that potentially affected people must
freely offer their consent. Consent must be entirely voluntary.
In other words, they must not be coerced or tricked into consent.

“FULLY – INFORMED”
“Fully-informed” means the affected people know and
understand as much about their own rights and the implication
of the proposed project as do the proponents, so that both sides
can negotiate with equality of information. This requires two
categories of information.
First, the weaker and more vulnerable of the two sides must
understand their rights, specifically historic territorial rights: their
rights to lands on which they have been living for generations,
and their rights of access to the natural resources on which they
depend, such as fish in the nearby river. Indigenous peoples have
the right to self-determine the course and pace of their own development. As a result, facilitating the process of consent is usually
best done by neutral agents. This may preclude the WBG from
acting as the facilitator for a consensual process, as it usually has
a vested interest in the positions of governments and corporations
as much as in the rights of potentially affected peoples.9
The second category of information concerns the nature of
the project being contemplated by the proponent. Affected people
must understand the potential harm and risks that they might
accrue if they accepted the project. Worst-case scenarios and
potential disasters need to be understood. In the experience of
many indigenous peoples, rivers do not die. It may be beyond
their imagination for a river to die. However, an industry can easily kill a river. The possible death of a river, the sterilization of an
area of ocean, or the irreversible removal of a tract of forest is not
easy for many indigenous peoples to imagine. In the experience
of many indigenous groups, even the damage from a rare and devastating forest fire is not irreversible. Regeneration restores many
resource needs after as few as five or ten years. Showing a cartoon or video film of a similar project or accident elsewhere cannot be assumed to sufficiently bring affected people up to speed
for the “fully informed” comprehension criterion.
It is also not possible to obtain consent if the people
involved have never seen an example of the project proposed. It
does no good asking peoples’ views on a gold mine if they do
not know what a gold mine is. Similarly, even if the people have
seen a country road, it is not legitimate to ask them to imagine
a proposed highway. If a person is asked about the acceptability of a reservoir – “like the farm pond you know well, only thousands of times bigger” – imagination will not provide an adequate basis for a valid response.
In the case of Ontario, the government thought it impossible to reach fully-informed consent on their proposal to construct new nuclear power plants. The government therefore
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT LAW & POLICY

financed a learning experience that would enable potentially
affected people to understand the questions that would in the
future be asked of them. Such “intervener financing” is now
commonplace. Intervenor financing augments the affected community’s capacity to design studies, ask the right questions, and
assimilate the results – all before deciding on FPIC.
In the case of dams, for instance, people are bussed to the
nearest dam so they can understand what a reservoir is like and
spend some days talking in detail with the people previously
impacted by a relatively old project. Explaining what a project
will be like is not easy. While scale models, videos, maps, diagrams, and photographs may help, they are unlikely to suffice.
The affected people, or their representatives, need to visit similar projects and talk with people who have been through similar
impacts firsthand. “Fully-informed” is the means to equality of
negotiation. Many societies require building reciprocal relationships before negotiations can legitimately begin. Incomplete
information means the people’s lack of information is being
exploited by the proponent.

“PRIOR”
“Prior” means consent has to be obtained before permission
is granted to the proponent to proceed with the proposed project
that will affect the communities. This must occur well before a
financing agency considers the request to finance the project.
Consent is best achieved as part of the Environmental
Assessment / Social Assessment (“EA/SA”) process: the impacts
are predicted together and mitigation is also designed together.

“CONSENT”
“Consent” means harmonious, voluntary agreement with
the measures designed to make the proposed project acceptable
to the potentially affected communities. FPIC does not demand
absolute consensus; a significant majority suffices. A majority
of 51% suffices in democratic elections, which may be used as
a guide to the definition of a “significant majority”.
There are many mechanisms for achieving consent,
although they may be called by different terms. Plebiscites
(direct single issue votes) and referenda (votes on a proposal or
subsequent endorsement of an agreement reached by leaders or
a legislative body) are two mechanisms used on occasion. For
instance, should your nation join the European Union, or shall
we permit Wal-Mart to build in our community? Some municipalities might also mandate referenda on assuming debt before
issuing bonds for a new thruway. If there is substantial opposition to the proposed project, consent becomes less achievable.
Although there are no hard and fast rules about the fraction of
the community that must agree, the point is usually less important than it first appears. Most relevant societies discuss important issues together as a community, with leaders or representatives, and often for days on end, until the spirit of consensus is
reached. The New York Stock Exchange was created through
long negotiations by 24 brokers pow-wowing in the shade of a
Buttonwood Tree on Wall Street, Manhattan, on 17 May 1792;
hence the “Buttonwood Agreement”. In Botswana, such indabas or parleys commonly last for several days.
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CANADA’S FIRST NATIONS, FPIC, AND
EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES
When Canada wanted to extract hydrocarbons from
the Yukon and Mackenzie Valley territories of Canada’s
Indigenous People, or “First Nation”, the 1974-1977
Royal Commission headed by Supreme Court Judge
Thomas R. Berger agreed with the First Nations’ rejection
of the project because the likely impacts looked too severe,
the offered benefits too meager, and the promises aspirational. Since then, political evolution and forceful legislation have improved protection for the First Nations and
strengthened their bargaining power, in part by devolving
control from Ottawa to the First Nations. The First Nations
now have some ownership rights over both surface and
sub-surface resources. In 2001, most of the potentially
impacted First Nations negotiated a financial stake in the
pipeline: oil corporations and First Nation now have
become partners, and it looks as if the First Nation will
provide consent. Pipeline planning began in earnest in
2003. Apparently, the 30-year delay has been justified.

The bottom line of FPIC is that the affected communities
must understand that they will benefit from the proposed project, and that these specific benefits will far exceed any worstcase scenario of unforeseen impacts. Affected communities
must become convinced that prudent mechanisms are in place to
guarantee their benefits, compensation will be just, and rehabilitation will ensure the communities are clearly better off with
the project. In addition, affected people must understand that
they will be fully involved in legally enforceable monitoring to
ensure compliance with whatever they are consenting.

WHO APPROPRIATELY REPRESENTS
A COMMUNITY?
Many societies are not homogeneous entities with shared
values and norms. Communities tend to differentiate and fragment. Many societies function with chosen leaders, but may
also include competing individuals and factions. The chosen
representatives may have different abilities to assert the views of
the community. In such situations, it is essential that truly legitimate representatives be sought and involved in FPIC, rather
than the usual easier-to-identify village elites. Most representatives discuss the current issue being negotiated in detail with the
larger group in order to seek ratification (or rejection) of a status.
Because it has been common practice for proponents to
latch onto a certain representative and deal only with them from
the outset, great care must be exercised that the representatives
retain broad legitimacy throughout the process. The FPIC
process can be manipulated. Proponent selection or acceptance
of a representative tends to increase fragmentation.
From the representatives’ side, their task is not easy, even
assuming they have the best interests of their own society as
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their topmost priority. Negotiations may change over the years,
so it will not be easy for the representative to know whether to
insist that 20% of the royalties devolve to the affected communities, or whether to hold out for 50%, or more.

FPIC FOR ALL COMMUNITIES, NOT JUST
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES
FPIC was accepted earlier for indigenous peoples
than for non-indigenous communities. The rationale for
this is the belief that indigenous peoples’ livelihood and
culture are more dependent on their relationship to customary lands. Hence, indigenous peoples are more likely
to suffer from displacement than non-indigenous communities. It is true that indigenous peoples are indeed more
dependent on customary resources than many other communities. There is a continuum of dependence on customary resources, with indigenous peoples clustered at
one end, peasants and the rural poor in between, and the
urban poor less connected. Proneness to suffering (or
worse) if displaced or severely impacted is certainly one
criterion for consent. But the other criterion is inclusion,
freedom to choose one’s fate, meaningful participation in
decisions affecting one’s community; in short, democracy. Why is it that the rural poor can be displaced against
their will, but other peoples cannot? Can development
have a double standard and advocate democracy for some,
but autocracy for the rest? FPIC should be applied to all
communities, certainly for indigenous peoples, but also
the poor in general.

NEGOTIATION FOR FPIC
Consent revolves around negotiation, which can work only
when the two negotiating parties have the same information and
are not overly unbalanced in power. It can be very difficult for the
weaker partner to negotiate, partly because the playing field shifts
every year, the price of the product sought by the proponent may
fluctuate, and the rules and laws governing development and
human rights change through the years. Some nations use referenda in such cases, especially when a municipality would take on
the future debt. If a municipality wants to widen a road or build
a new school, it needs consent before issuing bonds.
Eminent domain cannot be applied widely to villages or
communities. Where consent has been obtained properly from
all potentially impacted communities, one or two holdouts
against the consent of the community could possibly be circumvented through eminent domain, but even then, compensation
combined with development benefits for the affected families
would have to be fair and just.
Potentially affected people organize themselves to comprehend their rights and the potential risks of the proposal, and have
to be able to negotiate an “Impacts and Benefits Agreement”. In
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other words, the affected communities must be able to balance
potential risks or costs on the one hand, with what is being
offered by the proponent or sought by the community on the
other hand. Labor unions often have a role in empowering the
poor to improve the benefit/impact ratio.
There is little “best practice” precedent on which to base
negotiations. Some local impacted communities receive no royalties. A community might receive 20% of royalties, but this
might then be deducted from what the central government previously allocated to that community, making the net benefit fall
back to zero. Some impacted communities seek 100% of royalties for resources extracted from their lands. In the ChadCameroon oil pipeline case, 5% of royalties were allocated to
the oil-producing region. If the detailed, written terms of the
negotiation process are widely acceptable to the potentially
affected people, consent has been achieved. FPIC is earned
when there is demonstrable public acceptance of the transparently negotiated agreement.

IFC’S ALLAIN & DUHANGAN
HYDROPROJECT
Himachal Pradesh, India
The International Financial Corporation (“IFC”), a
part of the WBG, and the Hydroproject’s proponent were
accused on 13 Nov 2003 of “unduly pressurizing” the
affected communities, which had rejected the
Environmental
Resources
and
Management
Corporation’s environmental and social assessment of this
$192 million, 192 MW project as totally unacceptable.
The affected people claimed they were not at all
informed, much less consulted. The IFC refused to translate the EA/SA into Hindi in February 2004. The
Hydroproject’s standard requirement of a “No-Objection
Certificate” would not suffice for FPIC.10 The affected
communities insist on an independent panel and public
hearings (after they have read a Hindi EA/SA report).
The results of the hearings are to be public documents and
should go to IFC’s board along with other documentation
before their decision.11

HOW MANY FPICS SUFFICE?
Is FPIC perpetual or can FPIC be revoked when necessary?
It may not be clear whether FPIC is a once-off landmark, never
to be rescinded, or if it has to be renewed annually, with every
significant change in the project status, or with changes in the
affected society.
For instance, Peru’s Yanacocha gold mine, the second
largest in the world, was financed by IFC in 1993 with little or
no consultation and refusal to recognize that many of the affected people are indigenous. The first La Quinoa expansion in 2000
led to civil unrest and police brutality as the affected people had
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started to suffer from polluted water, mercury toxicity and
cyanide-related acidity. IFC claimed that FPIC was not needed
for the second expansion on Mount Quilish. The Newmont
Mining Corporation claimed to have already reached FPIC, but
nearly all of the surrounding communities are protesting the second stage of expansion. The Mayor of nearby Cajamarca
opposes the Quilish stage, and one poll showed more than 60%
of people also oppose it. By the time the expansion was being
planned, the people had been so severely impacted by the first
few years of operation that they passed an ordinance in 2002
legally protecting the sacred mountain, a major source of water.
Newmont Mining is appealing the ordinance. In such a case, a
second FPIC should be sought.
IFC also claimed to have achieved FPIC in the case of Laos’s
Sepon gold and copper mine discovered by Rio Tinto Zinc, Inc.
(“RTZ”) in 1995, but no Laotian had ever seen a gold mine, so it
is unclear how well-informed the affected people actually were.
In 2001, Oxfam International sent a governmental environmental
official to the Philippines to see a similar gold operation.

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FPIC IN
THE WORLD BANK GROUP
1. Economic development should not rely on
force. Coercion means people are being
excluded and are forced to subsidize the
developer.
2. The WBG should mandate FPIC for all operations (e.g., displacement) involving indigenous and non-indigenous peoples, and all
projects impacting communities.
3. The WBG should strengthen its policies on
consultation, participation, disclosure and
transparency so that FPIC is the main criterion to be used as a social license to operate,
hence as the WBG’s main tool in deciding
whether to support the operation once FPIC
has been legitimately obtained.
4. As genuine consensus is difficult and time
consuming to obtain, it is best sought by reputable objective and independent agents,
rather than either by the proponent, the government, or the WBG.
5. The WBG should clarify the conditions under
which eminent domain is permissible.

THE WBG, FPIC, AND HUMAN RIGHTS
FPIC is a more participatory approach to resource allocation, because it helps to democratize natural resource-led development.12 On the continuum between the poles of democracy
and autocracy, consent lies at the democratic pole, while involSUMMER 2004

untary displacement is at the autocratic pole. As an economic
organization, the WBG should remember that economics works
only under voluntary circumstances, and does not work under
coercive circumstances.

THE WORLD BANK GROUP’S POLICY ON
HUMAN RIGHTS
Adopting relevant and widely agreed labor principles (e.g.,
those of the ILO) seems preferable to the WBG’s current caseby-case ad hoc approach. A first step would be to adopt ILO’s
“Core Labor Standards”. The WBG’s decade of tergiversation
on whether to adopt the core labor standards against slavery and
extreme forms of child labor13 is not reassuring. If a client
country denies its citizenry the rights of association and collective bargaining, the WBG must question if it needs to be more
persuasive and proactive and more of a leader, rather than just
accepting such denials.
The WBG’s Chief Economist has written that the principle
of equality underlies poverty reduction: human rights principles
involve equality, or equal value of individuals in society, or
equality of opportunity.14 It is difficult for the WBG to admit
that poverty reduction via the trickle-down theory has been too
indirect, slow, and inefficient. However, in 2000, the WBG
committed to the Millennium Development Goals, which
includes direct poverty reduction.
Critics often claim that the WBG’s posture on human
rights lags behind that of the rest of the UN family, and also
behind industry leaders. According to the World Bank’s 2002
Development and Human Rights, more than 190 countries have
ratified the six main human rights conventions; the WBG has
not15. In the past, the WBG has emphasized that its articles prohibit use of non-economic criteria in lending; hence human
rights, it is claimed, should not be used in lending decisions.

THE WBG’S CAUTIOUS PROGRESSION INTO
HUMAN RIGHTS
The WBG is progressing to cautious engagement in a few
specific areas of human rights. As long ago as 1982, the WBG
adopted its official policy on indigenous peoples16, which is
essentially a human rights rather than an economic policy. The
World Bank’s (“WB”) General Counsel, Ibrahim Shihata, started publishing statements dealing with human rights issues in
1988. In 1993, he wrote that “balanced development can only
be achieved if the basic human rights are secured for persons
affected by development”17 (henceforth referred to as
“Shihata’s Threshold”).
The WBG still distinguishes between economic well-being,
which is the focus of its efforts, and political rights, which are
said to fall outside the WBG’s legitimate scope. On the other
hand is the view enunciated by noted economist Amartya Sen in
a speech to the WBG in 2002: “Political rights . . . are not only
pivotal in inducing social responses to economic needs, they are
also central to the conceptualization of economic needs themselves.”18 Economics has a creditable history of attending to
social justice, equality, and human rights dating back to John
Stuart Mill and John Rawls.
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The WBG’s first paper on human rights (1998) generally
accepted property rights and participation rights, but failed to
state that the WBG had an obligation to respect human rights.
However, it did state that the WBG believes that creating the conditions for the attainment of human rights is the central and irreducible goal of development. Since then, the WBG has increasingly alluded to human rights, and in three specific instances,
egregious violations have been commendably acted upon19.

ADOPTION OF ILO CORE PRINCIPLES
The WBG’s policies prohibit it from supporting actions that
violate conventions ratified by a member country. Although ratification of conventions is open only to sovereign nations, the
WBG can support client countries in their application of conventions they have ratified. Since 1988, ILO has made enforcement of its eight core conventions a condition of ILO membership. They are applicable whether or not the country has ratified
them. The WB is aware of ILO’s conventions, but it has made
a determination (more than once) that it would not adopt or
apply any of them. Nevertheless, IFC started applying two of
ILO’s core principles against slavery and extreme forms of child
labor in 1997 to all IFC and Multilateral Investment Guarantee
Agency (‘MIGA”) investments.20
At the 2000 IMF/WBG Annual Meetings in Prague, WBG
President Wolfensohn promised to grapple with human rights
issues. In May 2002, he asked staff to draft a Human Rights
Strategy21 without overstepping the WBG’s mandate or compromising “our advantage of political neutrality”. While he stated that the WB supports the promotion of all four core labor
standards, the institution does not apply conditionality on these
standards in its lending. Promotion of the standards is better
than none, but some critics have argued that refusing to uphold
the standards as conditions for loans undermines their implementation. In fact, the WBG sometimes recommends violation
of these standards22.
The World Bank’s 1995 World Development Report on
labor is generally positive about trade unions, but emphasizes
that “low cost labor is the main comparative advantage of poor
countries.” The International Development Association’s
(“IDA”) Replenishments 12 (in 1999) and 13 (in 2002) pushed
the reluctant WBG by mandating an assessment of core labor
standards in some Country Assistance Strategies, which has
started in a few select IDA countries. However, WBG’s rhetoric on corporate social responsibility, including ILO’s core labor
standards and corporate codes of conduct, is largely still aspirational. While ILO’s core standards are slowly being considered,
in practice they are commonly overridden to enhance labor market flexibility, reduce labor costs, or to act in an industry friendly manner.
Reconsidering whether to do business in countries with
gross human rights violations is not yet systematic in the WBG.
However, the WBG’s reinvigorated priority of reducing poverty
directly involves the advancement of human rights. A key question is the extent to which the WBG continues supporting governments systematically abusing human rights and with little
commitment to reducing poverty.
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THE STRUGGLE OVER AUSTRALIA’S
JABILUKA URANIUM
Uranium was discovered in 1971 on Aboriginal
lands. The miners – Energy Resources of Australia and
RTZ – claim there would be acceptable impacts on the
indigenous peoples, Kakadu National Park/UN World
Heritage Site, and posted a $30 million performance
bond. The Mirrar, another indigenous group, much of
Australian civil society, several senate investigations, and
a special UN mission disagreed. Demonstrations, civil
disobedience, blockades and mass arrests over a period of
thirty years helped to stop mining by about 2000. The
miners started to transport mined radioactive ore to its origin deep underground in 2003. The affected people are
expected to regain their veto power in 2004.23

CURRENT STATUS AT THE WORLD BANK
“SHIHATA’S THRESHOLD” – DETERMINING WHERE TO
DRAW THE LINE
The Bank’s Human Rights Strategy promised by President
Wolfensohn four years ago is not yet available. The situation
currently seems to be that if and when the WBG judges that
human rights violations have started to affect economic development, WBG staff will then be permitted to address such
issues. The WBG has been criticized for financially supporting
Suharto’s Indonesia, Mobutu’s Zaire, Marcos’ Philippines, and
the Democratic Republic of the Congo. That there was a struggle for the WBG to cease lending to apartheid South Africa24
suggests that finding the threshold at which human rights start to
influence economic development is not easy for the WBG to
specify, although pellucid for civil society. On the other hand,
the WBG refrained from investing in Burma/Myanmar, because
allegations of slavery had became inescapable. Had slavery
started to affect economic development, thus crossing
“Shihata’s threshold”? At least in some places, slavery appears
to have been abolished because of the belief that it is morally
wrong. In fact, gross social injustice often becomes morally
unacceptable long before it crosses Shihata’s threshold of influencing economic development.
Ascertaining Shihata’s threshold criterion at which human
rights abuses begin to influence economics has become more
difficult as economic wisdom has changed. For example, the
main reason adduced by the WBG for not supporting trade
unions and collective bargaining over the last 20 years was that
they are not economic. That abruptly changed in 2003. The
WBG’s new survey of more than one thousand studies on the
effects of unions and collective bargaining shows that they reap
significant economic benefits.25

STEPS TAKEN
It is difficult to ascertain what the WBG is doing about
human rights; they are scarcely alluded to in the official web-site,
and there does not seem to be an identified focal point or unit.
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• The WBG now considers that labor unions, collective bargaining and other civil liberties are “economic”, according to WBG’s own research.26

• The International Court of Justice has ruled that the
WBG’s articles need to be interpreted in the context
of contemporary law, in which human rights are of
international concern, rather than political matters
exclusively the purview of domestic governments.

• WBG President Wolfensohn stated in 1999 that no
equitable development is possible without protection of human rights.

• A draft Human Rights Policy approach paper was
discussed by WBG Executive Directors in May
2003, but was rejected. Industrial country representatives were positive, but developing country representatives feared human rights could be misused as
a form of protectionism.

• IFC’s Peter Woicke raised the need for a Safeguard
Policy on Human Rights at least twice during the
2002-2004 independent Extractive Industry
Reviews.27 In addition, he published his desire for
an official new human rights safeguard policy in the
Financial Times, and again on Human Rights Day
(10 December 2003).

• Almost all WBG member countries have ratified
human rights standards in international conventions.

• The WBG’s policies prohibit it from supporting violations of member countries’ commitments to
uphold international treaties, including human rights
obligations.

• Shihata himself ruled that obligations under the UN
Charter (Article 103) prevail over the WBG’s
Articles of Agreement.

• The World Bank’s January 2004 draft “Management
Response”28 to the independent Extractive Industry
Review did not accept its recommendations on FPIC
and human rights, nor even the two ILO Core Labor
Standards adopted by IFC in 1997. President
Wolfensohn distanced himself from the WBG
January 2004 Management Response to the report,
and ordered a more positive re-think. He then postponed the rethink until after the April 2004 Annual
Meetings, then until the summer.

October 2003, is said to be more positive on human
rights than his predecessors.

THE LEGITIMACY OF FREE PRIOR AND
INFORMED CONSENT
If fully-informed, potentially-affected communities reject a
proposed project, but the project proceeds over their objections,
democracy and freedoms will have been undermined. The use
of eviction and forced displacement without consent implies
autocracy, not democracy. This cannot be construed as a social
license to operate. FPIC balances the national interest with
community rights. Clearly, it would not be in the national interest if an extraordinarily lucrative mine, for example, was held
hostage by one absentee family with a house on the lode. In
such a case, eminent domain could rightly be used. But if the
capital city sits on a big lode, the developers would not dream
of annexing the city. Where potentially affected people are rich,
have a voice, and are numerous, projects do not go ahead.
Developers want to go ahead only when the impacted people are
poor, indigenous, or few in numbers. In the continuum between
one family and a major city, when should eminent domain be
used, and when should consent be required? The WBG’s paramount goal of poverty reduction cannot be achieved by forcing
risky projects on the poor. FPIC protects the poor so they do not
suffer as much from impacts by the development.
Free prior informed consent has been accepted by a dozen
UN institutions and many others in cases involving indigenous
peoples.29 FPIC does not preclude the infrequent use of eminent domain in individual cases. The World Bank Group mandates “meaningful consultation,” which it has interpreted to
include the right to say “no” to a proposal. Therefore, under its
own rules, the WBG should follow FPIC, but is loath to clarify
this inconsistency.30
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ENDNOTES:
Free, Prior and Informed Consent and the World Bank Group
1 Most economic development projects depend on shifting humans.

10 Bosshard, supra note 7.

Displacement is traumatic, sometimes gravely so. Urban resettlement
often works because even though the oustees are removed from their
dwellings, their jobs, society and relationships remain intact. Urban oustees usually receive another house in a nearby street. Rural displacement
usually fails, thus intensifying poverty, according to all internal World
Bank examinations. This is probably the worst feature of economic
development today; it is also the only case where economic development
relies on coercion, and does not try to seek consensus. This means the
poor subsidize the proponent who externalizes resettlement costs. There
has been improvement in the means by which rural people are moved.
Forty years ago, a village may have been warned to move out of the way
in a few days. Later, the villagers were informed they would have to
move in a few months. A decade or so later, they may have been consulted to see if they would prefer to move to site A or site B. Consultation
then progressed to the affected people being asked how and to where
they would be moved. A decade later, participation supplanted consultation. Potentially affected people started to participate in resettlement
planning. The next improvement was ‘meaningful participation’, interpreted by Ibrahim Shihata, WBG General Counsel, to mean the village
could reject being evicted.
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RIVERS REVIEW, Feb. 2004, available at
http://www.irn.org/pubs/wrr/issues/WRR_V19_N1final.pdf (last visited
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12 K. Slack, Sharing the Riches of the Earth: Democratizing Natural
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4 See also J. Athialy, Free Prior Informed Consent of Communities in
Large Hydroprojects : The Case of the James Bay Projects (2003) (Clark
University).
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14 Id.
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political rights, when extensive and pervasive, “could impose itself as an
issue in the Bank’s decisions.” The Bank’s country creditworthiness risk
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24 Apartheid began in the early 1960s. In 1973, the UN concluded that
Apartheid was a ‘crime against humanity.’ In 1986, the USA passed the
Anti-Apartheid Act. Apartheid ended in the early 1990s, and the WBG
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